Building Europe With New Citizens?
An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries

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SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

Building Europe With New Citizens?
An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised
Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries

POLITIS

State of the art
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Preface

Within the 6th Framework Programme (2002-2006), research in Social Sciences and Humanities is addressed under Priority 7 “Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society”. The main objectives of this thematic area are to mobilise European research in economic, political, social sciences and humanities in order to develop an understanding of the issues related to the emergence of a knowledge-based society, as well as to address, on the one hand, new forms of relationships between its citizens and on the other between its citizens and institutions.

In order to attain these objectives, researchers were invited to address issues related to the following 7 research areas, grouped into two major themes:

Knowledge based society and social cohesion
1. Improving generation, distribution and use of knowledge
2. Options and choices for the development of a knowledge-based society
3. Variety of paths towards a knowledge society

Citizenship, democracy and new forms of governance
4. Implications of European integration and enlargement
5. New forms of governance
6. Resolution of conflicts and restoration of peace
7. New forms of citizenship and cultural identities

and one additional research area of a horizontal nature:

8. Actions to promote the European Research Area in Social Sciences and Humanities and their contribution to the knowledge based society in Europe.

The implementation of this Priority was undertaken through the launching of calls for proposals in 2003 and 2004 and as a result 140 projects were selected for funding.

Some of these projects started in 2004 and are now delivering their first results. They are usually presented in the format of a report which reflects the state of the art of the specific topic in question.

This publication contains the state of the art report of the STREP project “POLITIS – Building Europe with New Citizens? An inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries” which addresses in particular research area 7 – New forms of citizenship and cultural identities.

The research is carried out by 4 teams over a period of 3 years, starting in January 2004 and its main objectives are to improve understanding of the different factors that promote or inhibit active civic participation of immigrants.

This report documents the first steps of the research already undertaken, covering the 25 EU member states. It summarizes the main features of migration, the conditions for civic participation as well as some key research results and gaps.

I hope this report will make a contribution to further consolidating and structuring the state of the art in this particular field of research.

T. Lennon
Director
POLITIS – a European research project

Project information
POLITIS is the abbreviated title for the research project “Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries”. The project seeks to improve our understanding of different factors that promote or inhibit the active civic participation of immigrants. Funded by the European Commission, the project is unique in its construction and has included workshops with foreign-born students recruited as discussants and interviewers and the preparation of country reports on the contextual conditions and the state of research concerning civic participation of immigrants by country experts in all 25 EU countries. These reports can be downloaded from www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe

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Foreword

This volume is the first joint product of the Special Targeted Research Project “POLITIS – Building Europe with New Citizens? An inquiry into the civic participation of foreign residents and naturalized citizens in 25 states”. This project is funded through the 6th research framework of the European Commission and aims to improve the foundations of the field of ‘Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society’.

This volume documents the first steps in our research on this topic, combining the joint efforts of many people. Dita Vogel and Anna Triandafyllidou have initiated this project and have summarised their conceptual approach to the topic. The main features of migration, the conditions for civic participation as well as key research results and gaps have been summarised for all 25 EU states, relying on the work of 35 experts in different states of the European Union. Principal researchers for the project include Nobert Cyrus, Ruby Gropas and Ankica Kosic. Together with the editor, they have comparatively analysed the country reports and have highlighted key differences and commonalities.

This report would not have been possible without the encouragement from our project officer Aris Apollonatos in the European Commission who supported our work with stimulating enthusiasm and helpful support until very recently. Our new project officer Alessia Bursi has willingly taken on our project and has supported preparations for publication.

This report is in English, although most of the contributors are not native speakers. English has been used as a means of scientific communication as a project involving all 25 EU states would simply be too slow and too costly if it relied on translations. The volume has been carefully language edited by Leonora MacEwen who corrected our most blatant mistakes and attracted our attention to potential misunderstandings. As part of the group of 74 international student partners, she will also take part in the larger study focussing on personal civic participation histories of immigrants from various backgrounds in different states.

Another group of persons that indirectly contributed to this report are those who have been responsible for administration, finance and accounting. Given our unique project construction that involves a fairly high number of persons, administrative staff have a major task to deal with. I would like to thank all those individuals who have contributed to these aspects of this project.

A European Migrant lobby organisation has been consulted in all stages of the research: Doris Peschke and Torsten Moritz from the Churches’ Commission of Migrants in Europe have provided useful information and have been helpful partners in our research. Many country experts spoke to active immigrants and used their expertise for their reports. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all of the individuals who have contributed to this part of the project.

Dita Vogel, project coordinator
Oldenburg, December 2005
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Chapter 1

Civic activation of immigrants
An introduction to conceptual and theoretical issues

Dita Vogel and Anna Triandafyllidou

Abstract
Civic participation is of major importance for the democratic development of Europe. As European societies are highly affected by immigration, it is interesting to examine why immigrants are usually less active than natives. We explain our concentration on first generation immigrants and at the same time raise awareness of the different meanings and research implications of terms such as ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’ and ‘foreigner’ both in statistics and in the public discourse of European societies. Active civic participation is defined as continuously investing time and energy to organise solidarity or give a voice to societal concerns in the receiving society. Although this definition is relatively broad and comprises both political and civil society activities, it does not include low-key types of participation such as voting or visiting events. Building predominantly on American literature on individual determinants of civic participation and using European literature to examine the influence of the societal opportunity structure on the participation of immigrants, we conceptualise our own model for researching the topic. We identify the activation process as the main research gap.
1. Introduction: Why participation of immigrants is of major importance for contemporary European societies

Not only have the traditional forms of civic participation through trade union activism, party membership or church and cultural association attendance declined in today’s society, but participation in the New Social Movements of the 1980s (environmental movement, feminism, peace movement) has also diminished. Sennet (1998) argues that it is the very nature of work organisation in contemporary capitalist societies that may lead to declining levels of social participation and active citizenship. Indeed, the USA has experienced a collapse of civic activities in the past twenty years (Putnam 2000). This trend is also present in Europe and has been deplored for the sake of democracies: abilities and dispositions like attentiveness and trust that are learned and confirmed in associations can contribute substantially to a democratic political culture (Offe and Fuchs 2001).

Within this general trend towards civic apathy and societal fragmentation, migration poses an additional challenge (Ireland 1994), bringing in further cultural and religious diversity. Citizens experience feelings of apprehension and often perceive immigrants as a major threat to the already dubious cohesion of their society. The newcomers and their alien customs, traditions and beliefs are blamed for the collapse of community feelings and practices.

International migration will most likely continue at a high pace throughout the 21st century, as European populations are aging and shrinking while economies and labour markets are becoming increasingly interconnected. Thus, the issue of civic activism both among natives and among immigrants is an important challenge for European society/ies today and tomorrow. Even today, immigrants make up large percentages of the generation of young adults in many European countries. The activation of this generation is crucial to Europe’s future civic life. If they are active today, they are more likely to stay active in the future and as parents, they are potential role models for their children.

In view of the overall decline in civic participation and the anticipated rise in international migration, a better understanding of the civic participation potential of immigrants is an important issue for Europe. Contrary to usual perceptions, we hypothesize that immigrants have an important potential for the revival of civic participation. Low levels of organisational involvement of immigrants in ethnic or mainstream associations are not necessarily contradictory to this hypothesis, as the potential may not translate into actual activities if political and social conditions are not favourable. If this potential does indeed translate into activities, the latter may be confined to the immigrant group and its ethnic networks rather than the broader society of the receiving country (Putnam 2000:22). Our emphasis is on the ‘catalysts’; those factors that transform a potentially engaged individual into a civic activist in a migration situation. Such catalysts, as we shall explain in the sections that follow, may vary among countries as well as among different immigrant communities. One can also identify catalysts that apply to different countries and settings.

European societies differ in migration history and policies, their overall level of civic activism and, more specifically, in regards to the political and social conditions that enable or impede migrants from participating in public life. Chapter 2 of this book will give an overview of the most important conditions in all 25 member states, while chapter 3 will discuss similarities and differences between the countries.
In this paper, we will give an overview of conceptual and theoretical issues, starting with the notion of the ‘immigrant’ (section 2) and the concept of ‘active civic participation’ (section 3). We will specify our own theoretical approach concerning the activation process, while reviewing scholarly literature on the factors influencing civic participation in general and the participation of immigrants in particular (section 4).

2. Who is an immigrant?

In the following sections, we shall briefly discuss how migrants are defined in various contexts such as official statistics, political discussions and scholarly literature. As we are taking a European perspective, we have to be aware of the fact that the notion of ‘immigrant’ differs considerably from country to country and reflects different political and historical conditions. We explain our emphasis on a particular definition of immigrants in our effort to understand civic activation in migration situations.

2.1. Foreign born and natives

The differentiation between ‘foreign born’ and ‘natives’ is the most widely used differentiation with regard to immigration. It defines immigrants as persons who have changed residence across borders. Personal migration experience is the decisive criterion.

In many sociological studies, foreign born individuals are called ‘first generation immigrants’, while there offspring – born in the receiving country or having immigrated with their parents at an early age – are called ‘second generation immigrants’. Instead of foreign born and natives, the terms allochthones and autochthones are used by the Dutch state to more precisely define the ethnic/national origin of citizens or residents. This pair of concepts is a refinement of the country-of-birth criterion. It differentiates between allochthones - foreign born individuals and their immediate offspring, taking the country of birth of the parents into account, and autochthones – native born with two native-born parents. This criterion has been used in the Netherlands since the 1980s for official statistical purposes, allowing social scientists and migration experts to have a more inclusive approach to the Dutch population of immigrant origin by including the second generation (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek 2002).

Because we are interested in the civic participation under the influence of migration experiences, we are exclusively interested in first generation immigrants, specifically in those persons who immigrated as adults or youth and possess a personal migration experience in the sense that the cultural and social frame of reference changed due to geographical relocation. Therefore the ‘foreign born’ criterion is a necessary although insufficient criterion to define the group whose activities we would like to better understand.

Although ‘foreign born’ seems to be an easy and straightforward concept, there are still some complications in the contemporary European situation. While more often than not people move over borders, in some areas of Europe borders have moved over people repeatedly during the last century. This has been the case in the aftermath of World War II and also during the state formation phase after 1989 in Central Eastern Europe. Two examples are worth citing here to illustrate this complexity. After World War II, Germany received some 12 million co-ethnic refugees of German origin, most of whom had been expelled from regions that formerly belonged to Germany and became part of the independent Central and Eastern European countries. These people were born inside
Germany’s former borders but outside its current borders. Germany still does not use the country-of-birth criterion in official statistics until today, making this mass influx statistically invisible. This is also true for contemporary ethnic German immigration coming from states that never had any affiliation with Germany.

From 1940 to 1991, the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union. During this time, many Russians and/or people from other Republics of the Soviet Union (mainly Ukraine and Belorussia) settled there (by their own will or by force) as part of the dominant occupying majority. They were thus born inside the borders of the former state (Soviet Union), but outside the borders of the current state (Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania). A differentiation by reason of admission (labour, family, refuge) does not make sense for these population movements as there was no ‘admission’ at that time. However, after Latvia and Estonia won independence in 1991, those persons (predominantly Russophones) who had arrived during Soviet rule and chosen to remain in these countries were assigned the peculiar status of foreign or stateless permanent residents of Latvia or Estonia. Although they did not experience a complete change of reference as did international migrants from other countries at that time, their current situation is comparable to that of current international migrants.

2.2. Aliens and citizens under the influence of naturalisation policies

People acquire citizenship according to their country of birth (jus soli) or as a result of their genealogical origin (jus sanguinis). Models of ethnic citizenship give preference to ancestry and hence to the nationality of parents and grandparents. Models of civic citizenship favour the place of birth criterion, conferring citizenship to children born in their territory regardless of the nationality of their parents. In general, most citizenship regimes involve a combination of the two elements. Thus, in some cases the jus soli principle is applied only if the parents of the child have lived for a certain period of time in the country or if the child her/himself continues to live in that country. In other cases, a pure jus sanguinis regime is mitigated by a territorial element: children of foreign parents or foreigners born in a different country who are long term legal residents are allowed to naturalise if they wish.

These different norms and practices are reflected in migration statistics (Grieco 2002). Some countries like France provide data that make a distinction between foreign-born foreigners, foreign-born citizens and native-born citizens. Others like Germany only reflect the principle distinction between citizens and aliens.

Generally speaking, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens (foreigners, whether temporary or long-term legal residents) is the main dividing line in official statistics and public discourse in most countries. Data on population by citizenship status is often used to frame migration related issues.

Let us, however, explore some concrete empirical examples. Most immigrants are foreign nationals at the time of migration. Exceptions are people of the same ethnic background who are granted citizenship upon arrival in the destination country, through preferential channels. This is the case, for instance, of the ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Muenz and Ulrich 1998), or of the Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Russia ‘returning’ to Greece (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002). Similar, albeit not identical, is the case of residents from former colonies in a transition period, such as the Surinamese in the Netherlands, the Commonwealth citizens in the
U.K. or the Algerians in France. Such cases are usually linked to unique historical circumstances. Other exceptions are made for the children or even grandchildren of former emigrants who may have inherited or re-acquired the citizenship of the country. The case of Argentine citizens of Italian ancestry who are able to recover Italian citizenship if they prove that at least one of their grandparents had been an Italian citizen is a good example here (Pastore 2001). A similar case is that of the ‘retornados’ in Portugal; former emigrants from Portugal who settled in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, returning to Portugal after these countries gained independence in the second half of the twentieth century.

More often than not, immigrants have the right to naturalise after a given period of time: usually between five and ten years of residence in the country where they wish to naturalise. Immigrants can naturalise under specific conditions; in some countries these conditions refer mainly to the socio-economic realm, e.g. having a job and stable residence and not having been convicted of certain crimes, whereas in other countries there may be cultural requisites such as language competence, familiarity with the customs and traditions of the country of settlement and/or a feeling of belonging to that country. Applicants may or may not keep the citizenship of their country of origin. The conditions and procedures involved in the naturalisation process influence the naturalisation rate and thus the percentage of immigrants that are citizens. Naturalisation policies and practices further blur the sociological distinction between immigrants and foreigners. While first generation immigrants may naturalise (thus not all immigrants are foreigners), sometimes non-citizens may not have experienced migration themselves as they may have been born in the country of settlement of their parents and are still not entitled to the citizenship of their country of birth. The obvious example of one such case has been the German citizenship and migration policy until the year 2000. Today, more than one million of Germany’s seven million foreign residents are native born, the offspring of immigrant parents or grandparents (second or third generation migrants), and have not yet been naturalised. In such situations, the popular distinction between foreign nationals and citizens is not a good indicator for our interest, particularly from a European perspective. In some countries, a considerable percentage of all first generation immigrants are naturalised citizens, whilst in other countries this percentage is negligible; and in some countries virtually all foreign nationals are foreign born, whilst in others there is a considerable percentage of second and third generation immigrants among foreign nationals.

We consider citizenship acquisition as a potentially important factor that influences active civic participation since the exercise of some rights is only possible for citizens and because naturalisation may be a conscious step towards becoming part of and taking part in the receiving society.

2.3. Status and staying perspectives

When European states consider immigration policies, they often orient themselves towards the classical immigration countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia with their sharp distinction between immigrants (with a permanent residence right) and non-immigrants with a temporary residence right). The differentiation suggests that non-immigrants leave after a specified period of time, while immigrants come for permanent residence and stay forever. Nonetheless, even in classical immigration countries, this categorisation leads to problems as it is built on rather simplistic assumptions about the immigration process. In the USA, there have been periods when a large percentage of
people arrived with an immigrant status and left after some time while today many people who have a (permanent) immigrant status had previously lived in the USA as temporary migrants or illegal entrants (e.g. Santel 1998).

In most European states, there are few migrants who came with a permanent residence status from the outset. Also, national policies vary not only in terms of citizenship acquisition rules but also in reference to migration statuses. Some countries like Ireland and Greece (Ruhs 2004; Kassimis and Kassimi 2004), have only recently developed a long term immigrant category given that the need for such a category and related policy provisions has only emerged over the course of the last decade.

Many people migrated with a temporary and/or uncertain staying perspective. They later decided to stay or were granted long term residence status after several years of life and work in the receiving country. Here again the distinction between the different categories of seasonal, temporary and long term migrants reflects the socio-cultural norms and historical experiences of the receiving societies. Thus, the main ‘hosts’ in post war Europe – Germany, France and the UK – had different expectations regarding the time perspective of their foreign workers. Germany saw immigration as a rotating guest worker scheme at the end of which migrants would return to their country of origin. This did not happen. On the contrary, a substantial part of the migrants settled and brought their families in, considering Germany to be their new home. In France and the UK, expectations were more relaxed, partly because migrants came from former colonies and were thus perceived as sharing important cultural and historical links with the receiving society. However, indefinite stay permits were gradually restricted to those with French or British ancestry and citizenship regimes became more restrictive. These changes emphasized the temporary perspective of international migration. Most receiving societies have difficulties coming to terms with the idea that newcomers are there to stay, permanently.

In reality, the distinction between temporary migrants and long term or permanent immigrants is a criterion that differentiates migrants according to the host society’s self-perception and policy objectives and has little to do with actual migration processes. Migration policies often change, adapting to the migration trends and realities as well as to the perceived interests of the host society. In this way, people who came under rotation agreements were given indefinite stay rights and undocumented migrants received legal status. Thus, when we distinguish migrants according to their status, we do not imply a hypothesis about their future migration behaviour, but relate to the legal ascription of the receiving state. When we want to analyse civic participation behaviour of immigrants, we should not restrict our analysis to certain types of immigrants – namely to those who came with a permanent residence status. From a historical and internationally comparative perspective, entry status is only a very weak predictor of later settlement.

While the migration status of a person should not influence whether s/he is included in a study about immigrant participation, it may have important implications for her/his participation behaviour. Illegal immigrants may refrain from active participation of any kind if they fear detection and expulsion. Seasonal or short term migrants may be oriented completely towards their country of origin with no interest in participating in the receiving society. In fact, migration status defines the social, economic and political rights of the immigrant and hence may play an important role in creating favourable or unfavourable conditions for civic participation.
2.4 National majorities and ethnic minorities/diasporas

Immigrants and their offspring from a certain country are often seen as an ethnic minority in the receiving country. Ethnicity is not an objective criterion like ‘foreign born’ or ‘foreign national’, but depends on self-perception and perception by others (Heckmann 1992). It may be linked to a specific culture, language or religion that signals a perceived belonging to a certain minority. This implies that boundaries of minority – majority perception may evolve and dissolve during migration processes. As ethnic minority building is based on perception, a certain size of immigration is usually necessary so that immigrants from a certain country can be perceived as a group. Visibility may be higher if the minority is of a different racial phenotype (skin colour, facial characteristics, overall complexion) making the group easily distinguishable from the majority. Visibility may also depend on cultural factors such as dress codes and the overall appearance of immigrant individuals that make them stand out from the majority ‘crowd’ (e.g. headscarf). Some groups are stigmatised by the political and public discourse that defines them as ‘problematic’, ‘backward’, ‘dangerous’ or ‘undesirable’ aliens. Such negative stereotyping is often directed towards Albanians in Greece or Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, and Pakistanis in Britain.

Because our main interest is to create a better understanding of activation processes in future migration situations, we are not concerned with historical minorities but rather with immigrant minorities. Historical minorities are native populations of a different ethnicity or nationality that were part of the country from its very moment of state formation or pre-modern migration movements. Well known cases of national minorities are the Basques in Spain and France and the Irish in the UK. However, most if not all European countries have one or several historical ethnic/national minorities living in their territory.

Although these populations are not part of our target group, it is worth considering whether countries with important historical minorities have a different way of dealing with immigration related ethnic minorities. In addition, new migration may blend with traditional ethnic minorities. In Poland for instance, recent Ukrainian economic migrants have settled in historical minority Ukrainian communities. They thus both challenge and revitalise the minority institutions and may provide for a test case to examine whether institutional channels aimed at catering for the civic and political needs of historical minorities can be used by and for immigrant minorities.

Ethnicity perceptions in immigrant minorities do not necessarily overlap with country boundaries. Kurds for example come from Turkey or Irak and organise in Kurdish associations in the receiving countries. People from South America may see themselves and be perceived as Latinos in receiving countries, while they would not have been aware of such a categorisation before leaving their country of origin. In some countries, people from sub-saharan Africa are categorised generally as Africans because they are black while they may internally differentiate not only in relation to their country of origin but also in relation to their ethnic or clan affiliation. In general, self-organisations of immigrants are often organised along ethnic lines, not differentiating between immigrants and non-immigrants by nationality or status but by ethnicity, as indicated by country of origin, culture or language.

As with the treatment of immigrant status, we propose that civic participation of immigrants should not be analysed along ethnic lines, but that ethnicity and the receiving countries’ way of dealing with ethnicity should be considered as a potentially influential factor.
3. What is active civic participation?

Active citizenship has been the focus of much political and policy debate at the EU level in recent years. Chanen (1997:1) defines active citizenship as “the people’s capacity to take an active role in public affairs, whether through formal democratic structures, through the press, through public debate, through associations, political parties, trade unions, local clubs and societies or simply through informal networks and mutual aid among neighbours, friends and family”. This is a rather extensive definition of active citizenship which, in line with feminist thinking, transcends the boundary between public and private life and defines active citizenship as a set of practices that link public life (associationism, politics, voluntarism) with the private domain (family and friends).

Other authors use ‘civic activity’ as a virtual synonym to political participation and differentiate as Kastoryano has done (1998), between civic activities (political participation) and civil activities (including wider forms of community engagement), with the latter being more likely for immigrants who do not have access to all forms of political participation. As we are not sure that this differentiation will be useful for understanding the process of immigrant activation, we will use a broader definition of civic activities and include both political and civil activities.

As we speak of ‘active’ civic participation, active implies a level of activity that goes substantially beyond voting. In our study, we are not interested in active citizenship as such, but in the persons who participate. Starting from the broad definition of active citizenship, we define actively participating immigrants (immigrant activists) for the purpose of our comparative study as people that give a voice to societal concerns, e.g. by engaging in political parties, local committees, parent associations or migrant lobby organisations; and/or organise solidarity and self-help, e.g. by taking leadership functions in religious associations, ethnic associations or informal self-help networks. This implies that this research overlaps not only with research on voluntary associations and political activism but also on elites and leadership. We are aware that only a minority of immigrant and native populations will be able and prepared to devote their time to demanding forms of civic activism. Nonetheless, these are very important persons, as they may influence or even shape the integration process of whole communities (e.g. Diehl 2002:26). Celis and others (2001:8) name them “agents of change” – actors who have a societal commitment and explicitly pursue objectives aiming at the democratic organisation of society, community and economics.

This focus on ‘agents of change’ implies that the distinction between paid and unpaid work is not crucial to the interests of this research. Active citizens with leadership functions may be professionally employed in their fields of commitment, receive smaller amounts of money or privileges to cover activity-related costs or devote their time and energy on a purely voluntary basis without any payment or in-kind compensation. The line separating paid and unpaid activities may differ between countries and between types of activities (e.g. trade union activists or members of local councils may sometimes receive remuneration). This may differ during the life-course of a person, as someone may have started as a volunteer and managed to turn his
concern into a paid profession at a later stage, exercising it far beyond the required working hours and work intensity, or someone may have found a job in a social profession (e.g. cultural mediator, social workers, health worker) and may have become civically engaged at a later stage (e.g. lobbying for her/his clients).

We are aware that a substantial part of the literature on the political participation of immigrants and minorities deals with their voting behaviour, political party and associational membership (see for instance Jacobs and Tillie 2004). Voting behaviour and organisational membership may be important background elements and preconditions for engaging in more demanding and stable forms of political participation.

One should note here that in different societies, we find different codes of practice and related categorisations. Thus, civic participation may take place in more or less formal/informal settings and in a more or less organised manner. In some countries, networks of civic involvement are more developed than in others and civic activism as such is a well-known concept, understood by most citizens and residents. In other countries where networks of civic activism are weaker, less organised forms of involvement may be more visible and qualify as civic engagement. Pertinent examples may be recent democracies of Central Eastern Europe as well as countries with weak civil societies (e.g. Greece or Italy, see Almond and Verba 1980; Demertzis 1994; Diamandouros 1993). It is particularly important here to consider what is understood in the national context as civic activism. We will seek to achieve a more refined conceptual definition of active civic participation in Europe with the help of interviewing immigrant activists at a later stage.

The starting point for our interest in the subject has been outlined as Europe’s future democratic development and the potential contribution of immigrants to European civil societies. Therefore, we are interested in immigrants’ participation in the receiving societies. At the same time, we are aware that contemporary migration is characterised by transnational ties of immigrants and immigrant communities made possible by new transport and communication technologies. Thus, long term immigrants may be politically and economically active in both their country of origin and their country of settlement. They may send remittances and/or make investments in their country of origin, start ethnic businesses in their country of settlement, and engage in commercial activities between the two. They may also engage in political activities in their country of origin, maintaining links with local politics while at the same time engaging in ethnic or mainstream networks of civic activism in their receiving countries. It is an interesting question whether transnational ties shape, encourage or discourage participation in the receiving societies. Supra-national or multinational organisations may encourage individuals to become active. For example, if an immigrant was active in the Rotary club or the Catholic church, s/he will find similar structures in the receiving country to which s/he can turn. Kastoryano (2002) denies this influence of European organisations, as national engagement is a precondition for political activity at the European level. The practical goals of immigrants’ European activities lie on the national level, as the nation state guarantees rights or responds to interests.

This leads us to further specify what is meant by civic activism in the receiving societies. Is it useful to include activities in all sorts of ethnic and migrant associations, or should the definition be limited to activities in majority institutions in the receiving societies? If we were to confine our analysis to majority institutions, we would run the risk of not taking into account a large part of immigrant activism and thus,
underestimate its potential for a civic revival of the European societies. Therefore, a mainly geographical definition of activism should be applied; we qualify immigrant commitment and leadership in ethnic or immigrant associations of the receiving societies clearly as civic participation in the receiving societies, as long as it fulfils the general criteria (giving a voice to societal concerns, organising solidarity and self-help). This implies that these associations are seen as part of the receiving societies, notwithstanding that they are discussed as ‘parallel societies’ in some countries. This view is supported by associational research. In his reconstruction of the formation of Turkish self-organisations, Schifferauer (1999, 2004) emphasizes that these organisations are not simply institutions transplanted from Turkey to Germany but rather institutions that have developed in reaction to the German environment. Ethnic associations including those with fundamentalist orientations are a “response” to the environment of the host country.

We are aware that there is a value judgement in our research interest; we are looking for civic activism of immigrants because we assume that active citizens are good for Europe. However, it is a highly debatable issue in some countries as to whether activities in ethnic associations are positive for the receiving societies. In Germany, for example, the debate goes back to the 1980s when Elwert argued that even segregative immigrant associations stabilise the individual and promote integration in the long run (Elwert 1982), while Esser stated that participation in such associations will hamper and prevent individual integration and lead to the formation of parallel societies (Esser 1986; Esser 1988). These arguments have been picked up in a number of studies and recently featured prominently in public debates (Cyrus 2005). Whatever arguments one may find to be convincing in these debates, they provide no significant reason to exclude activities in certain types of associations from an internationally comparative study of the activation process. However, there is a certain value judgement in the description of what we see as civic activism (giving a voice to societal concerns, organising solidarity and self-help) as it excludes destructive and undemocratic activities. Whether an immigrant lobbies for lower taxes in a liberal party, negotiates a location for mosque-building in a local community, acts as a representative for an immigrant nationality in a council or founds a women’s help organisation for a certain nationality – all activities would qualify as active civic participation, independent of any immediate or long-term effects.

To summarise: we are interested in immigrant activists – first generation immigrants who are continuously investing time and energy to organise solidarity or give a voice to societal concerns in the receiving society.

4. Which factors influence active civic participation of immigrants?

In the previous sections, we have demonstrated how we will transform a societal challenge into a research topic by explaining our research interest and by touching on a few factors that may influence the civic participation of immigrants. We will now review some scholarly literature in order to conceptualise factors that influence active civic participation of immigrants.

We mainly draw on three sets of literature to build our own theoretical model of the interaction of factors:

- We develop our approach from the civic voluntarism model of Verba and colleagues (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995, 269). This approach focuses on the
interaction of resources, a variety of psychological predispositions called political engagement and the recruitment process.

- In addition, we take the societal opportunity structure into account, as exemplified in studies which aim to compare differences between national groups in one location (Diehl 2002, Fennema and Tilly 1999) and between immigrants in different locations and nation states (Koopmans 2004).

- As we are fundamentally interested in the recruitment process, we make use of several concepts from the social capital theory (Putnam 2000) which looks at how social networks are embedded through associational life and can also be applied to immigrant minorities (Jacobs and Tillie 2004), specifically to the role of ethnic or immigrant associations in the activation process.

In our model, we assume that an individual has a command of individual resources. The individual is faced with a societal opportunity structure with more or less obvious and accessible options for participating. In this situation, the individual may or may not develop a motivation to become active, depending on the individual resources, psychological predispositions and the incentives that the opportunities imply for this person. However, the question remains as to how this motivation leads to activity. Instead of using the term “recruitment process” we will define it as the “activation process” because although active recruitment via third persons may indeed turn motivation into action, it is not the only factor that contributes to this change. To sum it up in simplified questions: What is he or she able to do (resources)? What could she do (opportunities)? What does she want to do, considering her personality, ability and opportunities (motivation)? How does she become active? (activation process)? What does she do (activity)?
Figure 1: Active civic participation of immigrants—graphical model

Individual resources
- Time
- Income
- Education
- Experience
- Immigrant status
- Social capital

Societal opportunity structure
- General features
- Migration specific features

Individual motivation
- personal predisposition
- incentives

Activation process
- contacts in minority associations
- contacts in majority associations
- media
- events
- ...

Activity
Active civic participation in the receiving society, individually, or in minority or majority associations, or both
The link between the basic elements in the model are summarised in figure 1. In the following sections, we will review research and considerations concerning the factors included in the model.

4.1 Individual resources

Because there are hardly any studies on active civic participation as such, we mainly rely on studies that are principally concerned with demanding forms of political participation. While there are numerous studies of single aspects of political participation like voting behaviour, the most comprehensive study was conducted by Verba and colleagues, and their results are largely consistent with other results of smaller studies.1

Verba et al. analysed a sample of 2,500 political activists in the United States, derived from interviews in 1990 (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1993). In their study, political activity is broadly defined and includes not only voting, but also contacting politicians, joining protests, volunteering in a local community, serving as a board member, working in an electoral campaign and donating to campaigns. They stress resources such as time, money and skills over motivations and recruitment as contributing factors to active civic participation. In their analysis, they find large differences in both the probability of participating and the level of activities. Generally, well-educated and well-off persons are much more likely to be active. Disadvantaged persons are much less likely to be active than persons with a high socio-economic status and more likely to become active for personal reasons. Generally, resources can explain the differences in socio-demographic characteristics, like age and family status (see also for example Putnam 2000 or Fuchs and Offe 2001). The lower level of participation for women can be largely explained by a lower command of resources (Schlozman, Burns et al. 1994:984).

From the analysis of characteristics of political activists, we can formulate expectations of civic participation of immigrants. Insofar as immigrants are predominantly in the low-income, low-status section of the labour market and lack language proficiency, they can be expected to be less active than the native population. Although Verba and colleagues do not differentiate between foreign-born individuals and natives, they do differentiate between Anglo-Whites, African-Americans and Latinos. As Latinos are predominantly foreign-born, this category can be used as an indicator for the effect of migration experience on participation. Across all categories of political involvement, Latinos are considerably less likely to be active. Among Latinos, citizens are more likely to be active than non-citizens (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995: 231-234). Among Latino activists, issues of civil rights or minorities figure higher, but are by no means dominant (248).

Generally, past activities are strong predictors of future activities. They create networks that are important for the activation process and they generate experiences that can be built upon. Also, experiences in the country of origin can be considered a resource. Portes and Rumbaut give the example of Finnish and German labourers who founded unions in the United States, using their experience in unions in their countries of origin to help them in their country of resettlement (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

However, immigration and forced migration (asylum seeking) in particular can sometimes be a traumatic experience that involves a rupture with one’s ties to the homeland and one’s past way of life. Social capital in the form of extended networks is

usually not transferred to the receiving country, unless whole communities emigrate (like in the case of ethnic Germans from Romania). Initially, networks in the receiving country are small – with sometimes only one person serving as a bridgehead for migration. However, the capacity to build a network does not disappear in a new country, but it may take a while to be revitalised and transferred (consciously or unconsciously) to the new context. We hypothesise here that migrants who were helped by ethnic or other networks and experienced solidarity during the migration process may be more likely to transfer their trust and become active in the society of settlement. We propose to consider the legal status of an individual as a resource, in as much as it is connected to participation rights and duties, and it therefore has to be analysed in relation to the societal opportunity structure. Uslaner and Conley (Uslaner and Conley 2003:341) point to the central role of citizenship status in shaping civic participation in their study on the Chinese in Los Angeles.

4.2 Societal opportunity structures

According to Koopmans (2004: 451), the political opportunity structure includes both an institutional element (e.g. political system, distribution of party power) and a discursive element (e.g. established notions of who and what is considered reasonable and legitimate). We start from this concept and broaden it for our purpose. The societal opportunity structure includes general features relevant for all residents and specific features relevant only for immigrant or specific groups of immigrants.

General features include the general framework for becoming active in a society, such as the legal framework (e.g. the voting system and the laws regulating the foundation of associations), the current institutional structures (e.g. party system, size and type of volunteer organisations) and the perception of activism in public and private discourse. Migration specific features include the legal framework for immigrants (e.g. system of residence status and attached rights, specific restrictions for foreign nationals), the current institutional structure of migrant associations (e.g. size and types of ethnic organisations or official advisory councils) and the perception of immigrant activism in public and private discourse (e.g. public promotion of immigrant activism or resentment of specific associations in the public discourse).

General features of societal opportunity structures may explain some international differences. We would expect more immigrant activism in countries where civic activities are generally promoted and widespread, while countries with a weak culture of activism would not encourage immigrants to become active.

However, migration specific features are more interesting when exploring why immigrants seem to be generally less active than native populations. Undoubtedly, the legal opportunity structure lays the framework for activities in which migrants can become involved. This is particularly relevant for immigrants that have not naturalised in the country of settlement and hence do not benefit from full citizenship rights. Legal differences between the national integration regimes are well-documented in European countries (Davy 1999, Davy 2001). Inherently, legal rules predominantly influence the type and level of political activity. If for example, voting and standing for office are not allowed for certain immigrants, these forms of civic engagement are not open to them. Their activities have to occur on a lower level or take on other forms. If association building is restricted, informal associations may develop or immigrant associations may be registered under a different status (e.g. as cultural or neighbourhood
associations or with the formal support of native citizens who may appear as founders of the immigrant association).

Immigrants with citizenship of receiving countries theoretically have full participation rights from the beginning of their migration project. In practice, the situation is somewhat different as they often have to face bureaucratic obstacles with which they are not familiar. They often lack the language competence to sort out the paper work and even after citizenship is granted to them, they are not able to effectively participate in the polity due to their limited communication skills.

Koopmans’ analysis (2004) shows that local integration regimes have a high influence on immigrant activities, as measured by the quantity and content of claims in centre-left newspapers. In his comparison of 16 German cities, he finds that structures for engagement and a liberal climate lead to more claims raised by immigrant or ethnic organisations and a higher focus on the receiving country than the country of origin.

Nonetheless, differences between Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are much more pronounced than differences between cities in these nation states. The importance of national regulations and discourses is reaffirmed by his study.

Local opportunity structures also depend on the size of immigrant populations and historical association patterns. Living in a city with many immigrants of the same origin provides multiple opportunities to become active in ethnic associations, while immigrants in some rural communities may only have the choice between becoming active in majority associations or not becoming active at all.

Historical circumstances may facilitate activation and association building either by motivating a large number of people to become engaged around an issue created by periods of distress in the country of origin or by encouraging mobilisation around important issues in the receiving country, as is the case of the sans-papiers movement in France.

4.3 Motivation

Civic commitment always involves costs in terms of time and energy and in some settings it may even involve personal risk due to public exposure on controversial issues. A precondition to becoming active is the presence of some kind of positive individual motivation. Studies show that individuals may be motivated by the prospect of status and acceptance (Diehl 2002:52), by some type of material rewards (direct remuneration or resume building), or by a sense of moral responsibility or duty (Price 2002). Here, we regroup all aspects that result from a combination of individual resources and societal opportunity structures as incentives.

Diehl (2002) emphasises that non-material rewards may be influenced by country-specific education. Well-educated immigrants, who often cannot use their educational qualifications in the receiving country, tend be active in ethnic organisations. In this way, they are able to experience acceptance in leading positions that are not accessible to them in majority organisations.

Motivations may be hard to pin down and analyse unless they are explicitly expressed or commented upon by the individual, as they may involve an element of personal psychological predisposition, independent of resources or rewards.

4.4 The activation process

The activation process encompasses the concrete movement from motivation to activity.
Using (non-immigrant) activists’ interviews, Celis et al. (2001:15) argue that learning active citizenship is “neither linear nor one-dimensional. Learning active citizenship can be continuous or ‘smooth’ (e.g. evolving from strong socialisation in the family) or ‘jagged’ (e.g. from critical or frustrating experience). The process may be conscious, but is more often accidental, unexpected and ad hoc.” They describe the activation process as highly individualised and contingent on social and political conditions. However, we will try to identify some recurring patterns of the activation process.

From other studies, we know that many activists are first drawn into community commitment by networks. A representative survey of civic activists in Germany has shown that 58 per cent of all activists were actively recruited or asked to become involved, mostly by leading activists or friends in organisations (Abt and Braun 2001:187). The same survey shows a relatively high fluctuation of activities, while most active citizens had already somehow been active in their youth or young adulthood. In their analysis of the recruitment process, Verba and others (2000:256) highlight the important role of recruiters. Recruiters tend to approach both individuals who were politically engaged in the past and individuals to whom they are somehow close. Thus, we can deduct two explanations as to why immigrants are more likely to be approached for positions in minority than in majority associations. Firstly, they are less likely to be close to political or civic activists from the host country. Secondly their prior political activity is less likely to be known to these individuals. The very migration process may have interrupted the activation chains that draw activists from one type of activity to the next.

This effect is multiplied if the role of voluntary associations is taken into account. In a contribution on different participation rates and patterns of men and women, Schlozman and others reflect on the relation between voluntary organisations and political participation (Schlozman, Burns et al. 1994:967): “these non-political institutions can act as the locus of attempts at political mobilization: church and organization members make social contacts and, thus, become part of networks through which requests for participation in politics are mediated.”

Another aspect that may hinder the process of activation is the lack of role models. Where women are visibly situated in political office or positions, there is greater participation among women. The conclusion of Bruns and others may also apply to immigrants: “What happens at the elite level politics and the broader political and institutional context matters for the behaviour of women and others [who are] less engaged in political life” (Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001).

Assuming that immigrants are initially more likely to become active in ethnic or immigrant associations, the question is whether some of these activities lead to separation from associations of the majority society, or whether they are the basis for broadening the field of civic activities. Building on other work, Putnam differentiates between bridging (inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) forms of social capital (Putnam 2000:21). As examples he names ethnic fraternal organisations (bonding) and the civil rights movement (bridging), among others. Bridging social capital is more valuable for community building. Many studies result in optimism that the immigrants’ development of bonding social capital may result in later development of bridging social capital.

Portes and Rumbaut, looking back at US immigration history, consider ethnic activism as an important factor of immigrant integration and comment that “time and the passing of the first generation inexorably turn immigrant communities toward American concerns” (Portes and Rumbaut 1990:126). However, their study also points to the
influence of the sending country and the length of stay perspective in moulding this process. The engagement for ethnically defined issues is interpreted as a learning process: “Defense of their own particular interest - defined along ethnic lines - was the school in which many immigrants and their descendants learned to identify with the interests of the nation as a whole” (Portes and Rumbaut 1990:142). Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer also emphasize the positive role of association membership for political participation, but are more reluctant with regard to ethnic associations: “Empirical research confirms that rates of voting rise significantly with the membership of groups of immigrant origin in associations of mainstream society such as churches, sports and leisure clubs, trade unions or neighbourhood committees. However, even a tendency of certain groups to ‘stick to themselves’ by forming their own ethnic associations may have positive effects (...). Where such associations communicate across religious and political cleavages or form larger umbrella organisations, they are more likely to encourage their members to participate in the political life of their society of residence.” (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002).

Inspired by Putnam, a study by Fennema and Tilly (1999, 2001) shows that the level of ethnically based civic associations is favourable to immigrant integration into majority politics. The authors offer two explanations. Firstly, the norm of reciprocity is produced in ethnic associations and is used both in the mainstream and in ethnically mixed settings. Secondly, the existence of ethnic associations produces an ethnic elite that has the social capital to indulge in mainstream politics. Ethnic associations create social trust which spills over into political trust and higher political participation. A comparison with similar studies in Belgium, Denmark and Germany confirms the positive relationship between ethnic membership and political participation, although there are variations with regard to the relative importance of membership in ethnic associations, cross-ethnic organisations and trade unions, each of which point towards different institutional environments (Jacobs and Tillie 2004:425). Uslaner and Conley (2003:332) question Putnam’s (1993:90) suggestion that participation in civic organisations generally induces skills of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours. Instead, they argue that building stronger social ties with an ethnic community may lead people to withdraw from civic engagement in the larger society (2003:333). Their empirical basis is a survey of ethnic Chinese in Southern California. Their most important conceptual assumption is the differentiation between generalised trusters and particularized trusters (335). While generalised trusters are willing to trust strangers who may outwardly seem quite different from them and believe that most people share common values, particularized trusters only put their faith in other people from their own group. Their analysis shows that generalised trusters have a higher level of activity, which is more often in majority associations, while particularized trusters if active at all, are only active in ethnic organisations. They suggest that there are “two separate worlds of civic engagement” (489). However, it is not clear whether this holds true for more immigrant groups and other indicators of ‘trust’. Moreover, their data is compatible with the idea that ethnic activism may lead to activities in majority associations, even though they would probably only concede to this for activists with the personality structure of a ‘generalized truster’. The structure of their sample shows a significant overlap of activity patterns. While 20 percent are only active in ethnic organisation and 14 percent only active in American politics, 28 percent are active in both (Uslaner and Conley 2003).
The connection between ethnic and mainstream, minority and majority civic activism is still an unsettled issue. While the majority of studies in different countries suggest that any kind of activism is better than no activism at all, a few scholars argue that ethnic activism may lead to social isolation and self-exclusion from the society of settlement. What also remains unclear is whether there is a transfer of social capital from ethnic networks to mainstream activities as suggested by Putnam (2000). Most importantly, it is worth examining whether civic involvement follows a linear path from ethnic activism to mainstream involvement or whether the reverse may also be true; immigrants may first become involved in mainstream organisations such as trade unions or local councils and then use the social capital accumulated there to create an ethnic association.

5. Concluding remarks: Research context

This chapter has presented conceptual and theoretical issues concerning the study of active civic participation of immigrants in European receiving societies. We suggest that this is a politically important issue for the future of European democracies, as European societies are likely to face high levels of migration in the face of demographic decline and aging (section 1). In section two, we have explained that first generation immigrants are particularly interesting for the study of the activation process for civic participation, as their personal participation history is influenced by their migration experience. We have outlined the difficulties of coming to a common understanding of ‘immigrants’ in a European setting. In the third section of this chapter, we have discussed the notion of active civic participation as it exists in both general literature and in literature which specifically refers to immigrant civic and political participation. We have provided our own working definition of the civicly active immigrant: an individual who engages in civil or political activity in a relatively sustained and durable form. We have provided a definition of civic activism that includes political, civil or societal activities that refer to public issues, centred around ethnic and migrant-specific issues as well as concerns of the society as a whole. Last but not least, we have reviewed various factors that influence the civic participation of immigrants (section 4). Our main interest lies in the process of transformation from a potentially active individual to an immigrant activist. In this chapter, we have developed the main theoretical framework for the European research project ‘Building Europe with New Citizens? An inquiry into civic participation of foreign residents and naturalised citizens in 25 countries’ (POLITIS). The POLITIS project aims to better understand the activation process, and takes into account not only the social networks of involvement but also the individual predispositions, resources, and structural factors that shape immigrant civic engagement in the receiving society. We assume that both individual and societal factors influence the motivation of an individual to become an active citizen. But motivations are not activities. We are particularly interested in the process that leads from motivation to activity and in the role that actors from majority or minority associations play in this process. Our key interest is the initiation and development of the activation process in a migration situation. We will explore this process by collecting individual activation stories and examining how immigrants describe and interpret their personal activation history. We will also look at if and how immigrants relate their activation to their migration experience, personal preconditions and societal circumstances.
With the help of country reports, we shall seek to relate the individual ‘activation’ biographies and experiences to the structural and institutional factors of the different countries studied. We shall seek to identify the key elements in the opportunity structures that act as catalysts of individual motivations and interests, transforming the activism potential to concrete engagement and actions.

In the following chapter, we will present summaries of country reports in all 25 EU countries. As they are short and concise, they cannot serve as a description of opportunity structures in these countries, but rather as a guide to the more extended reports that are available on the POLITIS website (www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe).

The last chapter highlights comparative aspects that are of interest for the study of civic participation of immigrants as outlined in this chapter.

References


Chapter 2

Civic Participation of Immigrants in Different European Societies –
A summary of available evidence in 25 EU states

This chapter introduces 25 country reports on civic participation of immigrants and
provides a short summary of each report in alphabetical order by country.

1. Introduction

With an open call in summer 2004, the research team of POLITIS recruited country
experts for all 25 states of the European Union. This chapter contains the executive
summaries of the resulting 25 country reports. To give an idea of the full reports, the
questions that guided the country experts and some considerations concerning our focus
are presented here as an introduction.

All reports contain an overview of important conditions for active civic participation of
immigrants (Part I), a review of scientific studies and – for those countries in which
studies were lacking – other available knowledge on this topic (Part II), an expert
assessment on specific questions concerning immigrant activities (Part III) and a survey
of relevant research institutes and researchers (Annex). Full reports can be downloaded
from the POLITIS website (www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe).

Part I of these reports gives an insight into the societal opportunity structure for active
civic participation of immigrants. It is designed to improve our understanding of the
background conditions framing the activation of immigrants. Country experts sketched
the recent migration history, demographic developments, media debates and the legal
and institutional conditions framing immigrant participation.

Country experts were asked to focus their attention on first generation immigrants from
states that are currently non-member states of the European Union. With this choice, we
wanted to direct attention to immigrant groups that are relevant for future immigration
to the European Union, as well as to people with personal migration experience (see
chapter 1).

This has important implications. Firstly, we are less interested in the participation of the
offspring of immigrants, namely their children who are born in the receiving country.
Secondly, we are not only interested in foreign nationals, but also in the participation of
co-ethnic immigrants and naturalised citizens. These immigrants are statistically
virtually invisible in some countries that only count ‘foreign nationals’ and not ‘foreign
born’ in their population statistics. Thirdly, we are less interested in the migration
developments between current member states, although some of the migrants were not

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2 Experts drafted reports from September 2004 to January 2005. POLITIS research teams reviewed
reports – with the following distribution of responsibility: Eliamep (Athens): Cyprus, France,
Greece, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, UK; European University Institute (Florence): Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia;
Interdisciplinary Centre for Education and Communication in Migration Processes (Oldenburg
University): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden.
Experts revised reports until April 2005.
EU citizens at the time of migration. Naturally, authors were forced to make use of available statistics and research that includes immigrants in other definitions, but they did their best to keep the specific focus of interest in mind and gave more specific information when available.

Country experts characterised the current public discussion on migration-related issues and sketched the main topics that receive media attention. Familiarity with the media debate is essential to understanding which topics can potentially mobilise people and raises awareness about sensitive issues.

When asking for the current legal and institutional conditions framing immigrant participation, we wanted to raise awareness of the fact that many countries restrict the participation opportunities for foreign nationals, either by excluding them from voting or standing for office or by restricting rights for self-organisation or participation in public rallies, for example. On the other hand, however, there are programmes that actively encourage participation, namely foreigners’ or immigrant committees, antidiscrimination provisions, subsidies to ethnic organisations and public awareness campaigns.

**Part II** of each report aims to summarise available research and knowledge concerning active civic participation of immigrants.

Active civic participation – as we have defined it in the previous chapter – is a very specific topic. We are particularly interested in forms of participation that require a continuous commitment and a considerable amount of time and energy. We are interested in the social elite of immigrants, those who are active in the interests of other people, the community and the society. These are namely people who:

- *give a voice to societal concerns*, e.g. by engaging in political parties, local committees, parent associations or migrant lobby organisations.

- *organise solidarity and self-help*, e.g. by taking leadership functions in religious organisations, ethnic associations or informal self-help networks.

Therefore, we asked country experts to pay particular attention to these forms of participation. However, authors were free to structure their reports according to the focus of interest in their country. Political participation in a narrow sense - voting, standing for office, and the development of ethnic self-organisations - are examples of important research topics that are not exclusively directed at the more demanding forms of civic participation but information on these matters has nevertheless been included in some reports.

Country experts were particularly encouraged to summarise those studies that are only available in their country and in the language of their country, in order to increase the value of their reports for the European research community. Experts were not only encouraged to look for specific articles and books on the topic, but also to consider the treatment of immigrants in more general studies on civic participation.

In some countries, third country immigration is only a recent phenomenon. There are hardly any studies on immigration, let alone the subject of immigrant engagement in the receiving society. In situations with little research to summarise, experts made use of grey literature and media reports and conducted some interviews with practitioners in the field. Thus, country reports differ in character. While some are structured literature reviews, others also contain some original explorative investigation into the topic.

**Part III** of the country reports provides answers to questions that are of particular importance for the research project POLITIS. Authors were encouraged to give short answers and inform the readers as to the reliability of the information, based on the
empirical studies as presented in Part II, or in the absence of empirical studies, according to the experts’ personal opinion.

The following questions were posed:

- What are the main fields of civic activities that immigrants engage in (e.g. religious associations, parent associations, political parties, etc.)?
- What ethnic and nationality groups are particularly active and why?
- Is the degree of active civic participation of immigrants high or low compared to the majority population?
- What is the relation between engagement in ethnic or migrant organisations (e.g. any organisation having the name of the minority in the name) compared to mainstream society organisations? Are there transitions and overlaps?
- What issues do you consider to be of particular interest and importance in the field?
- Where do you see the major research gaps?

Some authors freely shared their assessments with their readers, while others were more tentative facing research gaps. On the whole, Part III delivers a very useful guide to patterns, positions and country variations on these topics.

In an Annex, we asked national experts to map the research landscape in their country, i.e. to identify leading research institutions and researchers in the field of active civic participation of immigrants and complement this list with some leading institutions in the field of immigration and active civic participation in general. The Annexes are also provided as a separate document giving an overview of all countries. Research landscapes differ widely in the European Union. Obviously, mapping of research competences was a different exercise in a small country with one or two universities as opposed to that of a big country with hundreds of universities and a high degree of specialisation. It also differed between countries with a long tradition of research on immigration and those countries where this field is hardly acknowledged as such. In some countries, it was possible to identify scholars who have worked extensively in the field, while in others experts were only able to name institutions and researchers who were studying the broader field or related topics, or had only been active for a limited time and purpose.³

By presenting abstracts of the full reports in this chapter, we would like to share our research in progress and encourage readers to consult the full reports online (www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe).

³ We are confident that the national experts made all necessary efforts to include leading institutions and researchers. However, with the vast amount of publications in some countries, and the fragmented organisation of research in others, it is always possible that they may have overlooked individuals. In addition, experts were asked to make short and concise lists of 5 or fewer institutions concerned with the active civic participation of immigrants, immigration, and civic participation respectively, which may have led experts to eliminate certain institutions.
2. Austria

Karin Sohler and Albert Kraler

Although Austria has a long history of immigration, migration is largely associated with “guest worker migration” that started in the early 1960s and the “new immigration” of Eastern European, African and Asian migrants that began in the late 1980s. At the time of the 2001 census, Austria had a foreign population of about 711,000 or 8.9 percent of the total population and a foreign born population of just over 1,000,000 or 12.5 percent.

Imigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, which were the major sources for labour recruitment, still form the majority of immigrants, making up more than two thirds of the total foreign population at the time of the census. However, as a result of the “new immigration” from other European, mostly Eastern European countries as well as from Africa and South Eastern and Central Asia and, to some extent, Latin America and the Caribbean, the immigrant population is increasingly diversifying. Since the mid-1990s, the number of naturalisations, in particular of Turkish migrants, who have one of the highest naturalisation rates among individual immigrant groups, has been rising rapidly, thus also rapidly increasing the number of Austrian citizens with a migrant background. The growing proportion of Austrian citizens with an immigrant background has also led to a visible increase in the interest shown by political parties towards Austrians of immigrant origin as potential voters, most evident in 2001 and 2005 elections for the Vienna city council.

Until the early 1990s, Austria designed its migration policy exclusively on the basis of economic considerations, while the government left the determination of migration levels largely to the “social-partners”, comprising organised labour and institutionalised business interests. The changing patterns of migration and the large inflows that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Iron Curtain, as well as the rising numbers of asylum applications from third world countries, the transformation of the Austrian political system as a result of the erosion of the dominance of the traditional ruling parties and the increasing politicisation of immigration policy, however, led the government to adopt a major reform of immigration legislation in the early 1990s. The reform’s major objectives were to restrict immigration and drastically reduce immigration levels. Among others, the reform introduced annual immigration quotas which have been applied ever since. The reform also led to the massive deterioration of the situation of long-term migrants. The 1997 reform of the Aliens Act addressed these deficiencies to some degree by introducing the principle of “consolidation of residence”, that is, increasing residential security (protection from expulsion) for long-term third country nationals. Access to the labour market, however, remained decoupled from immigration legislation until the reform of immigration legislation in 2002. The latter introduced the so-called residence certificate which gives unrestricted access to employment for long-term third country nationals. The 2002 reform, however, also massively expanded the scope for temporary labour migration. In contrast to “guest-workers” who were equally regarded as temporary migrants, new temporary migrants are permanently excluded from both “denizenship”, the secure status long-term migrants enjoy and citizenship. In addition, mandatory integration courses were introduced and labour immigration was limited to highly skilled migrants.
Apart from basic political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly, third country nationals have no formal political rights. An attempt to introduce the local vote for third country nationals in Vienna was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional court, a decision that is unlikely to be reversed by Parliament. Hitherto, third country nationals were also excluded from standing for elections in works councils at the shop floor level and in elections for the statutory interest representative bodies, the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce. The European Commission has repeatedly criticized Austria for its practice. In response to a recent judgement of the European Court of Justice, the passive vote in works councils and chamber elections will finally be introduced. Similarly, third country nationals are excluded from standing for elections in the statutory student representative bodies and, only recently has the right to vote for citizens of the European Economic Area been introduced.

The denial of the right to stand for election has arguably had a tremendous effect on patterns of political socialisation of immigrants. While works councils are formally independent of trade unions, holding office as a works councillor has traditionally been a major entry gate into the trade union hierarchy. In addition, both trade union activists and delegates of the statutory chambers have been a traditional source of recruitment for political parties. However, surveys have shown that migrants are keen to have political representation, in particular in regard to the work place and wider forms of industry representation in the form of the statutory Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce.

As a result of the exclusion from formal channels of political participation, studies of immigrant participation have been rare while mainstream empirical political research continues to focus on patterns of political participation, voting behaviour and political preferences of Austrian nationals. The continuously rising number of naturalisations, however, has markedly expanded the pool of voters with an immigrant background. As a result, interest in migrant political participation has recently been growing. Although there is a growing body of specialised research focusing on immigrant civic participation, wider patterns of civic participation of migrants have been largely neglected by mainstream social science research. The bulk of the work focuses on associational patterns of immigrants, with several comprehensive mapping studies having recently been published. Although existing research generally indicates lower rates of civic participation of immigrants than is the case for Austrians, with participation rates of foreign nationals being the lowest, the existing studies also suggest that immigrants tend to engage more in informal networks than in formal associations and generally show a high willingness to engage in civic or indeed, political activities.

In general, research on immigrant civic participation is still in its infancy. The majority of studies published so far are case studies that limit themselves to describing patterns of participation and, only partially provide causal explanations for the patterns of civic participation found among immigrants. Thus, the existing research on civic participation has several limitations, including the lack of comparative and theory guided research and the descriptive nature of much of the literature. The application of network analysis, social capital approaches and research on transnational dimensions of immigrant participation rank among the most promising avenues for future research.
Due to a large scale recruitment of foreign labourers, the 1960s saw a considerable rise in the proportion of foreigners in the total Belgian population. The foreign population increased from 379,528 individuals in 1954 to 716,237 individuals - over 7 percent of the total population - in 1970. The largest group of immigrant low skilled labourers to settle in Belgium in the sixties undoubtedly came from Morocco. It is important to note that these Moroccan guest workers – just like other foreign workers - were explicitly invited to bring their families. As a result of the economic recession, the decision was made by the Belgian government in August 1974 to stop all new immigration and active recruitment of non-EC guest workers. However, there were some exceptions the policy change did not lead to a complete halt of legal non-EC migration flows to Belgium. It is important to note that Belgium, a former colonial power in Central Africa (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi), never opted to recruit colonial labourers so as to preserve a sufficient workforce for the colonial exploitation of Africa. On that specific point, the Belgian attitude diverged from that of most of its neighbours. Migration of political refugees to Belgium accelerated in the overall migration flows at the end of the eighties and throughout the nineties and increasingly became the object of political debate.

Of the three regions in Belgium (Flanders, Brussels and Walloonia), the Region of Brussels-Capital proportionally hosts the largest number of foreign residents. Approximately 30 percent of the region’s population are foreign residents. Belgium is a linguistically divided country. This cleavage has been central in defining two divergent types of attitudes and reaction to the inflow and settlement of immigrants. While the Flemish speaking community has pursued a multiculturalist policy influenced by Dutch and Anglo-American ideas, the French speaking community has opted for a less specific approach more in line with French republican assimilationism. On the whole, in comparison to other European immigration countries, both the Flemish and French speaking communities started devising immigrant policies quite belatedly. Until 1989 and the first electoral breakthrough of the extreme right in Flanders, the political establishment at the national federal level had turned a blind eye on this issue, assuming that immigration was a temporary phenomenon.

Considering the increasing involvement of immigrants in electoral politics, there is much discussion about political participation. The local election of October 2000 saw a remarkable breakthrough of immigrant politicians in Brussels. This development has been facilitated, among others, by the very broad opening of the nationality legislation. On the aspects of both nationality laws and the political representation of immigrants, Belgium has become an exceptional case in Europe.

There are a number of other areas in which immigrants have been actively involved in Belgian public life. Since the seventies, immigrants have had the right to vote and stand as candidates in so-called social elections (i.e. worker council elections). No specific research has been carried out on the extent of immigrant participation in workers’ participatory institutions, but participation is generally considered to be at a high level. The model of voting rights in private companies has served its purpose since it was put in place as a means of extending the arena of local politics. Trade unions, for instance, have pleaded for the local enfranchisement of immigrant workers since the seventies. However, it was not until 2004 that this resulted in a decision to allow non-European citizens to participate (only as voters and not as candidates).
Among more recent waves of immigration, especially those originating from the Muslim world, Arabic is becoming the language through which participation is increasingly sought. A review of the increasing presence of Islamic parties in Brussels and Antwerp and a discussion on the peculiar relationship established by the Belgian State with a number of institutionally recognised religions (including Islam) have recently been proposed. Belgium has indeed implemented a unique system which allows Muslims to select their representatives before the State through a nation-wide general election. As in many other immigration countries, participation through voluntary associations remains an important avenue for public and civic involvement. Immigrants and foreigners are active in fields ranging from politics and science to the arts and journalism, etc. Over the last fifteen years, they have become increasingly visible in public life by actively engaging in public debates around issues which are of direct concern to them. According to a quantitative survey in Brussels, the degree of active civic participation of immigrants differs according to the ethnic group considered. Turks are generally more active than low-skilled Belgians and low-skilled Belgians are more active than Moroccans. Citizens of Turkish origin are the most active within both self-organisation and cross-ethnic organisations. However, as far as electoral politics are concerned, citizens of Moroccan origin have been more successful than any other immigrant group including Europeans.
4. Cyprus

Immigration policy in Cyprus was largely formulated in the 1990s, when the government decided to abandon the restrictive policies it had previously followed and to allow more migrant workers to enter the country in order to meet labour shortages. This change of policy meant that Cyprus was transformed almost overnight from a country that traditionally exported migrants to all corners of the earth, to a net recipient of migrants from all over the globe. Today, the total number of resident non-Cypriots is estimated to be approximately 80,000 individuals, which represents about 10 percent of the total population residing in the southern part of the island. Most of these are migrant workers who work mainly in the service industry (tourism, trade), manufacturing industry, agriculture and construction and as domestic workers. It is estimated that there are between 10,000 to 30,000 undocumented migrant workers. These include persons from Eastern Europe (Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs, Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldavians and others), south east Asia (particularly women, mainly from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan), China and Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, Iran etc).

The policy assumption formulated in the 1990s on the employment of migrant workers was that their stay was to be short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors. Although the actual developments of the past decade have reversed this presumption, a number of institutional devices designed with those goals in mind have persisted and policy-makers have given little thought as to how to encourage the civic participation of migrants and help develop a sense of belonging to the Cypriot society. Only very recently did the debate on multiculturalism begin, but this debate is still at a very early stage and is more geared towards acceptance and tolerance rather than civic participation.

The specific historical setting of Cyprus has been dominated by ethnic relations between two constitutionally recognised communities, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots, as well as the role which foreign forces have played in the Cyprus conflict, something which has also been reflected in Cypriot research. Because the research agenda is subsumed in the ‘national question’, there has been an almost total neglect in initiating studies on other subjects such as migrant rights and civic participation. Only recently have some studies and NGOs begun to raise the issues of equal participation and involvement of migrant communities in institutions of Cypriot society.

The overall level of civic participation of migrants in Cyprus can be described as rather disappointing. There are institutional barriers that prohibit political participation in elections until full citizenship is granted (restrictions in voting, standing for office). Although there are no formal prohibitions on membership in parties and organisations, rights for self-organisation and public rallies, migrant workers do not participate in organisations such as trade unions en mass. Formal rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights are generally respected. Nevertheless, migrants generally face a hostile environment and racial discrimination in society. They are confronted with an unsympathetic immigration regime which, in spite of ongoing attempts, has failed to control the growth of migration.

So far, the main focus of migrant support groups and solidarity NGOs has been to protect the basic rights of migrants. Topics such as foreigner/immigrant committees or
quotas and subsidies for ethnic organisations have not been discussed yet at any level, with the exception of two immigrant support organisations that try to encourage immigrant participation within their ranks. There are however, some encouraging signs related to the processes of interaction with European NGOs and via the influence of practices in other European countries. Prior to Cyprus’s accession to the EU and in the period that has followed, NGOs and civic organisations have begun to be more actively engaged in awareness raising and campaigning for migrant rights, a development which may partly be explained by the increased availability of funding for these organisations. In addition, some mainstream organisations, such as large trade unions, have begun to actively engage in resolving the problems of migrant workers and new research and development projects have started to yield some results.
In the early 1990s, the Czech Republic along with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe became part of a buffer zone for international migration. The turbulent developments of migration in the Czech Republic which have since become visible created the need to draft and implement an immigration policy and regulative and control mechanisms. Democratisation and liberalisation of political and economic relations brought about the relatively free movement of persons. In a rather short period of time, especially in the mid-1990s, when migration legislation and practice were extremely liberal and economic relations favoured immigration, many foreigners came to the Czech Republic to work. The underlying approach of policymakers during this period was marked by a preference for a short-term, temporary migration of workers into specific segments of the economy. Recently, the Czech Republic has increasingly become a target country for immigration rather than a country of transit migration as it was during 1990s. This development generates a need to create a comprehensive policy for the integration of foreigners. The social inclusion of immigrants has become one of the main issues of migration in the Czech Republic.

The total number of foreigners legally residing in the Czech Republic is 254,294 (as of December 2004), which is approximately 1.8 percent of the total population. One third of these are foreigners live in the Czech Republic on the basis of family reunification; two thirds are typical economic migrants. Estimated figures on illegal immigrants vary from 100,000 to 200,000 individuals. The largest groups of immigrants are citizens of Ukraine, Slovakia, Vietnam, Poland and Russia. There are also immigrants from countries of the Balkans or Caucasus regions, as well as from Belarus, Moldavia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. The total number permanent residence permit holders in the Czech Republic is 99,467.

In the Czech Republic, the issue of social inclusion and consequently the civic participation of immigrants are linked to the inclusion of traditional minorities such as the Roma people. They are excluded and segregated in many areas of social life and problems have been aggravated by the immigration of Roma people from Slovakia. As a result, a high degree of attention and concern is directed towards the inclusion of Roma people, which is sometimes non-systemic and entangled with issues regarding other disadvantaged groups. This also results in a lack of specific research on the civic participation of immigrants from third countries and only recently have results from general research projects targeting the social inclusion of immigrants become available.

Despite considerable developments in creating super-structural elements (legislation, administrative practice, government initiatives) on the central level of the state administration regarding the integration of foreigners, the implementation of declared policy has been characterised by considerable shortcomings. Civic participation of foreigners, such as the right to vote at the municipal level, is lacking in practice even though it has been declared as one of the aims of official state policy and mentioned in conceptual documents of the Czech Republic. The fundamental limitation to the participation of immigrants is the lack of institutional settings at the local and regional levels in which integration issues can be voiced. Theoretically, immigrants can only promote their interests at the central level of public administration. De facto, concerns of foreigners have been defended by proxy by sympathetic NGOs and religious
societies. On the individual level, there has been remarkable participation of immigrants in school communities.

Institutions of “national minorities” such as the Russian or Ukrainian communities stand apart from ordinary migrant institutions. They mainly represent the naturalised groups of these immigrants. Immigrants are primarily concerned with basic survival and securing all legally required documentation. Their societal life is locked into informal structures. This is particularly the case for Ukrainians and Vietnamese (the two biggest immigrant groups in the Czech Republic). The internal social space of these communities also involves the life of religious communities (Greco-Catholics from Ukraine), and the participation in sport activities (immigrants from former USSR countries and Vietnamese). Several ethnic organisations provide culture and/or public education activities directed at particular communities. Some smaller groups such as Armenians and citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina are active and visible in the mainstream public space and several individuals participate in the work of specialised commissions on immigration of the Czech government.

Policy makers are aware of the need to encourage civic and political participation of immigrants and to develop a sense of belonging to the Czech society. However, the lack of common political will to promote civic rights of non-citizens who are commonly seen as undeserving of these rights presents a real obstacle to the implementation of the aforementioned awareness.
The history of new immigration in Denmark began in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a few thousand people from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan, seeking jobs at the bottom of the labour market, found their way to “the country up north”. After guestworker recruitment came to a halt, the number of immigrants continued to increase due to the right to family reunification under the protection of law. Years later, waves of national and international unrest brought groups of refugees to the country. The number of immigrants rose considerably. The original/working immigrants (Turks, Pakistanis and Yugoslavs), are still among the largest immigrant groups in Denmark, but over time, the number of asylum seekers and refugees from countries such as Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Bosnia has risen as well. The growth in immigrant population in recent decades (from 3.0 percent of the total population in 1980 to 8.2 percent in 2004) is mostly due to the rising number of immigrants from third countries.

Issues related to the integration of immigrants have been widely discussed in Denmark since the early 1970s. The 1980s then became the decade of political mobilisation among immigrants, supported by public funds, left-wing parties and trade unions. But the new millennium was the climax of the mutual acquisition between polarized coalitions in the Danish public and politics regarding the responsibility for what has been addressed as “the failure of integration policy.”

After winning governmental power in 2001, the new Liberal – Conservative coalition introduced a fundamentally different attitude to migration and integration that includes fundamental changes to Danish policy. The new policy has already created many institutional and administrative changes and has probably had the greatest impact on immigrants’ participation in civic and other areas. It seems that the scope, content and intensity of the debate as well as the overall discursive structure and institutional setting are changing.

The strong polarisation of the public debate, especially around the question of Islam, seems to influence the pattern of participation among immigrants. Immigrants’ participation in mainstream organisations and associations is clearly poor, if one ignores the more individually motivated participation in activities such as sport clubs and the like. However, participation in mainstream political parties seems to be growing. Traditionally immigrants have demonstrated relatively high participation in ethnic related organisations and associations, especially if one takes into account immigrants’ different conception of organised participation. After removing public support of ethnic organisations, the substantial possibilities for participation in such organisations and associations is falling. The gap seems to be filled by stronger participation in religious associations and political mobilisation along religious lines.

The empirical challenge would be to find out whether the new Danish policy on migration and integration, together with the dominant discourse in Danish media and public debate, leave religious and ethnic identification and participation as an attractive mode of civic and political participation for immigrants. The various forms of representation among different immigrant groups indicate a possible connection: the most active immigrants in politics at local and national levels as well as in the media, are individuals who can contribute, be it in constructive or polemic manners, to discussions on Islam. Iranians are most participatory in the labour market and civic (non political) areas, whereas Pakistanis and Turks have high levels of participation in political parties and political/ethnic/religious ethnic associations.
7. Estonia

The present immigrant population in Estonia is almost entirely the result of the country’s occupation by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. After having held the status of a Soviet Republic for more than fifty years, Estonia regained its independence in August 1991. Upon independence, the citizenship status was defined according to whether inhabitants or their parents or grandparents had been citizens of the independent Estonia (1918-1940). In this way, the Soviet-time settlers and their descendants were defined as non-citizens, i.e., as immigrants. The naturalisation procedure requires proof of five years residence and the passing of an Estonian language exam, except for children born of stateless parents in Estonia. The number of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship currently residing in Estonia is around 270,000, which corresponds to 20 percent of a total population of 1.37 million. During the 1990s and until present, there has been no massive immigration to Estonia and according to the 2000 housing and population census, the total number of immigrants from outside the former Soviet Union was less than two thousand people. Accordingly, a majority of the immigrant population is Russian speaking and has lived in the country for fifteen years or more. A great majority of all non-citizens hold permanent residence permits and enjoy (in most respects) the same rights as the citizens of Estonia. On the labour market, non-citizens seem to be in a more vulnerable position than citizens and ethnic Estonians have, in turn, a more favourable position than naturalised citizens. This cannot, however, be attributed to any purposeful discriminatory policies, but is the result of several different economic and social factors. Non-citizens cannot vote in national elections. Those who have resided in the same municipality for a period of five years or more have the right to vote in local elections, but are not eligible to stand themselves. Non-citizens may not be members of any political party; however, there are many examples of naturalised citizens who are active in party politics both on the local and national level. Despite the relatively large number of people with an immigrant background, the parties claiming to represent them have not been able to play any key role in institutional politics. In fact, all Russian-speaking members of Parliament and most of those in local councils have been elected from non-Russophone parties. At the same time, several examples of survey research point to a lower voting activity and a lower level of trust in political institutions among the minorities than among ethnic Estonians. Everybody has the right to participate in the activities of trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), irrespective of his or her citizenship. Trade union membership is, in fact, more common among ethnic and immigrant minorities. However, both population surveys and surveys of registered NGOs indicate that Russian speakers are less frequently members of other kinds of NGOs than ethnic Estonians. However, the degree of organisation varies widely among different ethnic minorities. The Estonian government policies towards immigrants and immigration are mainly focused on the integration of the Soviet-time settlers to the new society, which is now dominated by the Estonian language and in which Russian speakers are a minority. The need to develop a future-oriented migration policy has been acknowledged rather recently, partly as a result of the country’s EU membership in May 2004. The same can
be said about the scholarly literature regarding immigrants and immigration; the main concern of researchers hitherto has been the political and social-psychological relationships between ethnic Estonians and Russophone minorities, with new immigrants from outside the former Soviet Union receiving little attention.
Finland has traditionally been a country of emigration. During the 1960s and 1970s a lot of people migrated from the country. Traditionally Finnish migration policies have been restrictive and the number of immigrants has been low. The immigrants now amount to approximately 3 percent of the population. As immigrant groups in Finland are generally small and heterogeneous, it is difficult for them to get organised. Finland has been faced with increasing immigration since the beginning of the 1990s, a development which will probably continue in the future. More than half of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union areas are Ingrian return migrants. Also, a large number of the immigrants from Sweden are people of Finnish descent that have moved back to Finland. Besides these groups, there are fairly large refugee groups from the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Iraq.

Finland’s aging population will soon bring on the need for additional foreign labour, as with many other West European countries. The Finnish government has already taken action to better manage immigration by softening immigration laws and adopting a comprehensive integration law. Immigrant inclusion is made easier by laws governing the rights for immigrants to participate at the municipal level. The political participation of immigrants in Finland is low, which suggests a lack of political integration. Electoral participation among immigrants in Finland is lower than in other Nordic countries, although there are great variations between different immigrant groups. Immigrant groups in Finland are generally too small and too heterogeneous to be able to effectively organise themselves politically. The lack of organisations, information and resources seems to explain the low levels of electoral participation. The main parties have only recently shown some interest in recruiting immigrant candidates. The number of immigrant candidates has therefore increased and immigrant and minority issues have become more salient.

Although the civic participation of immigrants in Finland is generally low, this figure has recently been on the rise. In recent years, immigrant advisory boards have been established both at the state and municipal level, in order to improve both the formal and informal participation of immigrants in the policy making process. This should also be seen as a reciprocal development between the local authorities and the immigrants themselves. It has been shown that cooperative projects and immigrants’ participation in the planning of immigrant issues at advisory boards are important and efficient ways to improve the inclusion of immigrants in the Finnish society.

Further significant forms of civic participation are the associational activities of immigrants. Today there are approximately six hundred immigrant organisations, most of which were established during the 1990s. The majority of immigrant organisations are located in the capital region and in other big cities where most of immigrants live. Due to their recent creation and limited resources, immigrant organisations are still relatively weak. The organisational life plays an important role both for the collective identity of immigrants and the integration of immigrants into the Finnish society. The cooperation between authorities and immigrant associations continues to evolve. So far there has not been much research in the field of civic activities and political participation of immigrants in Finland, but the number of research projects seem to be increasing. In order to gain deeper insight into the factors and circumstances affecting civic participation more profound and extensive research is needed.
One out of five residents in France has at least one foreign grandparent. In 1993, individuals born to foreign parents were granted the right to French citizenship. Although this rule was abandoned in 1998, the majority of young people of immigrant origin can currently obtain French nationality without a formal procedure. Naturalisation is available to legal residents who have spent five years in the country. Thus, more and more immigrants and their descendants are French citizens. Non-naturalised foreigners do not have political rights, such as the right to vote. Obtaining the right to vote for immigrants has remained difficult in France due to the strong links between citizenship, nationality and territory. Because immigrants (with the recent exception of EU-nationals), do not have the right to vote in local elections and do not constitute a politically influential group, immigration has been used as a challenge in the local political discourse. However, French law does not exclude other possibilities of exercising certain public activities, such as the founding of public elective groups. Immigrants can be elected by parent associations in schools and for social security schemes. In addition, they can be electors, but cannot stand for the constitution of certain courts. Moreover, foreign students have the right to vote in universities.

In France, local migrant councils were introduced in the 1980s. They only have a consultative role and their competencies have been limited to municipal interests. Nevertheless, these councils have the ability to involve migrants in political decision making processes and to familiarise the national population with the idea of having foreigners participate in political life. There are additional forms of civic expression open to immigrants in France: participation in economic and social associations and participation in strikes organised in their interest, qualified by some as "an extra-parliamentary opposition".

Immigrants often engage in cultural associations in France. Some group members of Arab and Asian origin are also engaged in religious associations. Those of Arab origin who have become naturalised French citizens are relatively active in political parties, which they consider to be a way to counterbalance potential problems caused by Muslim fundamentalists. Political elites of African and Asian origin are rather seldom, with the possible exception of several mayors of African origin in several French villages. Africans have also been leading activists in the sans-papiers movement.
10. Germany
Norbert Cyrus

7.3 million persons do not possess the German citizenship (8.9 % of the total population). Experts estimate that about 30 percent of the population residing in Germany is born abroad or has ancestors which immigrated to Germany after 1945. It is noteworthy that temporarily admitted migrant workers contribute to a high turn-over of arrivals and departures.

The current German government declares participation and non-discrimination of immigrants to be an important policy target. However, available research literature shows that this target has not yet been reached. Germany is a country of constant, large movements of immigration. Here, the term “immigrant” refers to all foreign born persons regardless of citizenship. Accordingly, this report deals with third-country nationals, citizens of EU-member states and ethnic Germans that immigrate into Germany as ‘late repatriates’. Besides the accepted and institutionally embedded influx of ethnic Germans, foreign nationals enter mainly as family members or refugees. However, German society and policy only reluctantly accept the immigration of foreign nationals. Foreign immigrants are socially more excluded than German immigrants. In public discourse, foreign immigrants are mainly faulted for shortcomings such as their cultural otherness (religion) and their reluctance to acquire the necessary language. Additionally, their lack of professional skills is declared to be the main reason for failed integration.

Nevertheless, the juridical framework guarantees equal rights to foreign nationals who possess secure residence status – apart from active and passive voting rights and some further special regulations. Public authorities launched programmes on federal, state and local levels in order to promote the integration and participation of immigrants, concentrating primarily on ethnic Germans. Only recently have foreign immigrants become included in special programmes that strive to enhance immigrant participation.

Civic participation of immigrants is meanwhile a relevant issue in the general debate on immigration and integration in Germany. Several studies – some of them commissioned by public authorities – examine aspects of civic participation. The main focus is on the impact of immigrant associations on integration. The research field is however not geared towards the participation of immigrants – that would include ethnic Germans – but to that of foreign nationals. As a result, naturalised immigrants are omitted while foreign nationals born in Germany are included. Accordingly, in order to get information on active civic participation of immigrants, research findings require a closer re-evaluation.

First generation immigrants seem to participate in immigrant associations as well as in German institutions. But the level of formal immigrant membership in German institutions is lower compared to the native population and indeed hardly goes beyond passive membership. Immigrants rarely hold honorary offices or paid or unpaid posts in German associations. Until now, immigrants have been absent or extremely underrepresented in leading positions of institutions in the host country. A notable exception is the participation in foreigners’ advisory boards. Here, representatives of immigrant associations actively participate and serve as a link between immigrant associations and German institutions.
The main field of active civic participation are immigrant associations that deal with cultural and leisure activities, sport clubs and religious associations. Because informal associations are often overlooked, the level of active participation is probably underestimated. The focus of activities differ between national groups: Turkish immigrants participate most frequently in religious associations while immigrants from former Yugoslavia are most often involved with humanitarian associations and refugees from Africa have a tendency to be engaged in political campaign groups or unregistered exile parties.

Research is mainly concerned with the effect immigrant associations have on integration of both individuals and groups. Less attention is devoted to the examination of the circumstances and trajectories of active civic participation of immigrants. The available studies indicate that a combination of individual characteristics (educational level, language abilities, individual personality and length of stay in the home or host country) - and the participation opportunity structure (legal framework, institutional opportunities, support programmes) influence the scope and targets of active civic participation.

The engagement in immigrant associations is met with suspicion (in the case of religious or ethnic associations), and sometimes the importance of such activities that often do not receive adequate material assistance is questioned. But currently the issue of immigrants’ participation and the question how to promote active civic engagement of immigrants is becoming more pertinent. A recent survey indicates that immigrants’ motivations for active engagement are similar to those of German activists.
11. Greece

Greece’s immigrant population, including aliens and co-ethnic returnees such as Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians, includes just over one million people. This represents about 9 percent of the total resident population, a strikingly high percentage for a country that until only twenty years ago was a migration sender rather than host. On the one hand, immigration policy in Greece was quick to develop in terms of putting into practice stricter border controls and other enforcement measures. On the other hand, the Greek governments were much slower in designing and implementing a more comprehensive policy framework that includes the regularisation of undocumented aliens and that aims for the integration of this population across all sectors and areas of the host country.

Approximately three quarters of the immigrant population currently has legal status (work and stay permits). It is interesting to note that most immigrants have entered Greece illegally and have survived in the country ‘without papers’ for (frequently consecutive) periods ranging from a few months to several years. The prolonged undocumented status of many migrants and the policy vacuum that lasted for over a decade has not facilitated active civic participation on the part of immigrants in Greek public life. Nonetheless, several immigrant associations and NGOs led by Greeks have gradually emerged over the past fifteen years and have gained noteworthy visibility in the media. Overall, the media has been inclined to privilege the perpetuation of negative prejudices and only recently have there been initiatives or measures targeting xenophobic attitudes and perceptions of Greeks towards foreigners, aiming to promote tolerance, cultural pluralism and to bring forward the positive aspects of migration. Immigrant activism in mainstream associations like trade unions or political parties is barely existent. The main reasons for the lack of civic activism include the insecure legal status of many immigrant workers, their mistrust towards the Greek state (which has been very ambivalent in the implementation of regularisation and other immigrant policies) and their lack of time and resources to devote to activities other than paid work.

As a last note, scientific literature on the matter is extremely scarce.
The population of immigrant origin is relatively small in Hungary compared to many other EU countries. The number of foreign citizens legally residing in Hungary was approximately 140,000 in December, 2004, of which 112,000 had long term settlement permits. Persons with a settlement permit may vote in municipal elections. The public discourse is characterised by xenophobia and diaspora politics. The two largest immigrant groups are ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries and Chinese. Immigrant civic participation could not be identified as a major political or social issue in contemporary Hungary and research mainly relies on structured interviews conducted with immigrants and, in a very few cases, uses press content analysis, national NGO registers or survey techniques.

Preserving culture and maintaining cultural or national identity as well as religious activities are the main fields of civic participation: almost every immigrant community discussed in the literature has an organisation of these kinds. Other types of activities are pursued by special immigrant communities depending on their special needs and capacities. Powerful political activism in the form of lobby groups is typical of the Chinese community, economic associations for mutual aid or interest representation appeared among both Transylvanian Hungarians and the Chinese, and human rights associations are mainly established and maintained by African immigrants. The Chinese are the most active group of the migrants in the civic society, however their impact upon the host society is minimal as their activities are more or less restricted to their own community. The same is true in the case of the two largest refugee groups, i.e. Africans and Afghans. In both cases, the opportunity for civic activity is very low since other network forms, cultural and career patterns dominate the groups. Apart from small groups of intellectuals, the largest group of immigrants, i.e. ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring non-EU countries, seems to be inactive in the civil society. Overall, migrants’ level of activity is significantly lower than the level of civic activity of the majority.

The relation between migrant and majority organisations is only relevant in the field of refugee integration. A few visible refugee self-help groups – most of which are assisted by the Hungarian branch of UNHCR – play a role in the integration of the small number of refugees in Hungary. However, this role is mainly restricted to cultural activities. Although articles discussing the current situation are not available, several papers published in the 1990s reveal some examples of close relationships between certain migrant and mainstream society organisations. The most relevant issues of the field yet to be dealt with and the major research gaps are identified as the lack of relationship between the Chinese community and civil organisations of the majority society and the role of the quasi-diasporic situation of ethnic Hungarian migrants in restricting their civic activism.
Mass in-migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland. Until the beginning of the 1990s, Ireland was a country of continuous and sometimes massive emigration. But even at the height of mass emigration, migrants and minority ethnic groups were present in the country. Most migrants that came to Ireland before the mass in-migration of the last decade were temporary or non-permanent highly skilled workers and university teachers from the United Kingdom and North America. The mass in-migration that started in the mid-1990s has, however, resulted in dramatic changes in Ireland’s cultural and demographic landscape. According to the 2002 census, approximately 6 percent of Ireland’s 3.9m population was not Irish and another 1.3 percent was only part-Irish.

Public and academic discourse on immigrant civic participation has been muted in Ireland because, among other reasons, mass in-migration and the large-scale presence of immigrants are recent phenomena. The reluctance, mostly at an official level, to acknowledge Ireland as a major immigration destination has contributed to the silence on issues relating to immigrant civic participation. Consequently, there is a dearth of research and publications on immigrant civic participation in Ireland. The majority of academic and popular publications relate mainly to general immigration and immigrant issues and, of late, integration and inclusion measures.

Despite the dearth of literature, immigrant groups and individuals have been active in many facets of civic engagements, even in the days of low in-migration. Experiential knowledge and mass media reports suggest that the civic activism of immigrants has increased in the last few years – a change that is often attributed to the dramatic increase in the number of immigrants. Such a mono-causal explanation is challenged as other factors such as increased mobilisation and education and the specific immigration experiences of particular groups have contributed to the recent rise in civic activism among immigrants in Ireland. Many immigrants are engaged in civic activism because they want to effect a change, challenge a law or policy they considered unjust, attract social and material support for self-development or simply because they are bored. Active participation in civic activities is not evenly spread out among the different immigrant and minority ethnic groups in Ireland. The paths to civic activism for many individuals and groups are as different as their socio-cultural backgrounds and the kinds of activities in which they are involved. For some immigrants, civic activism in Ireland is a continuation of their life in their former home country, but for others it is a rough and uncharted path which their immigration experience and circumstances have forced them to tread. Particular groups appear to be more active in particular fields. The Filipinos have taken the lead in fighting for better rights for immigrant workers in the medical field, Africans are active in the religious sphere and in the anti-racism movements while the Chinese, though a large and fast-growing group, are largely absent on many fronts.

There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that some numerically bigger groups appear to be more active on many fronts than the smaller ones. Nigerians are a good example as they have set up more churches, championed anti-racism struggles and made a far greater foray into electoral politics than most groups. It is simplistic and intellectually naive to attribute these achievements to their large numbers. After all, the Chinese are equally as large and perhaps the fastest-growing non-EU group in Ireland. While they are beginning to make their mark in the economic sphere, their presence on the civic landscape is noticeable by their absence.
Just like other countries in Southern Europe, Italy has, in the course of less than two decades, rapidly and unexpectedly changed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. Italy witnessed a steady increase in the number of foreign nationals from 1986 to 2002. As of January, 2004, there were an estimated 2.6 million foreigners present in Italy, accounting for approximately 4.2 percent of the total resident population. Most of these immigrants are young people (aged between 20 and 40 years) who emigrated mainly for economic reasons. As early as 2001, more than half (about 59 percent) of the immigrant population had lived in Italy for more than five years. Acquisition of Italian citizenship, given the difficulties posed by the law currently in force, is still infrequent, with a high rejection rate.

Immigration towards Italy did not begin in a period of reconstruction and economic development, as it did in North-Western European nations, but rather during a time of severe economic crisis, characterised, among others, by growing unemployment. Italy has developed a piecemeal approach to immigration, lacking until recently a comprehensive and consistent policy framework. Several regularisation programmes have been enacted since the late 1980s (five times in sixteen years: 1986, 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2002), allowing the legalisation of more than 2 million immigrants. Nevertheless, these ‘amnesties’ have not solved the problem of undocumented migration. The 2002 regularisation programme brought to the fore a large number (approximately 700,000) of undocumented migrants working as care providers, domestic helpers and factory workers.

Italy, because of its geographical position, is highly exposed to penetration by illegal immigrants from the South and the East. Moreover, Italy like other southern EU countries, has a widespread informal economy that appears to be a prime determinant for illegal migration. Combating undocumented immigration and the trafficking of human beings is a priority both in terms of security and foreign policy, a priority to which public opinion is also sensitive. During the last two decades, the Italian mass media has promoted a negative and highly stereotyped image of immigrants. The main criticism against the media is the tendency to transmit alarmist information on immigration. News reports have linked immigration and undocumented (clandestine) entry to Italy, transforming all immigrants into ‘illegal’ ‘criminals’ ‘threats’ in the ‘common imaginary’.

Several NGOs, trade unions and charitable organisations have been active since the 1980s, providing assistance to undocumented immigrants who wish to obtain legal status. To facilitate contacts, these organisations encourage the civic participation of immigrants and their involvement in representative bodies. Furthermore, these organisations provide support for immigrant associations. Immigrant participation in trade unions, voluntary organisations, consultative bodies at the local and regional level and immigrant associations ensures their access to what are called ‘intermediate political rights’. However, civic and political participation remains mostly the realm of Italian citizens and naturalised immigrants.

Even though migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy and immigrant integration even a more recent one, there are a number of studies on immigrant integration and political participation.
According to the analysis of Latvia’s migration history, the biggest immigration flows occurred during the Soviet era. As the main migratory flows from 1951 to 1990 came from the nearby Soviet Republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the percentage of ethnic Latvians decreased from 77 percent in 1935 to 52 percent in 1989, while the percentage of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians increased. Since 1991, the net migration in Latvia has been negative: in general, more people leave Latvia than arrive. The main long-term migratory flows are still to and from CIS countries, with which the local people have maintained family relations and acquaintances and do not face language problems.

The statistics show that 78 percent of Latvian residents are citizens and 21 percent are non-citizens. The group of non-citizens is made up of individuals and their descendants who immigrated to Latvia during the Soviet era; according to 1995 Latvian legislation, former USSR citizens without Latvian or any other citizenship were granted the status of Latvian non-citizens. People with citizenship from other countries are called foreigners. The total number of foreigners is very small (about 1.4 percent), of which 1 percent are citizens of Russian Federation and about 0.4 percent are citizens of other countries. Due to the peculiarities of immigration history and the legislative system of Latvia, the main focus of this report is on the civic participation of non-citizens.

From the beginning of the naturalisation process in 1995 until early 2004, the percentage of non-citizens decreased from more than 29 percent to 20.8 percent. Non-citizens cannot vote in parliamentary elections, local elections or for referenda and they also unable to be a founder or a member of political parties. Consequently, one-fifth of the members of society have a limited right to participate in the process of decision-making and feel rather alienated from the state.

On the other hand, a lot of effort has been made in recent years to encourage non-citizens to become citizens of Latvia. According to the Citizenship Law (1994, amendments in 1998) to become citizens of Latvia, individuals must pass a naturalisation procedure. Over the course of the last several years, this procedure has been simplified a number of times. Likewise, since the establishment of the Secretariat of the Minister for Special Assignments for Society Integration Affairs, minority organisations in Latvia have better chances and more grant opportunities than do other organisations.

Altogether the studies on the third sector in Latvia indicate that NGOs are rather small in terms of membership. Their financial resources and capacity tend to be quite restricted; therefore their potential to mobilise segments of society is rather weak. About 20 percent of all inhabitants have a membership in a voluntary organisation. Individuals of other nationalities and non-citizens are slightly less involved in NGOs than ethnic Latvians. This can be explained by the alienation between the elite of state power and the inhabitants. According to survey data, the main fields of civic activities that immigrants, namely non-citizens, engage in do not differ significantly from those of citizens.

Current studies on political participation reveal an increase in the level of disenchantment with conventional political participation in Latvia. For the last two years, Russian speaking minorities (Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians) have been very active in different street protest actions. In 2000, politicized Russian speaking NGOs consolidated mutually to counteract against a language policy implemented in
the state. In 2004, in Riga and other cities, there were a number of protests by minority representatives, aimed against the changes which were planned for the minority education system in September 2004. This points towards an increasing gap between the Russian speaking community and the state as the political elite.
16. Lithuania

Rita Zukauskiene

The migration situation in Lithuania differs from most other Central-East European countries. Until the late 1980s, international migration in Lithuania was both intensive and stable. Since the end of World War II, Lithuania has undergone rapid, large-scale industrialisation, urbanisation and colonisation, due to the fact that in 1940 the Soviet Union occupied and annexed Lithuania. The migration of the labour force formed the ethnic groups of first generation immigrants. At that time, there were almost no migration relations with other foreign countries.

However, since 1989, as a result of political, social and economic changes in Lithuania, the migration situation has started to change, with some migration flows even reversing their direction. Until present, Lithuania has had a negative migration balance. This has been the prevailing trend in Lithuania for several years. The current immigrant waves to Lithuania mainly consist of the following three categories of persons: returning citizens (i.e., Lithuanians whose arrival is unlimited), reunion of family members (limited, although the priority is given to their arrival) and migration on business (the number is not high). The majority of immigrants come from Russia and the CIS countries.

The number of illegal transit migrants and refugees is relatively low. Although initially none of the transit migrants intend to stay in Lithuania or find work in the country, some of them eventually try to seek refugee status with the intention of staying in Lithuania. The law grants asylum and refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol.

At the national level, there is a legal and institutional framework to guide the implementation of the principle of equal treatment and to combat discrimination on the basis of racial and ethnic origin. The legal framework consists of the Constitution, laws, Lithuania’s obligations under international treaties and explanations of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Ethnic minorities receive fair treatment in Lithuania. Both citizens and permanent residents are equally supported by the state through social benefits, health and social insurance, pensions, loans, education subsidies for children, maternity leave and employment opportunities which are equally available to all. Social, political and economic changes that took place ten years ago have influenced the situation of all ethnic groups (including both majority and minority groups) in their selection of strategies of behaviour in the social sphere, their adaptation to new requirements (citizenship, civic loyalty, knowledge of the state language, value changes, participation in the newly formed bodies, e.g. the private or non-governmental sector) and, in a more active or passive way, their avoidance of adaptation (emigration, segregation, life in closed communities).

Existence of the non-governmental sector is directly related to the development of civil society. The first NGOs (public organisations, associations, support and charity foundations, communities, religious or church organisations) for ethnic groups were founded in 1991-1992. These organisations were mostly established on the basis of one ethnicity. All nationalities are represented by NGOs and their activities and cultural programmes are supported and funded by the Department of Ethnic Minorities and Emigrants under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and other NGO supporting budgetary foundations. Most NGOs restrict their activities to the interests and needs of one particular ethnic group. This leads to a relatively closed type of ideology and the development of activities focused on the cultivation of ethnic
consciousness and ethnic patriotism such as cultural events that are traditional in their form and content and are addressed to relatively passive elderly groups. The government Department of National Minorities and Emigrants, established to deal with national minority affairs, has implemented programmes such as “Encouragement of the Cultural Activities of the National Minority Communities”, “The Roma Integration into Lithuania’s Society”, “The Social Development of Eastern Lithuania” and “The Formation and Implementation of the Policy on National Relations and Contacts of the State with Emigrants.”

It could be concluded that international migration is far from being a homogeneous process and that the migration flows that affect Lithuania are currently undergoing various transformations.

The lack of new immigrant inflows to Lithuania (numbers of immigrants are still very low) has resulted in non-visible civic participation. From the review of the little existing material, studies and non-academic sources it appears that the main fields of civic participation are ethnic associations and participation in the legal and illegal labour market. Immigrants who arrived in Lithuania during the Soviet period have been naturalised and consider themselves Lithuanian citizens. They participate in religious associations, ethnic NGOs and political parties.
In Luxembourg, with its high percentage of foreign national inhabitants, civic participation of immigrants is evidently an important issue. The issue of civic participation is even more important as the proportion of foreigners is continually growing and the Luxembourgian population is aging. Hence, the electorate is becoming less representative of the actual active population. Against this background it is illuminating that it is virtually impossible to get information on civic active participation of immigrants in Luxembourg.

A survey of information on immigrant civic participation in Luxembourg poses two major problems. First, both political discourse and policies concerning foreigners in Luxembourg focus on the largest groups, i.e. European citizens, more precisely, those of Portuguese nationality. Currently about 38 percent of the population in Luxembourg is of foreign nationality, mainly from EU-member states. Second, the number of citizens from non-EU countries is small and they are statistically grouped together and represented and by the category of ‘other’. The economic and labour market situation is characterised by a particular feature of the labour force composition: only one third of the labour force is of Luxembourgian nationality, while one third consists of immigrant workers with permanent residence status and one third are commuters, coming from adjacent countries and entering Luxembourg daily or weekly.

Over the course of the last three decades, the debate on immigration and the integration of immigrants has gained little relevance in Luxembourg. Only recently have immigration issues become more politically important due to the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees, mainly from Bosnia and Africa, the consequent public attempts to deport them, and the protests of immigrant organisations against this practice. A generalised regularisation programme in 2001 delivered regular status to some irregular immigrants without much public attention.

The active civic participation of immigrants in public is focused primarily on the right to vote at the communal level. However, the demands to permit immigrant participation in local elections which arose for the first time in the early 1980s have still not been satisfied. On the contrary, the Luxembourgian government even managed – with reference to the large proportion of immigrants - to get a derogation for the European directive that stipulated the participation of immigrants from EU-member states in European and local elections. Thus, the government referred to this large proportion of foreigners in order to justify its policy of excluding immigrants. As a substitute for participation in elections, Communal Consultative Committees were introduced. Only after the treaty of Maastricht did immigrants from EU-member states acquire the right to vote. Non EU citizens will be allowed to participate in local elections for the first time in 2005. However, the participation rate is expected to be rather low due to an implementation procedure that requires every immigrant who wants to participate in local elections to register with the competent authorities 18 months before the election. This registration procedure for the electoral lists presents a further ‘natural’ obstacle. As the electoral lists for the communal elections of October 2005 have already been closed, only a slight amount of progress with regards to the numbers of registered foreigners can be noted.

The participation rate of immigrants in Luxembourgian associations is rather low. Likewise, the membership rate of immigrants in political parties is low and they do not hold party or public office. Whereas various trade unions count numerous foreigners
among their members, there are only a few foreign nationals registered with political parties. With a limited number of exceptions, immigrant NGOs are not extremely visible, nor are their political aims very well known. Immigrant associations are mainly concerned with the organisation of cultural events. Only a few associations deal with political issues. In particular, associations of refugees from Yugoslavia and Africa organise public protests against deportation and discrimination. Hitherto, immigration has been a rather neglected subject among academia and the Luxembourgian society.
Malta has been a country of emigration since the days of British colonial rule. With an area of just over 300 square kilometers and a total population of 399,867 inhabitants, the Maltese Islands have been one of the most densely populated countries in the world for several decades. So far, the political approach to immigration has been grounded on the assumption that a densely populated country with limited resources has no space for newcomers. As a result, the issue of immigration has been seen as a question of border control, in both discussions of accession to the EU and the illegal immigration phenomenon. In fact, the increasing number of "illegal" immigrants reaching the Maltese Islands since 2002 and the recurrent episodes of immigrants losing their lives at sea either when trying to reach Malta or when leaving the island to reach the coast of Sicily, have put the country's administration under enormous political pressure. The issue currently dominates the political debate and attracts the full attention of the national media.

In general, the country has a rigid protectionist approach to labour immigration aimed at safeguarding the national labour force from external competition. Maltese citizenship can easily be acquired by former Maltese citizens and the nuclear family of Maltese individuals, but citizenship is only granted on a discretionary basis for descendants of Maltese emigrants and long term residents. Foreign residents have active and passive voting rights in local elections after residing in the country for 6 months. Illegal immigrants, either asylum seekers or economic migrants, have no right to civic or political participation in Malta. They are usually detained upon arrival in closed centres. Detention policies in Malta have been harshly criticised for their low standards of treatment and especially for the duration of detention. According to government officials, these conditions are due to the difficulties of coping with the unprecedented influx of migrants and asylum seekers between 2001 and 2003. However, in order to improve conditions in the centres and to develop better relations with the residents, a new open centre was built for those whose applications have not been examined after 18 months. Residents of these centres were encouraged to elect their own leaders.

The largest groups of aliens living in Malta are Maltese emigrants, descendants of returned Maltese emigrants, or citizens of other EU member states, with British expatriates being the main group. Other groups are the historical Indian community, the “Arab-Muslim” community, predominantly Libyan and the smaller Nigerian and Albanian communities.

The dearth of research on immigrants in Malta and their civic participation does not allow for a comprehensive understanding of the situation. From the review of the little existing material and non-academic sources it appears that the main fields of civic participation are ethnic associations and self-help groups, followed by religious associations. Only one example of direct political engagement was found in the case of the Maltese candidate of Nigerian origin for the EP elections in 2004.
The current Dutch migrant population is characterised by a growing number of descendants of immigrants from former recruitment countries and post-colonial minorities, as well as a new migration based on family reunification, asylum and family formation. First generation immigrants, or ‘foreign-born’, make up 10 percent of the Dutch population; another 9 percent are descendants of immigrants or ‘second generation migrants’ who have at least one foreign-born parent. The largest groups are those of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Indonesian origin.

Although in preceding decades a multicultural and equal opportunity policy were followed and policies targeted specific ethnic minority groups, policy since the 1990s has been more generally focused on integration programmes. This has affected the funding system for migrant organisations, support to migrants’ civic activities and consultations with migrant organisations in various councils and support structures. In some situations, this has made it difficult for migrant organisations to continue their activities and to be taken seriously by local authorities. In several cities the migrant advisory boards have recently been discontinued.

Since 1985, foreign residents legally residing in the Netherlands for a minimum of five consecutive years have had active and passive voting rights for municipal elections. Only naturalised citizens can vote and stand for national elections. Representation of migrants in local councils and national politics is gradually increasing, but as a whole, this representation does not yet reflect the actual proportion of migrants in the general population. Electoral participation of migrants is lower than that of the majority population and, in some cities, particularly Amsterdam, participation in the 2002 elections dropped considerably. Political participation among the main ethnic communities has been a frequent object of study and is often related to the density of community organisation networks, their functions and cohesiveness and the levels of political trust within the different communities.

The literature has recently taken into account the position of less numerous ethnic groups and clearly indicates that there is not one form of migrant participation but many different realities even among the different Muslim communities (Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and refugee) in the Netherlands. The configuration of migrant organisations and their activities have been affected not only by changing policy conditions and subsidies, but also by the changing needs of the communities themselves, the differences in orientation between homeland societies and the Dutch society, the different forms of intervention by homeland political organisations that are quite often religious organisations, the varying degrees of mobilisation ranging from active participation to disaffection, and last but not least, the hostility towards foreigners and Islam in the general public debate.

With the change in generations, different types of self-organisation and mobilisation of identities have emerged among young descendants, influenced by the possibilities for debate offered within the Dutch public sphere and also by the use of modern communication technologies. On the one hand, these initiatives include the assertive intervention in the public debate by organisations of successful young professionals and students, aimed at the affirmation of positive role models. On the other hand, they also include the mobilisation of radical fringes among young urban descendants who defend ‘fundamentalist’ lifestyles and norms and show an exclusive interest in the
revalorisation of homeland identities. The various forms of active civic participation as well as the exclusion and disaffection of migrant youth need to be researched further.
The year of 1989 marked a turning point in the migration process in Poland. Profound political, legal and institutional changes in the country brought about inter alia, the opening of borders and the abolition of movement restrictions. Along with the political, social and economic transition which occurred in the Central and Eastern European region after 1989, the mechanisms and patterns of migration have also changed. Although Poland is still a country of emigration, it has recently experienced an inflow of asylum seekers, a movement of transit migrants and permanent immigration both from the East and the West. Indeed, a new ethnic diversity and the creation of a new ethnic consciousness can now be observed.

According to the population census of 2002, 775,300 persons or two percent of the total Polish population were born abroad (including in territories that belonged to Poland before World War II). More than 98 percent of permanent residents of Poland were of Polish citizenship, of which 1.2 percent (444,900 persons) held citizenship in both Poland and another country. The category of dual citizenship holders covered 279,600 German citizens (62.9 percent), 30,100 US citizens (6.8 percent), 14,500 Canadian citizens (3.3 percent), 7,300 French citizens and approximately one thousand citizens of the Ukraine. 40,200 persons held only foreign citizenship. In this category, Germans (7,900), Ukrainians (5,400) and Russians (3,200) were predominate.

However, as far as the active civic participation of immigrants in Poland is concerned, the situation is rather dramatic. Currently there are no formal structures that enable migrants to influence political decisions at any level. There are no consultative bodies or immigrants' parties. The question of voting rights at a local level for (non-EU) immigrants is not on the political agenda of any party. There is not even any public debate on the subject. The existing immigrant groups are still too weak and too new to the Polish soil to create organisations, parties or associations focused on political activities, local committees or migrant lobby organisations. They mainly concentrate on ways of improving the social and economic conditions of their existence in Poland. New immigrants groups now in the process of formation in Poland (such as Ukrainians and Armenians) tend to group themselves with their ethnic group that has lived in Poland for centuries. So far, with the exception of the Vietnamese community, almost all new immigrant structures have been created within or by the organisations set up by the old ethnic minorities.

Therefore, civic participation of immigrants or minorities is examined in Polish literature and research from the point of view of the revival of ethnic consciousness of old ‘ethnic minorities’ that started in 1989 and through the social and economic conditions of immigrants who have arrived in Poland since the early 1990s. Other than grey literature or media reports, there are no other sources on this issue. As far as the associations of ‘old’ national minorities are concerned, they take on various forms, sizes and activities, but are generally organised as socio-cultural associations. The registered ‘old’ minority organisations encompass religious associations, scout and youth organisations, cultural foundations and organisations representing the interests of certain professional groups within the minorities. New associations of the ‘old’ minorities that started to appear rapidly after 1989 have led to the public airing of minorities’ interests and have given minorities a chance to act in an open public forum. The possibility of establishing an institutional structure by minorities was both symbolic and constituted a substantial change in the status of ethnic minorities in Poland.
Portugal’s historical past has strongly influenced the composition of the country’s immigrant population. The main third-country foreign nationals in Portugal originate traditionally from Portuguese-speaking African countries (Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea Bissau and S. Tomé e Príncipe) and Brazil. In 2001, a newly created immigrant status entitled “permanence” authorisation uncovered a quantitative and qualitative change in the structure of the immigrant population in Portugal. First, there was a quantitative jump from 223,602 foreigners in 2001 to 364,203 regularised foreigners in 2003. Secondly, there was a substantial qualitative shift in the composition of the immigrant population. The majority of the new immigrants come from Eastern European countries, such as Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania and the Russian Federation. Thus, European countries outside the EU zone now rank second (after African countries) in their contribution of individuals to the immigrant population of Portugal.

The differences between the new and traditional immigration flows are visible in the geographical distribution of immigrants and in their insertion in the labour market. While the traditional flows would congregate around the metropolitan area of Lisbon and in the Algarve, the new migratory flows tend to be more geographically dispersed and present in less urbanized areas of Portugal. In terms of insertion in the labour market, although the construction sector is still the most important industry for immigrant labour, Eastern European workers may also be found in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors.

Access to Portuguese citizenship has been increasingly restricted in the past decades. In principle, foreign spouses and children of Portuguese citizens born abroad or adopted may acquire Portuguese nationality. Naturalisation and thus the acquisition of full citizen’s rights are available after 6 years of legal residence for foreign nationals from Portuguese speaking countries, and after 10 years of residence for other foreign nationals, provided that a number of other conditions are met. Access to local voting rights is granted to some nationalities on the basis of reciprocity, with voting rights being available after two years of legal residence for nationals from Portuguese speaking countries and after three years for others. Running for local elections requires four to five years of residence. Voting requires registration and registration rates are low.

The institutional conditions that encourage immigrants’ civic participation are divided into three different levels: state, local and civil society levels. At the state level, the High Commissioner for Migrations and Ethnic Minorities acts as mediator between state officials and the Portuguese civil society and, more specifically, immigrant communities. At the local level, some municipalities have created consultative councils and municipal departments aimed at encouraging the participation and representation in local policies of interests from immigrant groups and associations. In the civil society sphere, the main actors in Portugal that encourage immigrants’ civic participation are immigrant associations, mainstream associations directed toward immigration topics and, unions.

There is little research on the issue of civic participation of immigrants. On the one hand, the recent immigration history and the more urgent needs regarding school and economic integration kept this issue out of the research spotlight. On the other hand, it
was not until the beginning of the 1990s that immigrants took the very first steps toward collective mobilisation.

The political mobilisation of these groups has mainly occurred through ethnic and/or migrant organisations. Immigrant associations develop multiple roles, covering the social, cultural, economic and political domains. Political claims for the regularisation of illegal immigrants have been a permanent and important field of intervention since the mid-1990s. The most active immigrant groups are those from Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, as these groups constitute a larger number of ethnic associations, give priority to political claims, and present a more politicised discourse.
At the beginning of the 1990s, migration trends in Slovakia underwent a radical change. Slovakia began to transform from a country of emigration into a country of immigration. A set of fundamentally new phenomena appeared in Slovakia and found relevant actors in the country practically unprepared. A new conception for dealing with migration was not accepted until 2005. The country has particularly witnessed an unexpected growth in the number of asylum seekers and illegal migrants in recent years. The ratio of both transiting illegal migrants and asylum seekers to native inhabitants in Slovakia is one of the highest in Europe. On the contrary, the category of foreigners with a stay permit (temporary or permanent), which accounts for over 23,000 persons and is thus the most numerous group of non-natives, represents only 0.4 percent of the country’s total population and risks stagnation. Numerically, the largest group of non-EU citizens are from neighbouring Ukraine. Other big groups are from countries linked with traditional ethnic minorities (i.e. Russia and Bulgaria) and with migration initiated in the communist era (i.e. some Arab and Portuguese speaking countries, Vietnam). The legal and institutional conditions surrounding foreigners in Slovakia are not fully developed; officially are ensured by a combination of various laws, most of which have recently been harmonised with EU laws. The rights of foreigners are thus only guaranteed to a certain degree. The rights to liberty, privacy, conscience, religion and faith, the freedom of expression, the right to petition, assemble, associate and have membership in organisations are not restricted. Permanent residents have active and passive voting rights in local and regional elections, while for illegal migrants, asylum seekers and tolerated persons the free movement of persons, membership in political parties and the right to work are partly limited or even prohibited. Public opinion in the country is mostly unfavourable to migrants; there are obvious forms of xenophobia against migrants, sometimes exacerbated by social exclusion or discrimination. Questions of immigration are not considered important and are only rarely addressed. The most frequently discussed topics with relation to immigration are the rising flows and numbers of asylum applicants, the apprehension of illegal migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of migrants, the protection of the eastern Slovak border and developments in European migration or asylum policies. Due to Slovakia’s short history of international migration and the limited number of institutions dealing with particular topics of immigration, there is little research on immigrants in general and civic participation of immigrants. The following observations are mainly derived from conclusions from internet searches and expert interviews. In general, the degree of active civic participation of immigrants in Slovakia is very low when compared to that of the native population. Immigrants predominantly participate in various ethnic-cultural organisations. Russian and Bulgarian immigrants may group themselves with traditional ethnic minorities whose presence dates back to the 19th century (the Bulgarians) and the early 20th century (Russians). Ukrainians are often legal or illegal return-oriented workers with little visibility in the civic society. Particularly active in the area of civic activities are persons coming from countries in the near and Middle East, specifically Afghans and Arabs. Present since the communist era, many Afghans and Arabs came to Slovakia as students or workers in the 1970s and 1980s. Many were well educated and stayed in the country, often marrying Slovaks and building families and careers. A
second wave of Afghans came during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Similarly, there are immigrants from Portuguese speaking third-world countries, predominantly Angola, who also experienced early student and worker migration later followed by refugee migration. The Vietnamese community in Slovakia is extremely closed and maintains few links to participation in the mainstream society.
After the collapse of both communism and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Slovenia emerged as an independent state, which was soon to embark upon regional integration in the EU.

Migration policy in Slovenia is a relatively recent development. Before the 1950s it was predominantly a country of emigration. In the 1960s and 1970s, the picture gradually changed: new migrants from the East and South (mainly from the other Yugoslav republics) settled in Slovenia, while Slovenians still continued to (im)migrate as “guest workers” to the wealthy West. In the late 1980s and especially during the 1990s, with the intensification of ethnic conflicts throughout Yugoslavia, many new minorities came to Slovenia. Situated on important “migration routes” from East to West and North to South, Slovenia also started to attract immigrants from Third World countries. Initially, the influx of sizeable migrant groups, representing as much as 10 percent of the entire Slovenian population, was perceived as a clear threat to national identity. Young democratic institutions, civil society and the media were not always adequately prepared and did not have any previous experience in dealing with migration problems. Coping with “migration challenges” during the last decade has been more an experience of “learning by doing” for all actors involved in matters of migration and citizenship.

Since 2002, those foreign nationals with permanent residence in the country have the right to vote and stand as members of the municipal council. There have been no reported cases of immigrants or other foreign nationals (i.e. EU citizens) running for local elections.

Related research literature and various other publications do not present a very clear picture of the active civic participation of immigrants. Nevertheless, the first signs of active civic involvement are present, especially in large cities and among the “old migrants” from the former Yugoslav republics, such as Serbs, Bosnians and Croats. The media and the NGO community have also taken a pro-active stance not only to defend the immigrants’ rights, but also to give them a voice in public life.

In the Slovenian Constitution, there are special rights granted to members of the Italian and Hungarian autochthonous minorities and the Roma community. The ‘old immigrant’ communities strive to become new minorities with respective collective rights, so far without success. No research has been done to support the hypothesis that immigrants predominantly engage in religious associations, although this is the “common” public perception. The Muslim community has recently been quite active in the construction of a Muslim centre.
Previously a country of emigration, Spain experienced a period of continuous immigration after its entry into the European Union in 1985. This growth accelerated sharply in the first few years of the new century. In fact, the number of immigrants quadrupled between 1998 and 2004. At the beginning of 2005, aliens represented 9 percent of the total number of persons included in the local registers in Spain. Although Moroccans were the biggest group of non-EU immigrants in the 1990s, they have been overtaken in number by the rapid influx of immigrants from Latin America during this century. Among the non-EU aliens, Ecuadorians and Moroccans are dominant, followed by Colombians, Romanians, Argentineans, Peruvians, Bulgarians and Chinese. Irregular immigration is a major feature of immigration to Spain, currently representing almost half the total number of aliens. The great majority of immigrants who are legal today were regularised in one way or another during recent years, which means that they were at some point illegal immigrants.

So far, few non-EU immigrants are naturalised. Naturalisation rates are expected to increase as there are few requirements for those persons coming from countries with special cultural and historical bonds with Spain like Latinoamerica. They may obtain Spanish citizenship after two years of legal residence. In other cases, 10 years of legal residence are required, reduced to five in the case of refugees provided other conditions like good conduct are fulfilled.

Foreign nationals with residence permits have the right to meet, demonstrate, associate, join trade unions and professional organisations and maintain active and passive voting rights at the municipal level, provided that Spain has reciprocal agreements with their country of origin. Irregular immigrants in Spain lack political rights. These legal restraints have not prevented illegal immigrants from participating in immigrants’ associations or from attending demonstrations or sit-ins demanding “papers”. Immigrant associations are present in a national consultative body with little political influence. A limited amount of state subsidies are available for immigrant organisations, mainly for those organisations that also provide social services.

Given the lack of research, there are very few things that we can affirm with reliability regarding the civic participation of immigrants in Spain. The majority of immigrants in Spain are still in very precarious situations as they have only been in the country for a short period of time. This hinders any kind of civic participation. Probably belonging to a church (Islamic, Catholic, Orthodox, Adventist) is the only “civic” activity which is common among immigrants. The few studies that do exist are focused on immigrant associations whose main field of activity is providing social assistance to immigrants, either through legal aid for obtaining “papers” or other types of assistance such as finding lodging and jobs and connecting with social and charity services. The second principle area of activity involves filing claims against the Central Administration and demanding new regularisation processes and modifications to the legislation on aliens. Thirdly, associations are involved in activities related to leisure and the maintenance of the customs of their culture of origin. There are signs that the immigrants tend to associate more than the autochthonous population in Spain, which has one of the lowest rates of political association in Europe. However, we cannot assume that immigrants will contribute to a revitalising of the associative fabric, as the main function of these associations is assistance, which implies that the reason for associating may vanish when the situation of need disappears.
The Senegalese have been highlighted in several studies as being particularly active in the formation of associations, which can be explained by the intense associative and communal life in Senegal. There are no other noteworthy differences due to national origin. Although ATIME, the main Moroccan association in Spain is also the primary immigrant association, its pre-eminence may be due to two factors unrelated to its national idiosyncrasy: the immigration of Moroccan workers is the oldest type of economic immigration in Spain and for many years this was the most numerous of immigrant communities. It may be surprising that the associations of Ecuadorians, now the biggest national group of immigrants, have received little qualitative attention, but we must take into account the fact that immigration is growing and changing in its composition at a very fast pace in Spain.
In Sweden, there are currently one million immigrants and around 800,000 persons born to foreign parents. At the end of 2004, the total population of Sweden was 8.9 million people. The immigrant population represented 11 to 12 percent of the total population. Together with their children they represent 20 percent of the population. Approximately 40 percent of all immigrants who came to Sweden over the course of the last 60 years have returned to their home country or emigrated to a third country. While most immigrants came from European countries in the 1950s and 1960s, nowadays immigrants come from all corners of the world.

Immigration of citizens from Nordic countries has been without restriction since 1954 and of citizens from the European Economic Area since 1992. The Finnish population is still the biggest foreign population. Since 2004, citizens from the new EU countries can also move freely into Sweden if they find a job. Labour immigration was stimulated at the end of the 1940s and throughout the two decades that followed. It was stopped more or less at the end of 1969 by pressure from trade unions and by the creation of the Swedish Immigration Board. Since then, the main immigration to Sweden has either been refugees or spouses and relatives of persons already living in Sweden.

A policy reform started in 1965 and culminated during the 70s. Some of these reforms granted immigrants the right to vote in local and regional elections, the right to take Swedish language courses paid by employers and the right for their children to study their mother tongue in school. In addition, these reforms provided subsidies for immigrant and cultural organisations, as well as journals and magazines written by and for immigrants. Some of the reforms have been substantially changed or reversed in recent years.

Since the very beginning of Swedish immigration, immigrants have been allowed to have their own organisations. In some communities, they maintain an influence through consultative bodies. At the national level, immigrant organisations have had a continuous dialogue with authorities. Contact with other institutions of the host society has, on the other hand, been more sporadic.

The right to vote in local and regional elections as well as in referendums was granted to immigrants registered in Sweden for more than three years through a parliamentary decision in 1975. The degree of participation has decreased with every new election, from almost 60 percent in 1976 to 35 percent in 2002. There are different opinions as to the reason of this decrease. There is no major difference between immigrants who have become Swedish citizens and the Swedish native population. The small differences can mostly be explained by social status.

The research has primarily been concentrated on comparing the political representation of immigrants at different levels of society to the proportion of the general population that is politically represented. It has been noted that immigrant representation is fair, but that there is a gap between representation and participation, due in part to the segregation and ethnification in some parts of the society.

The participation of immigrants in important parts of the civic society is considered low. At the same time it is shown that immigrants who have become Swedish citizens have a higher rate of participation, explained mostly by their longer residence.
The United Kingdom’s long history of immigration which dates back to the 18th century, turned into mass immigration during the post-war years. Migration patterns have been shaped by the UK’s colonial past and its persisting links with the Commonwealth of Nations. Until today, the overwhelming majority of immigrants are from countries which have historical, cultural, linguistic and/or economic relations with the UK.

The migrant (foreign born) population represents 7.9 percent of the entire population (4.6 million, plus an unknown number of in-country born ‘black and Asian British’), in London where they are concentrated even 19 percent. 54 ethnic or national groups larger than 10,000 individuals have been identified and the UK is more diverse than ever. In demographic terms, the UK is unique in Europe because of its considerable population growth of 2.9 percent between 1991 and 2001, caused by both a rising birth rate and an increase in immigration. Since 1993, the UK has also shown a positive immigration balance of nearly 1 million individuals, while in earlier decades emigration usually outnumbered immigration. Available statistics are, however, confusing and dissatisfying.

Most present immigration is temporary (students, workers), but permanent settlement has steadily increased since the late 1990s. While most cases fall in the ‘dependants’ category, refugees dominate the category of ‘acceptances in its own right’. Work permit holders and other employees represent only 3.5 percent of all settlement acceptances. About half of the immigrant and ethnic minority population have UK citizenship; in the last decade about 800,000 immigrants have been naturalised, a practice which is becoming increasingly frequent.

Because of the ‘laissez faire’ approach to settlement, influenced by labour and housing market mechanisms and processes of discrimination, immigrants tend to form geographical clusters and develop ethnic minority, immigrant and refugee communities. The media debate on immigration is dominated by illegal immigration and asylum and more recently by discussion of the loopholes in the immigration control system and the resulting ‘immigration crisis’. The previously powerful concept of a positive perception of economic migration is at stake. But the debate seems to indicate a renewal of the traditional trade off, this time signalling: liberal migration policies require firm controls.

The legal and institutional framework is characterised by an efficient racial equality and anti-discrimination legislation, the Racial Equality act and a strong tradition of civil rights underscored by the new Human Rights act. Since 2000, the government has increased its efforts to encourage strong and active communities and to raise the participation of individuals in the voluntary sector. Regional schemes in particular target ethnic minorities, immigrant and refugee communities.

These measures, throughout the United Kingdom’s immigration history and for immigrants from all countries of origin, have created a rich landscape of participation in immigrant and ethnic minority social and political organisations, as well as participation in mainstream organisations. Likewise, there is a rich ethnic minority, immigrant and refugee media landscape. Regarding the post-war period, civic activities have usually been identified as a response to discrimination and racism and the accompanying social and political exclusion. The organisations have either been designed as self-help
organisations or as campaigning, protest and political organisations, and often they have been both. Civic participation is a concept that is infrequently applied to the activities of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the UK. Instead, concepts such as integration, communities, community organisations (COs) and voluntary activities are used. These are interwoven, as the widely held stance is that part of the integration process for immigrants requires the ability to create robust communities, not only by creating community organisations but also by equally representing the preconditions through which immigrants empower themselves and influence policy processes. Also used are the concepts of Black (meaning Afro-Caribbean, African and Asian) and, more recently, Black and minority ethnic (BME) organisations.

Immigrants are active even at the very highest levels of British society with twelve Members of Parliament and 662 local Councillors. Refugee community activities that focus on unrest in detention centres, anti-deportation and migration control related protests are very visible and raise considerable public attention. In recent years, settlement and integration issues have gained relevance. The single most important issue that has mobilised the UK’s ethnic minority and immigrant community has been police racism and judicial discrimination, namely after the murder of Stephen Lawrence, in 1993. The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry, corresponding with ongoing ‘black’ community civic activity and coinciding with a series of violent upheavals of Black and Asian people in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley in 2001, brought to light considerable institutional discrimination in all public services (McPherson, 1999). The report led to a reform of the Race Relations act in 2000 and triggered a wide array of integration efforts.

Establishing the state of the art of research in ethnic minority, immigrant and refugee civic participation brings to light that although there is a satisfying list of publications covering the early years from the 1950s to the 1980s, there are surprisingly few publications on recent developments. In particular, the gender perspective seems to be weak and research on smaller communities is rare.
Chapter 3:

Comparative Perspectives

Opportunity structures for immigrants’ active civic participation in the European Union: sharing comparative observations

Norbert Cyrus, Ruby Gropas, Ankica Kosic and Dita Vogel

Abstract

Over the past few decades, there have been significant population movements across the European continent and people from around the world have increasingly migrated to EU member states. This contribution intends to share preliminary observations from a comparative reading of 25 country reports. With regard to the importance of immigration, we distinguish four groups: states that have experienced high levels of migration for several decades; states that face immigration since the 1980s; states that have undergone a transition from emigration to immigration countries since the 1990s; and states with a low level of current new immigration. With regard to the composition of immigration, we identify the following reception patterns: the co-ethnic and returnee migration; colonial and post-colonial migration; pre-state formation settlement in newly founded states; immigration from recruitment programmes and subsequent family migration; immigration of asylum seekers and refugees; highly qualified immigration; new temporary workers’ schemes migration and, undocumented immigration. Depending on which pattern is examined, different groups of countries can be compared.

The comparison of key issues of the societal opportunity structure for immigrants’ participation shows that naturalisation regimes, the granting of local voting rights and the use of local advisory structures for immigrants does not lend itself to an easy country grouping. Immigrants may face very different opportunity structures not only depending on the country in which they live, but also depending on the rights that are linked to their specific country of origin and to their individual status as well as to the implementation of rights on the local level.

Thus, preliminary observations lead us to conclude that there is a need be very careful with generalisations regarding both countries of origin and receiving countries. Because we want to study the activation of immigrants in receiving societies and identify the influence of supporting and hindering conditions, we will have to take into account the specific circumstances of each individual case.
1. Introduction

All EU member states share the experience of immigration. Currently, it is estimated that about 18 million immigrants live in the twenty-five EU member states. Although it is impossible to provide accurate information due to the incoherence of statistical accounts, it is clear that immigrant populations differ considerably between the EU member states. These differences result from the host country’s distinct economic and historical development, its geo-political location and economic performance and other particular factors of each host country that may have encouraged immigration. As a consequence, immigrant populations are diversified in terms of countries of origin, duration of stay and size of the same-country immigrant group. Regardless of these differences, one general feature concerns all EU member states: each and every one of them has been faced with the challenge of integrating their immigrant population. The degree and extent of integration of immigrants presently living in the EU remains insufficient, not only for new arrivals but also for previous immigrant generations. Against this background, the European Commission and other relevant actors consider that improving the dialogue with migrant organisations and encouraging a wider participation of immigrants in civil society and the public sphere of EU member states are prerequisites for greater social and economic cohesion within Europe’s changing societies.

Given this situation, the POLITIS project tries to generate a deeper understanding of the factors that may encourage or discourage active civic participation of immigrants in EU host societies. This contribution is based on a comparative reading of the twenty-five POLITIS country reports that have been summarised in chapter 2. The reports form a text corpus of more than 1,500 pages, containing densely written characterisations of historical and legal situations as well as summaries of the relevant studies and fieldwork of the experts. Initially, comparative observations were noted in three reports on subgroups of countries and discussed during a project meeting in February 2005 in Oldenburg, and followed up in discussion that took place in the context of the first POLITIS Summer School that was held in Delphi in July 2005.

With this report, we like to share some of our observations from the reading, editing and discussion process. Thus, they are not the result of a rigorous comparative analysis, but they may well inform such an analysis, e.g. by helping to identify suitable countries for a more rigorous analysis, and by sensitizing the reader to differences and variations in the European Union. Our comparative observations seek to best take advantage of the wide variation of countries included in the study, sensitizing the reader to differences and commonalities across conventionally formed country groups and trying to raise curiosity to look more deeply at some of the countries that are often not yet part of a comparative analysis.

To begin with, we summarise the general importance of immigration and the specific immigration patterns across all countries. Then, we highlight some key issues in the societal opportunity structures of member states for civicly active participation of immigrants, namely the naturalisation regimes, local voting rights for foreign nationals and the structures of immigrant’s advisory boards. We conclude with remarks on the state of research on the civic participation of immigrants.

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The choice of aspects in the societal opportunity structures was influenced by three factors. First, they had to be important for the project objectives, i.e. active civic participation of immigrants under the influence of different opportunity structures. Second, the country reports had to be rich and relatively comprehensive with regard to these aspects so that we were reasonably confident to be able to contextualise the information. Finally, elements were chosen if they were considered to be academically pertinent. We are aware that we could have gone further with additional time, either by comparing our observations of additional elements of the opportunity structures (e.g. in trade unions) or by comparing our observations with the results of more recently published studies (e.g. in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 5/2005). However, we consider it useful to present our preliminary observations at this stage in order to encourage feedback from other scholars outside our project, and to thereby better guide our own future research.

2. The importance of immigration

Immigration can be considered important when the numbers are high or rapidly rising, or when it is a highly debated issue in the public arena. Reading the reports conveys the impression that the quantitative aspect of immigration is less important than the qualitative changes that are currently appearing in the phenomenon. In the first part of this section, we group countries according to the general importance of immigration, relating to major shifts in immigration trends and relevant debates. In the second part, we differentiate between major reception patterns, revealing further and sometimes cross-cutting commonalities and differences.

2.1. The general importance of immigration

At present, available statistics across the member states do not present a consistent numerical picture of immigrants within the EU. As mentioned above, there are no reliable figures on immigrants in the European Union due to the use of different statistical categories. Even after extensive efforts, it is impossible to get a clear and comprehensive statistical account of the stock and flow of immigration in all twenty-five member states.6

Current immigration into the European Union is characterised by an increase in the size of the migration influx, an increasing diversification of countries of origin of immigrant populations, a gradual decrease in the number of refugee and asylum seekers granted refugee and asylum status, and an increase in the level of illegal migration. However, it is obvious that the importance of immigration differs between the member states, which in turn influences the public perception of immigration and the opportunities for immigrants. Table 1 groups countries according to the importance of immigration movements.

Table 1: The importance of immigration for EU member countries

Level of Importance of immigration
High importance and changing patterns for several decades
Increasing importance of immigration since the 1980s
Increasing importance of immigration since the 1990s
Low importance except for minorities resulting from recent nation state building
Source: POLITIS compilation

2.1.1. High immigration and changing patterns for several decades

At the end of World War II and until the 1960s, Northern and Western EU member states shifted from being emigration countries to being immigration countries. This change was not always recognised in the public debate. France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and the UK have a relatively long migration history principally due to their colonial history or worker recruitment schemes. These countries are generally faced with aging first generation immigrants and the challenge of combating the social exclusion and marginalisation of second or third generation immigrants. Associated with this is the fact that economic crises and social frustration are exacerbating xenophobic reactions on the part of the majority populations while the religious factor is becoming increasingly visible and present within the immigrant population. Nevertheless, these countries not only have a long experience with different instruments for admitting and rejecting immigrants but they also have the most elaborate integration policies.

2.1.2. Increasing importance since the 1980s

Over the course of the last two decades, countries in the geographic periphery of the EU have become host countries. This is the case for Southern European countries (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) and for countries on the northern periphery of the European Union (i.e. Ireland and Finland). Their emigration patterns of the past have been reversed, mostly in spite of high rates of unemployment among native workers. This shift in European migration patterns partly reflects a gradual improvement in the economic situation and the living conditions in these countries, but it is also in part an unintended side effect of the restrictive measures taken by countries like the UK, France, Germany, and Switzerland. The immigration experience in these countries has been characterised by the absence of a consistent migration policy with a long-term approach to the issues of admission and integration. This has led to an increase in both illegal immigration and the number of migrants remaining in these countries unofficially or without proper papers namely for southern European countries which have long land and sea borders to the African continent. An irregular or illegal status has implications not only for migrants’ employment security but also for the extent of their integration in the host society. The large inflow of undocumented immigrants that has been common to the southern member states has led to repeated regularisation programmes. Since 1986, there have been five such programmes in
Italy involving more than two million immigrants and Greece has implemented two similar programmes with the third programme that is currently underway. Since 1992, Portugal has started four regularisation initiatives and Spain began its third and most far-reaching regularisation scheme in 2005.

2.1.3. Increasing importance since the 1990s

In a number of countries, major changes in migration patterns have only occurred since the 1990s. Certainly, the collapse of the communist states and the “Autumn of Nations” in 1989 was the most important contributing factor. Central European countries appear to be in the preliminary stages of an inflow of immigrants not only from former Soviet Union countries or neighbouring nations with which there was a formal relation (e.g. between former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), but also from the far East and from the West. But as a general rule, almost all formerly European communist states face the phenomenon of new immigration from African and Asian countries (e.g. Chinese citizens) as well as from some countries of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Ukrainian citizens in Poland). In recent years, CEE countries have also become an attractive destination for entrepreneurs from Western Europe and the USA. These immigrants are predominantly involved in economic activities in the tertiary sector as highly-skilled managers, experts, consultants, scientists etc. Public discussion is concerned with issues of policy formation and migration control. Although the islands of Malta and Cyprus do not fall within this group they have also experienced increased immigration since the 1990s. While Cyprus has allowed more temporary migration since the 1990s, Malta has been concerned with increasing amounts of illegal migration and asylum seekers only in the past five years. These countries are still characterised by emigration, but they simultaneously experience transit migration and new immigration influx.

2.1.4. Low importance except for minorities resulting from state formation

For some formerly communist states, migration is still of minor importance. This is true for the Baltic states, but also for Slovenia and Slovakia. With regard to the Baltic states, the previously steady migration flows from the former Soviet Union have generally ceased since the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, the emigration flows that were characteristic of the first years after their independence also appear to be levelling out. However, these countries are characterised by important minorities originally from the former Soviet Union who came as internal migrants before the state formation. This is also true for Slovenia where parts of its population stem from internal migration from other states of former Yugoslavia. Of all the EU member states, Slovakia seems to have the lowest level of immigration.

2.2. Patterns of immigrant reception in the EU 25 member states

Some of the main reasons for the existing diversity in immigrant populations within the 25 EU member states include the history of migration flows (i.e., colonialism, ‘guest worker’ recruitment schemes, etc), specific political and economic configurations between sending and receiving countries, geo-political circumstances, and national differences in immigration policies, to name a few. The types of migration patterns that can be observed throughout the EU member states are briefly examined below. This categorisation serves to highlight certain interesting features that may contribute to our understanding of the contemporary
immigrant population within the EU. This approach relates characteristics of immigration patterns (historical context and regional origin) with their respective political frameworks in the receiving countries. Thus, using the information from the 25 POLITIS country reports, we can derive the following eight patterns of immigrant reception:

- immigration of co-ethnics and returnees,
- migration related to colonialism or post-colonialism,
- pre-1989 settlement in the new EU member states that belonged to the communist bloc,
- settlement related to old ‘guest workers’ recruitment programmes followed by family unification,
- immigration of refugees and asylum seekers from other European states (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Turkey), from Africa and Asia or from the Middle East,
- migration in the framework of new temporary employment and contract schemes,
- immigration of highly qualified professionals,
- and finally, undocumented immigration with state reactions varying from active counter measures and repression to tolerance and regularisation.

We argue that these reception patterns affect the level and partly explain the fields of immigrants’ civic participation. First, the reception pattern often defines the degree of exclusion from participation rights and the path to equal participation rights. Second, these patterns may be linked to different moral claims of being part of the immigration society insofar as they give a specific justification to the migration and involve an expectation that migrants should or should not return.

2.2.1. Immigration of co-ethnics and returnees

The immigration of co-ethnics is often a neglected topic in migration research but is of particular importance for studies of civic participation of first generation immigrants. After surveying the twenty-five POLITIS country reports, it became clear that favourable reception patterns for co-ethnics are more widespread than we had previously realised. It is interesting to note that most country experts who reported immigration of co-ethnics and returnees assessed this pattern as rather unique for the country under study. The comparative reading of the country reports reveals that a favourable reception of co-ethnics is declared to be an exception that is usually substantiated with unique historical circumstances.

Two categories can be distinguished within this pattern: returnees and co-ethnics. Returnees were born in the country, emigrated, and have since returned after a long absence abroad. Co-ethnics are descendants of immigrants or members of co-ethnic communities abroad that result from past migration movements. While some EU-member states have a larger presence of returnees, other member states have a higher proportion of co-ethnics. Poland clarifies this distinction; persons who emigrated from Poland as adults and returned to the country after the system transition (mainly from the USA) are considered returnees whereas co-ethnics are the descendants of settlers and deportees mainly in Kazakhstan. In the case of Germany, immigrating co-ethnics...
(Aussiedler) today come mainly from Kazakhstan, whereas in Finland co-ethnics come from Estonia. Greece receives co-ethnics (Pontic Greeks) from the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and from Armenia, and a large number of ethnic Greeks from Albania, while Portugal’s retornados come mainly from Angola and Mozambique. Hungary is also a country with a high number of immigrants of ethnic origin. Since 1989, immigrants and temporary workers are mostly from ethnic Hungarian communities beyond the borders of contemporary Hungary (e.g. Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia). Another country that has experienced an increase in the number of co-ethnics is Italy. Here, immigrants (mostly from Argentina), whose parents from up to three generations prior were Italian, are still considered co-ethnics. Finally, there has been a remarkable flow of immigrants to the Baltic countries in recent years. This migration predominantly consists of a high percentage of repatriate citizens (returnees) who returned to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia when independence was restored. The reception of co-ethnics and returnees is often linked with access to privileged conditions and often includes some financial and institutional support that may be perceived to be exemplary good practice for an admission policy.

2.2.2. Colonial and post-colonial immigration

This pattern mainly pertains to member states with a colonial past and seems to have worked as a de facto substitute for the recruitment of workers. This is particularly the case for the UK, France, the Netherlands and to a certain extent, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. In these countries, immigrants were granted access to the territory as citizens of the former colonies with certain sets of rights associated to this status. The United Kingdom has received several immigrant groups from Commonwealth states of the West Indies, Asia (e.g. India and Pakistan) and Africa (e.g. Nigeria and Ghana), while France is concerned with immigrants from former African colonies (e.g. West Africa and Maghrebian Africa). The Netherlands has primarily welcomed former colonial subjects from Indonesia and Surinam, and Belgium has received migrants from its former African colonies such as Congo (former Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi. Spain has large immigrant communities from Ecuador, Argentina and Peru, and the main countries of origin of immigrants in Portugal are from Portuguese-speaking African PALOP countries (e.g. Angola, Cap Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique) and Brazil. Initially, immigration from Africa and Asia mainly took place within the framework of post-colonial migration but the receiving countries gradually put legal obstacles in place so as to curb post-colonial immigration.

2.2.3. Pre-state formation settlement in formerly dependent parts of larger communist states

This pattern mainly affects countries located in central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. During Soviet rule, large population movements took place and as a consequence, large numbers of Soviet citizens of Russian nationality settled in areas that became independent states after 1989. In these countries, internal migration movements were very characteristic for the communist era. At that time, there were almost no migration relations with other foreign countries outside the council for mutual aid. The governing regime tightly controlled emigration and political reasons for emigration were often intertwined with economic motives. The Czech Republic (then part of Czechoslovakia) experienced immigration within the framework of “international aid cooperation” schemes and the consequent intergovernmental
agreements drafted between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries including Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, Angola, and North Korea. In contrast, it is worth noting that there was hardly any immigration to Hungary between 1949 and 1989 with the exception of two politically motivated movements when Greek and Chilean communists were given asylum in the early 1950s and 1970s.

Throughout the large-scale industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s, significant numbers of people from different parts of the Soviet Union (mostly from Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia) settled in all of the Baltic states. As a consequence of nation state re-formation, most of the settlers are now identified as foreign nationals in the newly independent states, suggesting immigration. However, the reported high percentage of foreign residents in these countries is not linked with the movement of people across borders but rather with the movement of borders across people (see also chapter 1, 2.2).

2.2.4. Recruitment programmes and subsequent family migration

The pattern that has, until today, received the most attention and has been perceived to be the most important form of immigration are the recruitment programmes that were primarily implemented in the older host countries of Northern and Western European member states from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. These programmes, also known as guest-worker recruitment programmes, were established through bilateral governmental agreements mainly with Southern European and Mediterranean countries (though there were certain bilateral schemes of more relevance with more geographically distant countries such as the scheme linking Germany and South Korea). The recruitment was initially intended to be strictly temporary and recruited workers were expected to return to their country of origin. However, the return aspect of the agreements was not implemented in a strict and consistent manner. Instead, policies allowing for the repeated renewal of residence rights were commonplace. In the end, this led to settlement and subsequent family re-unification migration. This has been the case for immigrants from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia who have settled predominantly in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg. Although Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal are EU member states today and immigrants in these countries enjoy free mobility within the union, immigration from the former Yugoslavian states, Turkey and North Africa is still of third country status. Today, family formation (marrying a partner from the parents’ country of origin) is an important source of new immigration linked to this historical recruitment pattern.

2.2.5. Refugees and asylum seekers

Since the mid-1970s, Western European countries have received at least three major migration flows from some other part of Europe that were initiated by political persecution and war. The first wave was from the socialist countries of central and eastern Europe. These migrants were perceived as legitimate refugees escaping communist suppression and received preferential reception until the end of the 1980s. Due to restrictive passport regulations in most socialist countries, the largest refugee migration came from the least restrictive Polish People’s Republic. These migrants went primarily to Germany and secondarily to Italy, France and Greece when the martial law was imposed in 1981. The second most important refugee migration came from Turkey in the 1980s when members of the Kurdish minority and the religious minority of Alevits sought refuge predominantly in Germany, but also in Greece. The
third most important wave of refugee migration was a result of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. Between 1991 and 1995 hundreds of thousands refugees arrived in Germany, the UK, France, Austria, Italy, and Slovenia. These refugees only received temporary protection as civil war refugees and the majority have returned to their home country. However, a considerable proportion has remained in the receiving countries, among them Roma people who in particular have experienced problems of discrimination and intolerance in countries of settlement. From the mid 1970s until the early 1990s, the number of non-European persons applying for asylum increased drastically throughout the EU member states. The majority of asylum seekers came from countries affected by political intolerance, ethnic conflicts, and civil or international wars. Accordingly, the main regions of origin were Latin America (Chile, Columbia, Ecuador), Africa (Ghana, Congo, Nigeria, Somalia), the wider Middle East (Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco) and Asia (Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan).

Due to the constant rise in the number of asylum and refugee applications, by the mid-1990s some European countries had made the relevant regulatory frameworks and assessment criteria more restrictive. Germany, for example, has changed the respective article in the constitution in order to reduce the inflow of asylum seekers. This alteration has allowed for those asylum seekers who are legally identified as being from ‘safe countries’, to be returned to their country of origin. Asylum seekers and refugees have shifted in reaction to policy changes, with the peak of asylum applications being later in some countries than in others. The overall tendency of increase in the number of asylum seekers has been followed by stricter regulations, and then shown a decrease. The new member states are increasingly not only transit countries for asylum seekers, but also destination countries.

### 2.2.6. New temporary programmes

Temporary migration programmes has also been a permanent feature of migration regimes. The recruitment programmes of the 1960s were planned and propagated as temporary programmes, although not administered accordingly, and resulted in major settlement of recruited workers. After the recruitment stopped in the early 1970s, temporary programmes were used with greater reluctance in many countries. However, with the crash of the communist states in Eastern Europe and revived migration, older programmes increased in scope or new temporary programmes were introduced in order to find a legal way to respond to the pressure of migration. The majority of this immigrant labour force tends to be employed in the lower-skilled, more labour-intensive and volatile sectors of the economy. Mainly western European receiving countries coped with this immigration by introducing temporary employment schemes. Countries like Germany, the UK, France, Spain, or Cyprus introduced temporary employment schemes in order to enable the employment of a cheap and flexible labour force that was needed but not available through the existing conditions of the domestic labour market. At the same time, these programmes have been geared to strictly prevent the settlement of these blue-collar-workers. Until now, mainly citizens of the new EU-member states were temporarily employed within these programmes.

### 2.2.7. Highly qualified immigrants

There has always been temporary and permanent immigration of highly qualified professionals such as managers, investors and business persons, researchers in
academia and industry, engineers in multinational companies, sport professionals and actors in the Western and Southern EU countries. This migration occurs to a lesser extent in the new member states in the East. Immigration law usually foresees preferential treatment for highly qualified migration, but differs with regard to the degree of discretion and the definition of ‘high’ level skills. Although some highly qualified migrants have received particular media attention and have used their position to defend the cause of other immigrants, the majority of these migrants seem to be largely invisible and are not considered to be part of the immigration issue. In recent years, the discourse in many countries has had a tendency to actively address the issue of attracting this ‘gold-collar’ immigrant labour force. It is perceived to be a major challenge to attract and keep a part of this highly qualified, multilingual, internationally mobile cosmopolitan elite in order to enhance the knowledge-based competitiveness of its economy. Today, these migrants are still a minority. However, in most member states US citizenship is among the ten most important third-country nationalities. In the UK, only Indian citizens are more numerous. The question of their civic participation in the host societies has rarely been raised.

2.2.8. Undocumented migration and regularisation programmes

A large percentage of new immigrants in EU countries are undocumented. Due to either the gradual establishment of restrictions on migration or the absence of an appropriate migration policy, a proportion of the immigrant population currently has or has had an irregular or illegal status. Some have entered host countries illegally, others have entered with a valid visa or residence permit and “overstayed”. Depending on the control regime of the receiving country, some undocumented migrants may only work in unregistered jobs of the shadow economy whilst others may work in registered jobs. While some states – mainly in the North, e.g. Germany – reject regularisation campaigns as an option and generally react with restrictive measures, other states in the South have repeatedly reacted with regularisation programmes (s. 2.1.2.). Gaps in the regularisation laws, inefficient public bureaucracies and the lack of incentives for employers to ensure or facilitate the legal status of many migrants have complicated the situation. This has led to a situation that is continually fuelled by new immigration, where a significant size of the migrant labour force is informally employed and thus exists precariously.

3. Key issues for the societal opportunity structure for civic participation

3.1. General remarks

This section attempts to shed light on some important features of the societal opportunity structures for civic participation in Europe. This first point concerns the naturalisation and status regime of the countries. It influences the entitlements in all fields of civic participation. We concentrate further on some fundamental conditions for political participation of immigrants in Europe. We choose the issue of political participation of immigrants not because we think that this is the only important field of civic participation (see chapter 1). However, this is a field which has received the most research attention in
the past and is thus more comprehensively covered in the country reports than other issues.
We are aware that there are important variations in other fields as well. For example, when comparing the openness of the occupational representation regimes in Austria and Germany, it appears that Austria has excluded foreign nationals from more participation for a longer time. Likewise, the self-organisation of immigrants is viewed in varying ways in different member states. While this is encouraged and supported in some member states (e.g. Sweden and Finland), states like Denmark and the Netherlands have gone from maintaining a general organisational support policy to having a more restricted support policy and only assisting specific projects. In other states such as Germany, the extent and effects of public support are difficult to oversee as it is mainly an issue in the responsibility of local and federal state authorities. Moreover, in many new member states, immigrant organisations are only supported by the framework of EU funded programmes. The state relation with regard to religious organisations seems to vary widely, depending on the existing relationship between the state and religious community, and may have a big impact on religious communities that are dominated by immigrants. At this stage, we will not follow up on these issues, but will concentrate on local voting rights for foreign nationals and foreign advisory committees, given the fact that these issues have been relevant to most reports.
However, let us note that there are further conditions that influence and shape the opportunities for political participation. In Austria, for example, third-country nationals may freely participate in public assemblies and demonstrations, but they cannot organise assemblies or demonstrations or lead public assemblies dealing with public issues. In Greece, there is more and more involvement by immigrants in political parties but the right to vote and to stand for elections has not yet been recognised to non-EU nationals. In fact, in some member states, such as Estonia, immigrants cannot become members of political parties and the idea of immigrant naturalisation and full political participation remains a taboo subject. However, in the majority of the Member States there are no such restrictions, and, in the UK, there have even been a series of efforts to increase the participation not only of minorities but also of immigrants in party politics and civil society agencies. These differences indicate the importance of general features of the political opportunity structure which are not specifically directed at foreign born or foreign nationals.

3.2. Naturalisation and status regimes

As a general rule, all twenty-five EU member states have participation regimes that set distinctions for their own nationals, EU citizens and third-country nationals. Most of the time, only their own citizens enjoy full political and civic rights while non-citizens generally have to accept substantial restrictions. There is a differentiation between EU nationals and nationals from non-EU countries which does not only involve freedom of movement (EU nationals are free to live and work in any other EU member state) but also voting rights (EU nationals residing in another EU state are entitled to vote in European and local elections). The distinction between citizens and non-citizens seems to be the most important divide with regard to political participation.
However, for other participation fields the distinctions between different third-country status groups seem to be more important. Most states have designed a variety of status levels for specific groups – temporary workers, asylum seekers, family migrants,
immigrants with renewable residence permits and permanent residents. Each type of permit may encompass a specific set of rights which more or less deviate from citizens’ rights, and which change from country to country, despite EU efforts to define minimum conditions. While legal permanent residents sometimes enjoy full equality except for enfranchisement at the national level, undocumented workers may be de facto excluded from all rights or may only be allowed to access specific services like emergency health services. Asylum seekers may be restricted in their mobility in various ways ranging from detention and an obligation to live in specified places to being forbidden to leave a certain town. These restrictions will naturally influence their motivation and capacity to raise a voice in the public arena.

Having laid out this background, we will now concentrate on the naturalisation regimes. The underlying idea in all European polities is that it is citizenship and not residence that warrants full political and civic rights. Full political and civic rights may be acquired by immigrants from third-countries through the naturalisation process. Only naturalisation puts immigrants on par with EU citizens in terms of rights and obligations.

The various naturalisation processes are relevant in identifying which frameworks are more open to or more rigid in transforming certain immigrant groups into EU nationals, and in understanding whether and to what extent this might be a relevant component of civic activism.

Most EU states primarily base citizenship on ancestry (jus sanguinis) rather than on place of birth (jus soli), although more hybrid solutions are increasingly sought out. The naturalisation process is long and complicated in almost all countries, requiring that a very long list of documents be provided. Moreover, many EU states require the renunciation of one’s first nationality a prerequisite in order to naturalise, though in more recent years the tendency has been to provide the option of dual citizenship. Eligibility for naturalisation is basically defined on the basis of the length of stay. Other core determining factors include language proficiency, good character, sound mind and a non-criminal record. Acquisition of citizenship via marriage with a national of an EU member state is subject to specific conditions, as are the procedures for refugees and asylum holders.

In practical terms this means that first generation immigrants can request citizenship on the basis of length of residence in a country of the EU. Residence requirements vary among countries, but also in relation to country of origin and residence status (e.g., EU citizens, adopted foreigners, refugees, stateless persons, non-EU citizens, etc.). Children born to immigrants in the EU are usually considered to be ‘foreigners’, even though many EU member states have decreased residency and other naturalisation requirements for ‘second generation’ immigrants and have extended automatic citizenship for the ‘third generation’. Ireland is exceptional as it granted unconditional citizenship to all children born in Ireland until 2004. Since 2005, automatic rights to children of immigrants have been abolished unless one of the parents or grandparents has Irish citizenship or if the parent had been living in Ireland for three of the four years preceding the birth of the child – still a comparatively open regulation.

Greece holds one of the longest residence requirements in Europe. According to a policy which is currently under revision, immigrants are required to reside in the country for ten of the past twelve years in order to be eligible for Greek citizenship. In most EU countries, refugees and foreigners with regular residence permits may request citizenship if they have permanently resided in the territory of the country for 5 to 10 years.
In the CEE countries, the number of naturalisations was relatively high in the first half of the 1990s with over twelve thousand persons naturalised each year. Since 2000, this number has been much lower. The most numerous group is made up of returning co-ethnics who have lived in other countries for long periods of time. A specific situation was created in the newly formed Baltic states and Slovenia where immigrants from other regions of the former larger unit were not awarded citizenship. While there is some preferential treatment for gaining citizenship in the Baltic states, no special provisions have been made to recognise the sizeable community of citizens from other former Yugoslavian republics and war refugees that have resided in Slovenia for many years. Between 18,000 and 40,000 people were “erased” from the citizenship registers in the period immediately following national independence. In the Baltic countries after the restoration of independence, all other Soviet citizens and their descendants residing in these countries were declared to be non-citizens and were expected to undergo a naturalisation procedure. At the same time, ethnic expatriates and their descendants that chose to return to these countries were automatically granted citizenship. Requirements for the naturalisation procedure are similar in all three Baltic countries, and include five years residence, a legal source of income, and a thorough knowledge of both the constitution and the state language (an important factor which has hindered the naturalisation of a large part of the Russophone adult stateless population). Most of the immigrants who arrived in Latvia and Lithuania during the Soviet period have now been naturalised, but the situation is more difficult in Estonia. The annual number of naturalisations has grown smaller, and the majority of the people who have received citizenship in recent years have been children.

In fact, for many countries of Central Eastern Europe, naturalisation policies appear to be more strongly shaped by concerns about expatriates, diasporas and ethnic kin minorities in neighbouring countries than by immigration. It should be noted, however, that a number of older EU member states, (e.g. Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece), have also long pursued policies of preferential access to citizenship for persons who are considered ethnic or linguistic relatives. Germany awards German citizenship immediately to ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union who have been accepted as co-ethnics in the application procedure. Spain reduces the ten year legal residence requirement for naturalisation to two years for persons from countries that hold special cultural and historic bonds with Spain such as Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and most Latin American countries. Portugal also has a preferential regime for Portuguese-speaking countries since PALOP nationals require a minimum of six-year residence permit to be eligible, whereas a minimum of ten years is required for other third country nationals. As a result, every country has a specific distribution of naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants. This can be exemplified by Germany and the Netherlands; countries that have significant numbers of naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants. While Germany has granted preferential access to citizenship to ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Netherlands had granted preferential treatment to colonial subjects, at least until full independence was achieved. Although there are large proportions of naturalised immigrants within both of these states, the naturalised immigrants are visible in Dutch statistics, but not at all portrayed in German statistics. Both countries recruited workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Morocco in the 1960s and early 1970s and allowed subsequent family migration. But the Dutch naturalisation policy with regard to these groups was much more open than the German policy, resulting in a higher percentage of naturalised
immigrants from these countries in the Netherlands and a much lower percentage in Germany. Citizenship policies have long-term effects, and even though Dutch policies have recently become more restrictive, this cannot undermine those changes that were the result of more open policies in the past.

3.3. Local voting rights for non-EU citizens

The most visible aspect of active civic participation is political participation in the receiving country. The limitations of participation and representation in a democratic nation-state are traditionally defined by the denial of voting rights. The only exception to this involves EU nationals. Under EU directive 94/80 it has been stipulated that all EU member states must grant resident EU citizens voting rights in local and European level elections. However, both EU citizens and non-EU nationals are excluded from voting on the national level. They are only able to vote or stand for office if they are able to acquire citizenship through the various naturalisation procedures outlined above.

Nevertheless, some countries have offered non-EU immigrants access to voting rights at the local level. The 2004 report on immigration from the EU Commission noted that the majority of EU member states grant immigrants local voting rights. We can roughly distinguish three modes of incorporation: (1) the denial of voting rights on local level, (2) the granting of the right to vote but not to stand as candidate in local elections, and (3) the granting of full voting rights on the local level (see table 2).

Table 2: Local voting rights for third-country nationals in EU-member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of political incorporation on local level</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denial of local voting rights</td>
<td>Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granting of voting rights but not of the right to stand as candidate</td>
<td>Belgium, Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full voting rights on the local level when special requirements are fulfilled</td>
<td>Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 25 POLITIS country reports

(1) Denial of local voting rights: Nearly half of the EU member states belong to the first group of countries that do not grant voting rights on the local level to their resident foreign population. Altogether twelve countries strictly deny local enfranchisement (see table 2). But the fact that these countries deny immigrant voting rights on the local level does not mean that the issue is not part of the political debate. In those Western countries with a higher percentage of immigrant population such as Luxembourg, Italy, Germany or Austria, the introduction of voting rights for immigrants was at one moment or another already an issue on the political agenda. While the government of Luxembourg did not even consider the opportunity, legislators in some other countries took the proposal to enfranchise foreign residents more seriously but ultimately did not do so. The case of Germany with its federal
constitution is illuminating. Here, some of the federal states had passed a law that foresaw the voting right for resident non-EU nationals. However, the project was cancelled after a court ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 which underlined that the political voting right on every level of decision making is perceived to be the exclusive privilege of citizens. The only way to get political voting rights is the acquisition of citizenship.

(2) Reduced local voting rights: Two countries, Belgium and Estonia, have introduced a reduced voting right on the local level that gives resident non-EU citizens the right to vote but not stand in elections. In the case of Belgium where voting is compulsory for citizens, the enfranchisement of foreign nationals on the local level will come into force for the first time in 2006. The main requirement is to maintain a legal residence for at least five years. The regulation is a response to the claims of immigrant associations and their supporters to grant local voting rights. In the case of Estonia, foreign citizens and stateless persons – here the relatively large group of former Soviet citizens who lost their citizenship with the formation of the Estonian nation-state – are entitled to vote in local council elections if they hold a permanent residence permit and have resided legally on the territory of the corresponding municipality for at least five years by January 1 of the election year. However, the right to stand as a candidate is reserved for Estonian citizens.

(3) Enfranchisement: Currently at least eleven EU member states have enfranchised the resident foreign population on local level. Local voting rights were introduced in some countries several decades ago (e.g. Sweden 1976, Denmark 1981), while in other countries foreign nationals will enjoy local voting rights for the first time in forthcoming elections. All countries require the observance of particular conditions that define the eligibility of non-EU citizens to participate in local elections as voters or candidates. The most general requirements are legal status of a minimum duration (usually 5 years time) and that individuals have to register in order to vote. In some countries enfranchisement is restricted to immigrants who hold the citizenship of specific countries A notable exception to these obligations is Ireland where third-country nationals who are ‘ordinary residents’ have enjoyed full local voting rights from the first day of their registration with the local register since 2004. Three EU member states have only enfranchised individuals from particular countries. In the UK only citizens of commonwealth countries qualify to vote for local elections. In Spain and Portugal only those citizens of countries which have signed a mutual agreement to grant local voting rights can participate in local elections. In 1996, for example, Portugal introduced the immigrants’ right to vote and stand for election on the local level. However, only citizens from some countries are entitled to this political participation (namely Argentina, Brazil, Cap Verde, Chile, Israel, Norway, Venezuela, Uruguay and Peru) because enfranchisement is based on the principle of reciprocity between states.

When examining the distribution of local voting rights among EU member states, the following observations can be made. First, there are no geographical clusters. Northern, Southern and Eastern European countries are dispersed among all three groups. There is also no clear division with regard to the level of immigration and its composition: countries with high or low immigration numbers, with recent or long-term relevance of immigration debates, with or without the importance of ethnic and post-colonial immigration are in all three groups, and local voting rights are granted in new and old member states.

It can also be argued that local voting rights are granted in situations with a restrictive naturalisation regime and low naturalisation rates, in order to compensate for these
practices. But it appears that countries with an open naturalisation regime are also less reluctant to grant local voting rights. At this stage, we cannot analyse these suggestions in detail or provide more evidence from the literature, but the overview indicates that easy answers are not possible and that comparisons of only a few countries may lead to misleading conclusions. It can be observed that states with a strong ethnic or national element tend to be in the group that denies local voting rights, even though there is a certain trend towards local enfranchisement of immigrants in the European Union.

3.4. **Foreigners’ advisory boards on local, state or federal levels**

Many EU countries have introduced consultative bodies that include representatives from immigrant communities. Such institutions exist mainly at the local level and in a few cases also at the federal level (see table 3). We refer to these consultative bodies as foreigners’ advisory boards, regardless of the existing differences between national names and compositions of these bodies.

*Table 3: Introduction of advisory boards at federal and local level*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreigners’ advisory boards at</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal level</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some institutional representation at the local level</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No local representation</td>
<td>Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 25 POLITIS country reports

Governments of seven EU member states have introduced advisory boards at the federal level. As a rule, the composition of federal advisory boards is controlled by state agencies. The members are either directly appointed by authorities or are chosen by those immigrant associations entitled to make selections for membership in the advisory board. Federal advisory boards normally counsel legislators and authorities at the federal level. In practice, the federal boards have only restricted influence. At the local level, advisory boards exist not only in a wide variety of forms but also on different legal basis. As a rule, in countries where advisory boards exist the national law does not always oblige municipalities to introduce advisory boards. In Austria for example, municipalities may establish an advisory board but they are not required by law to do so. On the other hand, in Denmark or Luxembourg national law obliges all municipalities with a certain proportion of immigrant population to establish local integration councils. In Germany, the legal framework is set at the state level and differs considerably. In some federal states, municipalities with a certain
percentage of foreign population are obliged to organise advisory board elections for the foreign population. In Italy, some consultative bodies have been instituted at the local level. Large immigrant associations have been asked to elect representatives who then acquire legitimacy to express opinions on behalf of these associations within the consultative bodies. Interesting differences between the various municipalities can be noted when the composition of the consultative bodies and electoral regulations are taken into consideration. In some cases, these bodies are formed exclusively by immigrants while in others immigrants represent only a small part of the membership. According to a general appraisal, the institution of advisory boards is often criticized because these bodies only have advisory competencies and therefore cannot put forth decisive proposals that have a binding force for decision making. Thus, the extent to which they are able to contribute to the political empowerment of immigrants is restricted. In effect, such consultative institutions are blamed for not necessarily offering the appropriate vehicles or opportunity structures through which immigrant 'voices' can be integrated in the host country's politics. It is argued that in a political system in which immigrants do not have the right to vote or stand for election, the principle of consultation can easily contribute to reproducing the political exclusion and powerlessness of immigrants. It is furthermore argued that these boards merely provide an illusion of participation in the structures of power and convey a deceptive image of a political system which is more open to the inclusion of immigrants than it actually is. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that immigrants can only participate in consultative bodies on issues that are of specific concern to them thereby restricting their participation and not encouraging engagement on wider, more general societal issues. However, the information gathered for the POLITIS country reports indicates that such a critique may be overgeneralised and misleading. In effect, advisory boards may serve as a substitute for denied local voting rights and thus may only function figuratively. Nevertheless, several countries have introduced both local voting rights and local advisory boards. In the case of the Netherlands, the municipalities are particularly interested in establishing local advisory boards as a complementary element of immigrant participation. The advisory boards provide different ways of communicating with immigrant communities. Elsewhere, the absence of advisory boards may be due to low levels of immigration, as is the case for Cyprus and Poland where the participation of immigrants has never been on the political agenda. On the other hand, the case of the UK shows that the absence of advisory boards does not necessarily mean that immigrant voices have been neglected. In the UK, local authorities are obliged by national law to develop direct channels of communication with leaders and representatives of ethnic communities. The relevance and usefulness of advisory boards is context bound. A main problem that hampers the usefulness of local advisory boards is their attached double function in many countries. Advisory boards are simultaneously designed to advise local policy makers and local authorities and to represent immigrants according to their nationality or ethnic belonging. The two targets are conflicting in so far as members of the advisory boards are appointed – or even elected - in order to represent a particular ethnic community or national group. Such a procedure of filling advisory boards does not fully comply with the counselling function which would require that members of advisory boards be appointed according to their personal expertise rather than elected according to their nationality or ethnic belonging. This situation may frustrate both inactive immigrants who do not see themselves represented and active
immigrants who realise that their advice often does not carry much weight or is not taken into account at all.

4. Some features of participation research in the EU-25

The most general and unsurprising remark concerning the research landscape is that immigrants’ participation is a relatively new research topic. Only in a very small number of countries is this subject at the centre of more intensive research efforts. Indeed, the majority of country reports indicate that the issue of immigrant participation has not been researched at all. This is the case for all new member states, Luxembourg, and the southern EU member states of Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece. In Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, France and the UK, a new research strand predominantly examines specific aspects of integration including immigrant political participation, integration in labour markets, and the formation of immigrant associations. In addition, growing interest in migration-related research has been observed in countries that are being transformed from emigration to immigration states such as Finlad, Ireland, and Poland. There is also a growing body of comparative research that compares the opportunity structures in a few countries or interprets loosely related local studies.7

Three topics appear to be at the top of research agenda: (1) political participation of immigrants (i.e. voting behaviour and participation in foreigners’ advisory boards); (2) mapping of immigrant associations and their impact on integration; (3) participation in institutions of mainstream societies (trade unions, parties and other). There is often no distinction made between the first and second generation of immigrants, and the second generation has received at least as much attention as the first.

The process of immigrant activation which is the primary concern of the POLITIS research project has not been well developed. However, some aspects have been dealt with indirectly through focused research on immigrant associations.

When comparing the plethora of research in some countries with the extremely limited research on migration issues in others, a number of observations can be put forward. First, research is linked to the amount of immigration; countries that have not yet experienced large immigration flows tend to be less interested in dealing with the integration and participation of immigrants. It must be noted, however, that there are exceptions like Luxembourg where the presence of a large immigrant population does not automatically arouse research interest in immigrants’ participation. Thus, a second observation is that research interest seems to initially be linked with the general perception that immigration has become a challenge for the host society. There are a number of studies in different countries that have been commissioned or funded by public authorities. This could explain, for instance, why there is practically no reliable data on immigrants’ participation in Luxembourg where immigration has not been perceived as major challenge due to the country’s economic prosperity and the kind of migrant workers it has attracted.

Lastly, a factor that has contributed to the development of a European research landscape in participation studies seems to be linked to a phenomenon that we can

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define as academic globalization. Research on immigrant participation in the USA has been increasingly prolific and seems to have encouraged similar research on the other side of the Atlantic. However, the country reports indicate that this research is mainly descriptive and aims at offering information relevant for a more consolidated debate on immigration policy. As the country reports suggest, research is often implicitly guided by the main question of successful or failed integration. While participation in mainstream institutions is interpreted as successful integration, membership or active participation in immigrant associations is more controversial. As a rule, member states like the UK with a more multicultural concept of immigrant policies tend to attribute a positive value to membership in immigrant associations. Member states like France, Austria or Germany that are characterised by a republican or assimilationist concept of immigrant policies have met the creation of immigrant associations with some reservations even though there are existing support systems that encourage this associative activity (i.e. the availability of public funding to support these associations).

The comparative analysis of the country reports indicates a shift in the approach toward immigration. The Netherlands illustrate this paradigm shift from a multicultural approach in the 1990s to a more integrationist approach in the 2000s. This development is also reflected in the kind of research that is underway and the kind of funding that is available.

5. Final remark

In the POLITIS research project, we seek to understand why temporary migrants and permanent immigrants from third countries become active in the receiving societies, what influences their choice of activity, and which factors promote or inhibit immigrant activism. The twenty-five POLITIS country reports have made us aware that we have to be very careful with generalisations regarding receiving or sending countries. The selected observations that have been summarised in this contribution allude to the fact that most immigrants may face very specific conditions and potentially unique combinations of conditions that depend not only on national circumstances, but also on local circumstances in their countries of residence, on their nationality, their status, and the period in which they entered the receiving country. Our objective is to study the activation of immigrants in the receiving society under the influence of these supporting and hindering conditions. It is pertinent to our work to observe the specific circumstances of each individual case.
### 6. POLITIS Country Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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