Local integration policies for migrants in Europe
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In the spring of 2006, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the City of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions came together to form a ‘European network of Cities for Local Integration Policy of Migrants’ (CLIP). The CLIP network, which was officially launched in Dublin in September 2006, aims to bring together 25 large European cities in a joint learning process over several years, aimed at supporting the social and economic integration of migrants, at combating social inequalities and discrimination and helping immigrants to preserve their cultural identity. This joint initiative marks a new phase in the Foundation’s longstanding work in the field of social inclusion.

European cities, especially the larger cities with strong economies, have considerable experience in integrating a highly diverse and culturally rich immigrant population into the local community. They can use this experience in developing strategies on how best to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities and encourage their participation in society. However, cities and municipalities often have to pay the price for failed integration processes – although they are not in control of immigration flows and depend on national and federal legislation in all immigration related issues. For this reason, cities and municipalities have a genuine interest in following successful local integration practices.

This report follows on from a 2006 Foundation study into local integration policies for immigrants in Europe, Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities, which investigated the concept of integration. The report describes the historical and institutional factors which shaped migration policy in 12 EU Member States and analyses local integration policies in 14 European cities. While it points to the very different migration histories and patterns in different European countries and cities and the distinctive ways of implementing concrete integration measures, it identifies areas of common experience and practice. The report concludes that there is no single European integration model, and recommends taking good practice measures based on joint experience to develop a more effective and targeted integration policy.

In light of recent re-shaping of the physical contours of the European Union, we trust that this report will offer guidance on how to create the conditions for harmonious co-existence between citizens and immigrants in the future.

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Introduction

The social integration of migrants into a host society always has a very strong local dimension. For this reason, national and European policies aiming at strengthening social integration and equal opportunities for the resident population have to consider the local, mainly the urban, context.

First, some remarks about the concept of integration and the current importance of this issue. The report, *Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities*, published by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions,\(^1\) states that the concept of integration is understood as the process of inclusion of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society. For the migrants, integration means a process of learning a new culture, acquiring rights, accessing position and status, building personal relations with members of the receiving society and growing to identify with it. For the receiving society, integration means opening up institutions, giving migrants equal opportunities and publicly welcoming their integration into society.

The concept differentiates between the dimensions of structural integration, cultural integration, interactive integration and identificational integration. This is the foundation for developing a framework for identifying integration needs and policies in an urban context. Needs and policies should relate to the framing of the immigration situation; general and specific policies of integration have to view the migrants as actors and not simply as objects of measures by others. Although by no means all immigrants are in a precarious situation, certain groups face a difficult situation which has the potential to threaten urban and societal cohesion.

This risk constitutes a challenge for many municipalities and for Europe as a whole. Therefore the European Commission recommends in its communication, ‘A Common Agenda for Integration, Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’ (COM(2005) 389), the exchange of information and good practice between regional, local and urban authorities through networks operating at EU level. Other European players, such as the Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council of Europe (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe) are supporting this European exchange and cooperation. Since this political discussion has already taken place in the report mentioned above, this is not the place to repeat it.

As outlined above, cities are relevant stakeholders and players in the integration of migrants. Any policy aiming at promoting social cohesion and equal opportunity depends on the contribution of cities.

Nevertheless, municipal policy is embedded in a specific national background. The migration history of a country as well as the nation’s philosophy and its concept of integration have an influence on the local policy: the national framework defines to a certain degree what municipalities can do with regard to the integration of migrants. Therefore this study firstly provides basic information about the national background and framework of local integration policies of twelve different European countries. It describes briefly the migration history and the integration paradigm of the respective

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\(^1\) The concept paper, ‘Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities’, written by Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann, is intended to create the framework for implementing a proposed project, involving cooperation between local and regional actors in the area of integration policy at the local level. It analyses the meaning of the term ‘integration’ and locates it in the context of other concepts prominent in discussion of immigrant integration. Further, it discusses the political discourse on local integration policies among important actors at the European level. This paper has also been published by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (http://eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/e9622.htm).
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country. Additionally it describes the institutional implementation of integration policies and the most relevant actors at the national level. Secondly, this study delivers insights into integration policy at the municipal level. The short profiles of fourteen European cities present some general data, for instance the percentage and origins of the migrant population. Furthermore they describe the principles of municipal integration and concrete measures taken. These are placed in the context of the respective regional and national framework.

The selection of both countries and cities should not be understood as choosing ‘best practices’; it simply aims to show different interesting approaches. The cities and countries described represent distinctive methods of integration (assimilative versus multicultural concepts, ‘non-policies’ etc.) as well as very different migration histories and experiences: some countries have experienced substantial immigration over many decades; others are former emigration countries that are now becoming ‘new’ countries of immigration.

The purpose of this report is not an analytical evaluation of the national and local policies. The idea is to exemplify different ways of implementing integration policies and to show the large variations within European countries and cities. The paper should create an understanding of the distinctive migration situations and integration philosophies in the countries and cities. It is facilitating the exchange of experiences on integration practices between European municipalities, and provides a basis for better cooperation within the CLIP project (Network of Cities for Local Integration Policy).
Austria

Austria has been a country of immigration for a long time. After the Second World War many refugees, mainly ethnic Germans and others from Eastern European countries, came to Austria. The second significant migration to Austria consisted of Hungarian refugees in 1956 and 1957. In 1968/69 refugees came from Czechoslovakia, and in 1981/82 from Poland. These flows consisted of migrants, especially refugees, for whom Austria was mainly a temporary stop.

In the 1960s Austria began to recruit foreign workers. In 1964 the country signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey, and in 1966 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The employment of foreign workers was based on the so-called 'rotation principle' reflecting the wish for a limited presence of migrants in Austria. Their integration into social life was focused on their contribution to the labour market. The oil crisis of 1973 and the resulting economic stagnation led to a halt in the recruitment of guest workers. Because of the new economic and legal situation, some of the migrant workers - especially Yugoslavs - returned to their home countries (Appel et al, 2005, pp. 3–49).

An increase in immigration, particularly from Eastern Europe, followed the fall of the Iron Curtain in autumn 1989. Apart from growing numbers of refugees, Austria was confronted with growing illegal migration flows. This time, the great migration wave was not made up of workers, but of refugees, many of whom once again viewed Austria as a transit country.

The situation changed at the beginning of the 1990s, when civil wars and ethnic cleansing in Croatia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–93), and in Kosovo (1998–99) caused mass flights to Austria and other Western European countries. Often these immigrants no longer saw Austria as a transit country, but as a place of refuge. Nonetheless, most of the war refugees later returned to their home countries (Appel et al, 2005, pp. 3–49).

Nowadays Austria faces a variety of migration trends. In addition to seasonal workers and cross-border commuters, there are many immigrants residing permanently in the country. The present migration and integration policy, however, still does not consider Austria as a country of immigration. Political measures still concentrate on the regulation of immigration.

Between 1960 and 1990 Austria had no coherent ideas for promoting integration at the national level, and adequate institutions did not exist at the national level to ensure or develop integration measures. On the other hand, Austria was the first country in Europe to try to regulate migration by law: since 1993 the government has set annual quotas for different migration groups to limit legal immigration. As in other European countries, the regulations restricting immigration flows have been combined with the goal of integrating foreigners who have lived in the country for a long time and are likely to stay. So, since the 1990s, immigration to Austria has been institutionalised and is legally regulated on the basis of the principle that existing migrants should be integrated before further significant immigration is accepted.

On the other hand, the government in Austria installed in 1990 the principle that the number of foreign workers must not exceed 8% of the total of working people. This principle (Inländerprimat) creates certain barriers for promoting the integration of migrants by active measures targeted at
structural integration in the labour market, an important factor for integration in general. Another indicator of a restrictive immigration policy at the national level is the limitation of family reunification by including families in the quota system for newcomers (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 164 ff.).

The naturalisation law of Austria is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* [citizenship by blood] and regards naturalisation as the ‘end result of all integration processes’, not as a necessary means during the integration process (Waldrauch, Cinar 2003, p. 283). To become an Austrian citizen is seen as the last step in the successful integration of foreigners in Austria. Compared with other Western European countries, Austrian citizenship law ranked last in respect of openness to integration (König and Hintermann, 2003, p. 13). There are no provisions of a *jus soli* [citizenship by birthright] type even for children who are born and raised in Austria.

Finally third country citizens do not enjoy active or passive rights to vote either at the federal, provincial or municipal level in Austria. An exception is the city of Vienna, which in 2002 granted non-EU citizens the right to vote, limited to elections in district councils on condition that the foreigner had lived legally in Vienna for at least five years. The restrictive Austrian policy on political integration is also reflected in the limitations on third-country citizens’ access to public services and on restrictions to their freedom of assembly and of association (Waldrauch, 2001, p. 420).

At the federal level the government approved, in 2002, passage of an ‘Integration Agreement’ giving a clear signal that the executive branch favoured integration versus new migration. The agreement is essentially a ‘contract’ between Austrian society and immigrants. All third-country nationals who have become residents since 1 January 1998, and all new immigrants, are obliged to attend German language courses. Exempted from this requirement are relatives of Austrian and EU citizens, people who can prove they already have a certain level of German language skills, toddlers and school children. Regarding integration into the job market, it is important to note that the (rapid) fulfilment of the agreement can lead to receiving a first-year restricted work permit (Appel et al, 2005, pp. 3–49).

To sum up, integration has become a ‘key concept both in the wider debate on immigration and for immigration policies. Generally, however, integration is rarely discussed as a concept to guide policy makers in designing legal ‘integration pathways’ in a way that favours the wider social, economic and political integration of migrants. Thus, the debate is more concerned with finding remedies for perceived integration deficiencies of individual migrants than tackling known obstacles to integration’ (Kraler and Sohler, 2005, p. 17).

Since it is a federal republic, Austria is a country with a very complex institutional system. One result can be the loss of coherent implementation at the different levels at which integration policies have to be implemented: the federal, the provincial and the municipal. Due to the few structures and measures at the national level – some would say due to lack of input at the national level – the provinces and municipalities have themselves put in place integration measures, as Austria’s federal provinces are also responsible for both migration and integration policies. But, to date, no common understanding of integration is present among the political institutions at the provincial level. Consequently, not all provinces have public offices devoted to integration matters or individuals charged specifically with facilitating the integration process. Most of the existing institutions are part of the municipal and provincial administrations (Appel et al, 2005, pp. 3–49).
With the exception of Vienna, the integration measures of larger cities are limited to the promotion of NGOs and migrants’ organisations. Only a few cities have installed executive offices responsible for the support of integration (Europaforum Wien 2002, p. 167). The trend to develop integration principles at the municipal level is a quite recent phenomenon in Austria. The city of Dornbirn, in Vorarlberg, has taken a pioneering role in this respect. Austrian provinces and municipalities are also developing other methods of integration such as advisory boards for foreigners, integration conferences, integration branches and ad-hoc programmes.

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Belgium

Belgium has always experienced significant migration flows. While during the 19th century these migration flows consisted of internal migration, after the Second World War Belgium definitely became an immigration country. At that time the booming Walloon industry attracted workers from neighbouring countries and later from Italy and Poland. At that time the mining sector was seen to be crucial in revitalising the Belgian economy and in rebuilding the country. This led to the conclusion of various recruitment agreements between the Belgian government and several Mediterranean countries. As a result of one of these bilateral agreements, for example, some 2,000 Italian workers were transferred from Milan to Belgium by train every week. Only after 1955 was the recruitment of foreign labourers no longer limited to the mining sector, but was progressively extended to the steel industry and the construction sector.

In subsequent years the economic boom throughout Europe and the competition for migrant workers with neighbouring countries forced Belgium to further expand its recruitment targets. Thus in 1964 bilateral agreements were concluded with Morocco and Turkey, followed by Tunisia (1969) and Algeria (1970). These low skilled migrant workers, invited explicitly to bring their families along, settled mainly in major cities, especially in Brussels. In the late 1960s the crisis of the coal industry induced the Belgian government to move progressively from an open to a more restrictive immigration policy. The global oil crisis and the related worldwide economic recession confirmed the Belgian government in holding to its position on migration issues and even led it to impose stricter controls on migration flows from 1974 onwards.

Nevertheless the policy change did not lead to a complete halt to the legal migration of third-country nationals, as family reunion was still allowed. Belgium has remained an immigration country.² As at 1 January 2004, there were 860,287 foreign nationals living legally in Belgium (8.27% of the population), of which some 263,000 lived in the Brussels area. In comparison with the other regions of Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), the region of Brussels-Capital hosts the largest number of foreign nationals (about 30% of its population) (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, pp. 6–10; Lafleur, 2005, p. 1; Institut National de la Statistique, 2004).

Belgian migration policy, i.e. the regulation of entry and residence, has always been a national competence, while integration policy is largely in the hands of the single communities. Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs state, however, that ‘depending on the policy field (labour, education, housing, urban renewal, fight against poverty etc.) or the region concerned (Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels), political authorities from all levels of powers have a share in the policies directly or indirectly related to the participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in society’ (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, p. 12). Nevertheless, in 1989 the Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policies (RCMP) was established, attached to the Prime Minister’s administration. This was a semi-official body aimed at the development and monitoring of integration policies for foreigners and ethnic minorities. In 1993 the Commissariat was replaced by a permanent institute, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism (CEOFR) (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, p. 12).

Of particular importance is the definition of integration which the Commissariat introduced as a principle of governmental policies on immigrants and ethnic minorities. On the one hand integration is perceived as incorporating migrants into Belgian society according to three guiding principles:

² It is important to note though, that Belgium has never opted for recruiting workers from its former colonies, such as Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, 8).
a) assimilation where the ‘public order’ demands this;

b) consequent promotion of the best possible ‘fitting in’, according to the orientating social principles which support the culture of the host country and which are related to ‘modernity’, ‘emancipation’ and ‘true pluralism’ as understood by a modern western state;


On the other hand, integration in Belgium is perceived to include ‘promotion of structural involvement of minorities in activities and aims of the government’ (CRPI 1989, p. 39 cited in Bousetta, Gsir, Jacobs 2005, p. 12).

This framework on integration, as formulated by the RCMP and the CEOFR, has been taken over as conceptual guidelines by the Flemish as well as the Francophone policies. They have, however, stressed other dimensions. It appears that the linguistic dichotomy of the Belgian country, i.e. its division into the regions of Flanders, Belgium and Wallonia, is reflected also in the formulation of its migration policies: while the Flemish-speaking community shows its migration policy to be influenced by Dutch and Anglo-American ideas of multiculturalism, the French-speaking community has adopted a more general approach, linked to the traditional assimilation model of the French Republic (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, pp. 5,12).

Oscillating between these two approaches, the region of Brussels-Capital pursued a third way of integrating immigrants. Due to the de facto residential concentration of ethnic minorities in the city, Brussels-Capital is moving towards a ‘pragmatic multiculturalism’3 (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, p. 13).

References


3 The term ‘pragmatic multiculturalism’ has been adopted by the authors to refer, for instance, to the practice of employing people with migration background in local services, while an official policy of recognising diversity and respective instruments such as minority quotas does not exist. See the section on the city of Brussels, pp. 43-4.
The Czech Republic

Historically, international migration movements in the Czech territories show emigration rather than immigration. Between 1850 and 1914 the area under Czech dominance experienced a net emigration of about 1.6 million inhabitants (Drbohlav 2004). Czech emigration was mainly to other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as to the United States and Canada. In the second half of the 19th century, emigration from southern and south-western Bohemia exceeded emigration from other regions (Beloševská 1999). While socio-economic factors were crucial for emigration movements until the Second World War, the situation changed at the end of the 1930s, when political factors gained significance, causing mass migration movements which affected the whole of Europe. After 1945 some 2,820,000 ethnic Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia to Germany or Austria, transforming the Czech part of Czechoslovakia into a fairly homogenous society (ethnically): 94% of the population at that time was Czech.

During the communist era, international migration movements in Czechoslovakia were quite specific: while some 420,000 to 440,000 people left Czechoslovakia between 1984 and 1990, immigration occurred at the individual level through agreements on temporary workers with other socialist countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary, hiring guest workers who entered the country under so-called ‘international aid co-operation’ (Boušková, 1998; Drbohlav, 2004). This type of immigration was strictly regulated and immigrants were usually segregated and hardly visible. In contrast to other immigrant workers in the 1990s, immigrants from Vietnam tended towards de facto settlement in the Czech Republic. Apart from these Vietnamese workers, permanent immigration into the country was a rather marginal phenomenon and usually politically motivated (Drbohlav, 2004).

Along with other Central and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, the Czech Republic became a part of a ‘buffer zone of international migration’ (Černík, 2005, p. 4). The processes of democratisation and liberalisation of its political and economic systems led to the relatively free movement of people. Liberal migration legislation and practice in the mid-1990s and prospering economic relations especially favoured immigration to the Czech Republic. Many foreigners came to the country for short-term, temporary working purposes. Although since 2000 the Czech government has intensified its measures to regulate the immigration movements into the country, from 2001 onward the numbers of citizens from third countries living in the Czech Republic has continued to increase, resulting in restriction on foreigners’ employment by the Czech government. These developments generated the need for a comprehensive policy on the integration of immigrants, with a special emphasis on their social inclusion: one third of the approximately 2.5% of migrant residents in 2003 immigrated on the basis of family reunification; two thirds for economic reasons.

On Czech integration policy, Černík states that despite the development of structural elements (such as legislation and government initiatives), the realisation and implementation of integration policies in the Czech Republic still shows considerable shortcomings. Although it has been declared as one of the aims of the official state policy to promote the civic participation of foreigners, the implementation of voting rights at the municipality level in practice has often failed. Following Černík, migrants’ concerns have been dealt with mostly by Czech NGOs and religious associations, while he assumes that a lack of political will on the part of Czech representatives to promote the civic rights of non-citizens is an important obstacle to migrants’ civic participation (Černík, 2005, p. 4).
In general, Czech migration policy and practice in the 1990s could be described as fairly improvisational, with no coherent conceptual approach. The Czech Republic passed through the complicated process of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia accompanied by economic and political transformations. Institutional bodies were occupied with different issues. The process of the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union gradually raised clear objectives for its migration policy, such as combating illegal migration, harmonising migration policies with EU standards and formulating a comprehensive asylum policy. Institutional and legal harmonisation between the Czech Republic and the EU was a formative element in Czech migration policy, deeply affecting its 'morphology'.

Since the 21st century Czech migration and integration policy has been characterised by an increasing dynamic: in January 2000 two key acts came into force, one on residence of aliens in the territory of the Czech Republic (Act No. 326/1999 Coll), another on asylum (Act No. 325/1999 Coll.). Both acts have been changed by several amendments in recent years. The political framework for the integration of foreigners in the Czech Republic was established by the ‘Conception of the Integration of Foreigners’. Until 2003 the Minister of the Interior was entrusted with coordinating and supervising migration matters, and an advisory body called the ‘Committee of the Ministry of Interior for the preparation and implementation of the policy of the government of the Czech Republic in the area of integration of foreigners and the inter-community development’ was established. Even before accession to the European Union in May 2004, the Czech Republic had accepted a number of harmonising legislative changes affecting both foreigners’ residency conditions within the territory and the institutional framework for their integration. In summary, nowadays the Czech policy is shaped by the establishment of institutions, by the passing of new laws and regulations and, in this context, still by adaptation to the regulations of the EU.

References


Finland

Finland was mainly a country of emigration until recently. When it first experienced immigration in the late 1980s, policies were mainly concentrated on questions of return migration. Sweden has been the most popular country of emigration for many Finnish people, and the majority of re-migrants to Finland were ethnic Finns. In the 1980s the numbers of Finnish citizens re-migrating to Finland exceeded the total emigration numbers for the first time.

Finnish immigration policy has traditionally been restrictive and immigration itself quite limited because of the very restrictive granting of residence and work permits. In general Finland's membership of the European Union in 1995 has encouraged and accelerated its transition from a country of emigration to a country facing immigration. But compared with other European countries the number of immigrants and of foreign residents is still low. By the end of 2003 there were 107,003 foreign nationals living in Finland (about 3%), coming mainly from Russia (24,998), Estonia (13,397), Sweden (8,124) and Somalia (4,642).

In 1995 the government set up a committee on immigration and asylum policy, affiliated to the Ministry of Labour, which led to the formulation of a programme for immigration and refugee affairs in 1997. Immigration and refugee affairs fall within the scope of different national authorities, of which the Ministry of Labour carries most responsibility. On the basis of the committee’s work and in spite of the low numbers of immigrants, Finland started to create a comprehensive integration policy at the end of the 1990s. The law on the integration of immigrants came into force in 1999 (Immigrant Act, 493/1999). It aims at providing foreign citizens with a knowledge of Finnish, and information about Finnish culture and society, and it contains possibilities for education and work.

Personal integration plans are designed for those immigrants and refugees who need help finding their place on the Finnish labour market and within society. Such individual integration plans are not intended for all immigrants, but only for those who are registered as unemployed job seekers and who receive public assistance. Integration plans include additional language instruction, the drawing up of a plan for studies or employment, daily routines, practical training, vocational training and social contacts. Immigrants who are committed to an integration plan are entitled to receive public assistance, i.e. a special integration support instead of the ‘ordinary unemployment benefits’. If immigrants do not follow the plan, they lose part of their assistance (Final report, 2001, p. 34).

The Immigrant Act formally gives the Ministry of Labour charge of the general development, planning, control, coordination and supervision of immigrants’ integration. At the regional level, employment and economic development centres are responsible for the immigrants’ integration into society and working life. At the local level the municipality prepares integration programmes together with the employment offices and other appropriate authorities. In public and political debate some assume that the Finnish model of dealing with migration and integration issues is too scattered, since there is no coherence in policies at different levels and different authorities have different, sometimes even contradictory aims. Recently there has been discussion of whether a special authority for immigration and immigrant affairs, as in Sweden, would be appropriate for Finland (Sagne, Saksela and Wilhemsson, 2005, p. 14).

As far as Finland's ‘official’ philosophy on migration is concerned, integration in cultural terms is defined as an option. Immigrants may maintain their own culture, language and ethnic identity, while at the same time adjusting to the host society. The new integration policy is trying to unite the
rights and duties of immigrants in the spirit of communitarianism, i.e. assuming a focus on migrant communities, which is new for the Nordic universalistic welfare state (Final report, 2001, p. 34).

Despite these official efforts, people of migratory background (except those from the Western world) may run the risk of becoming stigmatised in Finland, due to the high unemployment rate on the one hand and the negative attitude of Finns towards immigrants on the other; ‘living on social welfare’ is commonly associated with immigrants. Since the social security system in Finland, as in other Nordic states, is based on residence and not on previous employment, all residents are entitled to social security and welfare services. The present system of social welfare might in some cases contribute to keep people in dependency instead of supporting integration into the labour market (Final report, 2001, p. 34; ICMPD, 1994, p. 28; Sagne, Saksela and Wilhelmsson, 2005).

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France

France has been a country of immigration since the mid-19th century. It has, however, never had and still does not have any specific integration policies with regard to migrants. But since 1889 nationality laws have been very open and they constitute the main political application of universalistic principles. The main implicit principle of the French Republican approach is that the lack of any specific integration policy is the best way to integrate migrants and their children. They are simply considered as French citizens.

So the integration of migrants and their children was ideologically centred on a political programme linked to values symbolised by the French Revolution. National integration is on the whole political: members of the nation are being integrated by individual citizenship. National integration is thought to be the result of the individual's political will and cultural belonging. This principle, stemming from the founding myth of the Revolution, is the ideological foundation of contemporary integration policy, known as ‘assimilation’ policy. It is through individual citizenship that this policy attempts to transform a population of foreign origin into French men and women.

This is related to the history of the nation, which has been formed by the ‘assimilation’ of populations from various regions (Burgundy, Brittany, Provence etc.). All these populations had their own cultural identities and in some cases religious identities, as well as traditional dress codes and languages. They were transformed into French citizens while their own regional identity was not promoted. The same policy has been implemented with migrants, who have gained the right to participate in political life and become part of a ‘community of citizens’ (Schnapper 1994).

According to this approach, multiculturalism as well as cultural specificities should remain in the private sphere and not be recognised in the public domain (as the Hegelian distinction between the specificities of the private individual and the universality of the public citizen suggests).

So at school, in the workplace and in trade unions, the ‘ethnic’ dimension has in principle never been taken into account. In practice this principle has not always been scrupulously followed. The promotion of French nationals of foreign origin has always been carried out on an individual rather than on a collective basis. This ‘colour-blind’ policy is supposed to favour integration. Its aim is to promote a strict policy of equal opportunity, which the welfare state helps to implement.

The school system as modelled by the Third Republic, along with nationality legislation, has been considered the best instrument for integrating young people into the national culture, whatever their origins. School is also considered the embodiment of equality and secularism. The debate about secularism (laïcité) in France had been focused in the field of education on the ‘affaire des foulards’ (headscarf controversy). French secularism promoted the notion that ostentatious signs (signes ostentatoires), illustrating the following of a particular faith, should be prohibited in order to combat fundamentalism and to help children adopt universal values.

Although there is no specific integration policy, special measures for immigrant children, such as special classes (classes d'accueil or classes francophone pour primo-arrivants), special training and information centres supporting the education of immigrants’ children (centres de formation et d'information pour la scolarisation des enfants de migrants, CEFISEM) have been implemented with the aim of giving support to these children to join the mainstream system as soon as possible.
Another dimension of affirmative action (*discrimination positive*) can be found in urban planning policy. But this policy focuses on certain districts (*quartiers*) on a socio-economic basis rather than by special measures for certain ethnic minorities. It does have direct implications for the integration of migrants and their children as they often represent more than 40% of the inhabitants of these areas.

In keeping with the principle of universalism, no form of discrimination at the workplace against foreigners and their children, whether negative or positive (affirmative action), is permitted. The only exception is for officers in the civil service who have to be French citizens. Any special measures for promoting professional and social integration are officially directed at young people moving from the education system into the labour market. They do not explicitly target young people with migratory background.

In practice and as a result of tensions between ethnic and universalistic-civic principles, there are exemptions from these principles. Attempts to manage these tensions often play a great role in the day-to-day practice of integration into the institutions of society. In a way the organisation FAS (*Fond d’Action Sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles*) is an exemption from universalism, since it is specifically designed to favour migrants’ integration by providing funds for professional training, housing and social work services.

The French way of dealing with problems of integration has not been more successful than other approaches in the eradication of xenophobia, racism and discrimination. Discrimination against people of non-European origin exists, especially against people of Maghrebian origin. The areas in which this occurs are private sector employment and housing, police treatment and admittance to nightclubs. It is more difficult for the children of migrants than for other French children to rise from the often disadvantaged positions of their parents.

The French pattern of integration can be characterised by illustrating the tension between universalistic principles and exemptions from these principles. The ways in which these tensions are managed constitutes one of the specificities of this pattern. Universal principles (theoretical and abstract) and the exemptions from these guidelines (on a day-to-day basis in practice) should not be opposed to one another but, rather, they combine and interlock in a complex manner at a number of different levels. Measures for supporting integration focus on territorially defined problem areas, usually the periphery of major cities (*banlieue*). French integration policy is strongly defined at the national level, but in the areas of its implementation, usually the regional and local authorities have responsibilities. This situation leads to the creation of local ad-hoc bodies which implement multi-level cooperating systems for a specific measure. The city policy of the national government (*la politique de la ville*) is a good example, defined by a national ministry as a cross-departmental policy which is implemented at the municipal level.

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Germany

Germany has experienced large scale immigration since the end of the Second World War. Over the past thirty years about 30 million people have migrated to Germany. During the same period about 21 million people have left the country. With the exception of the periods 1967–1968, 1975–1977 and 1982–1984 there has always been a net gain of migrants. Because fertility has been below reproduction level since the mid-1960s the population increase since then has been entirely due to migration gains.

As long ago as 1955 Germany signed the first contract with Italy on recruitment of guest workers. But until 1961 the number of refugees from the former German Democratic Republic was high, so it was only in the mid-1960s that the country made use of this and further agreements signed with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). For the whole period of recruitment there was a consensus in society and in political circles that, as ‘guestworker’ employment was temporary, residence would only be temporary and integration only partial. What follows in the mid-1970s is a gradual recognition that not all guestworkers would go back and that a settlement process was under way as labour migrants started to bring their families into the country. Nowadays a second and even a third generation of these migrants live in Germany. The foreign population still consists mainly of citizens originating from the former sending countries (Currle, 2004).

At the end of the 1980s a new phase in the migration history of Germany began. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, delayed migration movements from the countries that were starting to reform their whole political systems, began. So the democratisation of the Eastern European countries resulted in high numbers of immigrants coming to Germany throughout the 1990s, among them many ethnic Germans, the so-called Spätaussiedler, but also citizens who came partly as asylum seekers (Currle, 2004).

In 1978 it was decided to create the office of a Commissioner for the Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families. The foundation of this office showed that the integration of migrants was officially recognised and defined as necessary (Mahnig, 1998, p. 53). Denial of the immigration situation, however, was officially maintained by the federal government till 1998, while in some sections of society – in many organisations, in the churches, the media and the left and liberal parties – a change of perspective was developing.

So the main feature of the German mode of integration has been to open the core institutions (labour market, self-employment, education and training system, housing) to the immigrants and to include them in the general welfare state and social policy system. Compared with this, the numerous special measures to integrate immigrants have had, and still have, much less relevance. The effects of welfare state inclusion on overall integration have in the past been somewhat counteracted by a lack of legal integration, since the naturalisation law has been quite restrictive until 1999. Welfare state integration without citizenship gave integration policy in Germany an ambivalence which resulted in a lack of identificational integration of migrants. In 2000 the new law on citizenship, including the jus soli concept for children of foreigners born in Germany, was introduced. This reform of the German citizenship law introduced the concept of naturalisation as an important step in bringing the integration process into official policy.
Another important step has been the third section of the 2001 report on immigration (Zuwanderungskommission, 2001) which focused on integration. Under the heading ‘Fördern und Fordern’ (supporting and requiring), the commission recommended individual integration contracts, obliging the state to offer integration courses to new immigrants, and obliging migrants to participate in these courses as well as pay part of the expenses. This report led to a new immigration law which finally came into force in January 2005. With regard to integration, this law makes several provisions for integration measures (with some exemptions): new immigrants eligible for permanent residency are entitled to participate in integration courses. Under certain conditions, participation can also be mandatory for resident foreigners, for example long-term residents receiving welfare payments, or migrants classified by the authorities as ‘in special need of integration’. If people refuse to attend integration courses, possible sanctions include a reduction in welfare payments. These integration courses are funded by the federal government. The Länder governments cover the costs of accompanying social pedagogic counselling and of childcare for the course participants.

Traditionally the main competences for migration and integration policy at the federal level have been split among three ministries: the Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMA) and the Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ). Under the new Immigration Law of 2002/04 (Zuwanderungsgesetz), the Ministry of the Interior acquired extended competences in the field of integration measures. The responsibility for integration measures at the national level was transferred to the BAFI, renamed the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). The parallel process of residence status determination (local foreigners’ office) and labour permit processing (local labour office) became streamlined and by law coordinated (one-stop government).

As Germany is a federal state, the competences of the federal ministries are quite limited. The implementation of home affair policies is to a large extent up to the Länder ministries, which also have full responsibility for the school system and education at all levels. Only in the area of labour and youth do the respective federal ministries have a certain control at the national level. In addition, laws which interfere with the responsibilities of the Länder, have to pass the second chamber of Länder representatives, the Bundesrat.

Another specific feature of German migration policy is the delegation of public responsibilities to non-statutory welfare agencies. In addition to the structural integration of the migrants at the workplace and into the social security and welfare system, the large welfare organisations have developed measures for the social integration of the foreign migrant population. Six agencies (Catholic Caritas, Protestant Diakonie, Jewish ZWST, the labour movement’s AWO, the non-partisan umbrella organisation, DPWV, and the German Red Cross) implement the overwhelming majority of services to migrants and of integration measures, receiving public funds from the EU, and from the national, state, district and local levels. The district, state and national offices of the agencies occasionally implement larger projects which have to be coordinated, but in general, all services are performed and accounted for by local agencies, which receive information, guidance, and internal funds as well as some of the public funds from their central offices. Although the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is now in charge of implementing integration measures, the office continues to delegate the implementation to the local agencies (Bosswick and Bronnenmeyer, 2001).

The non-statutory welfare agencies are relevant political players because of their close links to the churches or to grass root initiatives. During the 1980s and 1990s the agencies, as well as the
municipalities at the local level, implemented a de facto reform of integration policy and practice, bottom-up at the local level, while the government had no vision of a coherent integration policy. This integration policy at the local level, however, remained divided between numerous bodies, usually lacking coordination and exchange of information at the local and regional levels.

References


Italy

Along with other Southern European states, Italy has changed in the past two decades from a traditional country of emigration into a country of immigration. Inflows started after the 1973 oil crisis because other European countries closed their doors to immigration. Italy was mostly considered to be a transit country, but the 1981 census revealed that many foreign residents had decided to stay. Between 1986 and 2002 Italy has experienced a constant increase in numbers of foreign nationals, estimated at 2.6 million in 2004 (approx. 4.2% of the total resident population). Immigrants to Italy are mostly young (aged between 20 and 40), and enter the country mainly for economic reasons, i.e. to work (Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2005, p. 5). The first big influxes were between 1984 and 1989. These peaks resulted from the regularisation processes. Zincone says there are two significant features of migration processes in Italy: rapid influxes of substantial numbers of migrants and, among these immigrants, a high proportion of undocumented persons. 'Italy attracts illegal immigration more than other countries due to the difficulty of controlling such extensive borders and above all because of the size of its informal economy' (Zincone, 2006a).

Relevant policies aiming at regulating inflows and the legal treatment of foreigners started only in the late 1980s. The slow shift of public opinion from tolerance to intolerance and fear, including acts of violence, led to the enacting of the first migration law in 1986 (law no. 943/1986). The formulation of this law followed the perception of existing migrants as simply a workforce, and regulated their entry accordingly. Moreover it provided an amnesty for undocumented migrants, introducing the practice of the sanatoria – a regularisation programme that, being repeated in 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002, could be considered as an integral part of the Italian migration management.

The years following saw the introduction of new migration provisions in 1990 (law no. 39) and 1995 (law no. 489), but the first political steps towards the systematic integration of migrants took place in 1998. The centre-left government of that time tried to implement a new migration policy, introducing annual quotas for immigrants and a whole set of activities and consultative bodies to promote their integration. The law of 1998, the so-called ‘Turco-Napolitano’, concentrated explicitly on discrimination issues and stressed the importance of respecting linguistic and cultural differences.

But national legislation in Italy is one thing, implementation is another. What ‘integration’ means in practice is a matter for local bodies and can be best seen through the lens of interventions in the everyday realities of single municipalities (Borkert, 2005, pp. 53–5; Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2005, p. 7).

In general, the institutional setting of Italian integration policy is not centralised in one dominating administrative body, but divided among different national ministries (mostly the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies) and between national and regional authorities. Bolaffi identifies this institutional scattering, the historically weak and limited cooperation between Italian institutions, and the missing professionalism of a single competent office to be the main causes for the inefficiency of integration measures in Italy (Bolaffi, 2001, pp. 117–26).

The Italian provisions on migration were modified in 2002 under the Berlusconi government’s so-called ‘Bossi-Fini law’, aimed at restricting legal and undocumented entries to the country. Italian legislation envisages a planned quota system. The quota is determined by one or more annual decrees. The law limited the immigration of non-EU migrants, relating it to a valid working contract.
for a fixed period of time. People from third countries who want to enter Italy need to have a valid ‘residence contract’ (contratto di soggiorno), a contract of dependent employment signed by themselves and the respective company or family. They are permitted to stay in Italy as long as they have a regular job and must find a new one within six months of being unemployed. In addition, so-called ‘social integration measures’ are limited to migrants legally residing in the country, and the law aims to reduce undocumented migration through the use of compulsory repatriation. The decree fixing immigrant entries for 2006 increased the quotas from non-EU countries to 170,000 for the first time. The centre-right 2002 reform gave regional authorities a more significant role in deciding and managing inflows. The 2002 Bossi-Fini law did not change the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law as far as the treatment of cultural diversity is concerned (Zincone, 2006a).

Zincone emphasises, though, that many measures introduced previously by the left-wing government in 1998 have not been changed at all and that restrictions of entry and admission have been counterbalanced by the legalisation programme of 2002: ‘The Turco-Napolitano Act, later however amended, is still the main piece of legislation concerning the status of immigrants in Italy’ (Zincone, 2006b). Outlining the strong influence of the Catholic advocacy coalition, present in both left-wing as well as right-wing political coalitions, Zincone states that these Catholic influences played an important role in softening the originally more radical ant-immigrant programmes of the Northern League. Following Zincone, these Catholic forces kept an open ear for voices defending immigrants’ rights, which are mostly of Catholic origin anyway (Zincone and Caponio, 2005, pp. 3–4).

The most significant changes in terms of financial support relate to integration measures. The new provisions under Berlusconi abolish de facto the National Fund for Migration Policies (Fondo Nazionale Politiche Migratorie) through which special integration activities for migrants have been financed in the past; they leave it to the Italian regions to decide if they want to finance integration measures and to what extent. To sum up, Italian regions are no longer obliged to dedicate financial resources to the integration of migrants (Borkert, forthcoming).

The present government has once more separated functions and competences on immigration and immigrants’ rights, even increasing the number of ministries involved. Zincone (2006b) assumes that ‘all this will make it even more difficult to coordinate immigration and immigrant policies’. However, the centre-left has started to reform nationality law, favouring the naturalisation of non-EU immigrants and granting them local voting rights, as it promised in its manifesto when in opposition. It may succeed if it can count on the support of some of the opposition, since there is a heterogeneous majority in the Senate. In fact the new Prodi government must try to find ‘internal and external compromises’ (Zincone, 2006b) to realise the goal of fundamental changes in the law of 2002.

The process of constitutional revision is still going on in 2006. It is intended to create a more federal and less centralised order, through a significant devolution of responsibilities at the regional, or joint state-regional, level. Regions now have legislative responsibility for welfare measures concerning immigrants’ entitlements (public health, public housing, large parts of public education), while provinces and cities act as administrative units (Zincone, 2006b).
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The Netherlands

Until 1961 the Netherlands showed a negative migratory balance, as many Dutch left the country to settle in Canada and Australia after the Second World War. During the 1950s the main migration movement consisted of about 300,000 citizens from the former colony of Indonesia who came to the Netherlands after the end of colonisation. Relatively late in comparison with other European countries, the Netherlands started the recruitment of unskilled workers from Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Morocco and Southern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. With the worldwide economic crisis of the mid-1970s looming, and the closure of the borders throughout Europe, some of the recruited labour migrants from Yugoslavia and other parts of Southern Europe returned home. In contrast, labour migrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin tended to stay in the country, counteracting the original aim of stimulating their remigration, planned by the Dutch government.

In 1975 this migrant group of Moroccan and Turkish nationality started a phase of family reunification on a large scale, followed in the mid-1980s by ‘marriage migration’, i.e. the entry of people from these countries mainly to marry their compatriots. Moreover the 1970s were marked by steady migration from the Dutch overseas territories, mainly Surinam, which became independent in 1975 and experienced a five-year transition period. These overseas territories also included the Dutch Caribbean islands, the Antilles and Aruba, which continued to be part of the Dutch crown and were exempted from immigration restrictions. Since the late 1970s the Netherlands has seen itself as a country of immigration and stuck to the idea of temporary migration. From the 1990s onwards the descendants of the Moroccan, Turkish and other migrant groups cited above gained importance in the management of Dutch migration and integration; they were largely born in the Netherlands and achieved significant part of their education in the country (Ter Wal, 2005, p. 1).

In 2003 the percentage of the total population born abroad amounted to 10.6% or 699,954. The largest group of immigrants came from European countries (35.8%), followed by Asia (23.6%) and Africa (17.8%), with northern Africa (14.8%) and western Asia (15.6%) showing the highest percentages. In terms of single nationalities Turkish (14.3%) and Moroccan (14.0%) citizens outnumbered German (8.0%) and British (6.3%) immigrants (Migration Information Source 2006).

From its very beginning the Dutch integration philosophy has been strongly influenced by concepts of multiculturalism: the Netherlands has had a long-standing tradition of ‘consociational’ democracy, a system whereby the inclusion of different groups – Catholics and Protestants, Liberals and Socialist – is made possible by making them institutionally independent from each other. These separate ‘pillars’ only met at the level where policies were made. Even though this ‘pillarism’ in its classical sense has disappeared since the late 1960s, it did much to set the tone in current political and public debate: political disagreements are settled by compromise, leading to equal access to society’s resources for all parties involved (Doomernik, 2003, p. 170).

Since 1980 the central element of the Dutch approach on minority policies has been the promotion and emancipation of ethnic communities, the so-called ‘Ethnic Minorities Policies’. Ethnic as well as cultural, religious and political minorities were considered integral parts of Dutch society and so were enabled to play an active role in processes of societal integration and policy formulation. Ethnic and religious minorities had the right to create their own schools and radio stations, and special consultative bodies for the Dutch government were established. In 1985 immigrants were granted local voting rights and could benefit from more liberal naturalisation provisions in comparison with other European countries.
Moreover, in 1994 with the Equal Treatment Act coming into force, an Equal Treatment Commission was established to investigate ‘cases of direct and indirect discrimination in employment, education, and the provision of goods and services on the basis of ethnic and racial origin, nationality, religious belief, political affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, marital status and working hours in employment’ (Ter Wal, 2005, pp. 13–14). In general, the emphasis on anti-discrimination within the Dutch integration management has fostered measures and programmes aiming at promoting equal access and equal (political) representation of minorities, especially in the labour market. The Law for Stimulation of Labour Participation (SAMEN), for instance, obliged employers to know and to report the percentage of ethnic minority members working for them. In addition, a ‘minority quota’ was introduced in public administration, requiring a relevant proportion of staff with an ethnic minority background to be employed; and many other programmes fostering cultural mainstreaming were supported financially by the Dutch government or by its international subsidies (Michalowski, 2005; Ter Wal, 2005).

Summarising, Doomernik characterised the general integration philosophy of the Netherlands as follows: ‘Dutch society is founded on the principle of ‘differences’ perhaps as much as on the idea of ‘commonness’, which helps to explain the present stance towards recent newcomers, and has been conducive to formulating the idea of a Dutch multicultural society’ (Doomernik, 2003, p. 171).

In recent years, the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh (November 2004) who worked critically on subjects linked to Islam, death threats against the critical female politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali (VVD) and the ‘responding’ acts of violence against religious institutions in the Netherlands has de-legitimised the Dutch multicultural model of immigrant’s integration. Already in the 1990s its integration policy has been criticised for being established merely on ethnically defined group rights and for promoting immigrants’ emancipation collectively, instead of basing it on individual grounds. The evident social tensions between the different (minority) groups in the Netherlands and the assumed failure of the Dutch multicultural model ultimately gave weight to the emotional discussion of the ‘right integration policy’ for Europe (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 150–51; Michalowski, 2005).

In the Netherlands the acts of violence, starting with the murderer of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, initiated a process of self-reflection within Dutch society that led to the creation of a committee (affiliated to the Dutch parliament) investigating the failure of Dutch integration policy and to a greater awareness of alternative ways of integrating immigrants4 (DIE ZEIT, 2002; Michalowski, 2005).

Yet in 1998, with the enacting of the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (the law on incorporation of newcomers) the Netherlands established an obligatory integration programme for accepted immigrants and refugees which has to be started within six weeks of arrival in the country. The programme contains courses (almost 600 hours in total) in language training and other basic competences as well as courses on Dutch culture and institutions. Instead of preparing for life within a minority culture, the programme intends to focus on the early participation in society of people with

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4 It has to be noted, though, that research related to policy-making, in the sense that it ‘advises’ policy-makers or evaluates policy implementation and its effects at the national or local level, has been conducted before in the Netherlands by scientific advisory committees, such as the Advisory Committee on Research relating to Ethnic Minorities (ACOM 1976-1989), the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 1979, 1989, 1999), the Temporary Advisory Committee on Minorities (TWCM 1992-1996) and the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Integration (Commissie Blok, 2004). In the course of time, individual scientists have produced comprehensive monographs on Dutch immigration and integration policies (Van Amersfoort, 1981; Entzinger, 1984; Penninx, 1988; Rath, 1991; Lucassen and Penninx, 1997) to an abundant extent, describing the content of immigration and integration policies and their developments, in general and in many of their sub-domains (see Penninx, 2005).
migration background. Its nationwide introduction, however, turned out to be a difficult process. In the atmosphere of a less friendly public attitude towards immigrants and a growing political definition of integration policies as ‘failed policies’ at the turn of the century, more and more adaptation from newcomers was demanded and much more has been expected than existing measures can provide (Final report, 2001; Currle, 2004; Michalowski, 2005; Penninx, 2005).

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Poland

The history of Poland is largely characterised by emigration rather than immigration. Until the end of the 20th century, the country experienced emigration in large waves as well as in continuous yearly migration movements, especially by Polish citizens into other Western European countries. At the end of the Second World War the shifting of Poland’s borders to the West resulted in the displacement and forced migration of almost eight million people of Ukrainian, Belarusian and German origin. In addition, some 300,000 Poles of Jewish origin returned, of which, however, some 220,000 moved on to Israel-Palestine, Western Europe and other places in the years following.

Since the 1950s emigration from Poland to Germany consisted mostly of the so-called Aussiedler (ethnic Germans). In addition some 30,000 Polish Jews left the country in 1968, when Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia. In general Polish people were allowed to travel relatively freely in comparison with other communist countries, but the introduction of visa restrictions in most West European countries in 1981 changed the situation. From this year onwards, emigration from Poland consisted mainly of members of minority groups, allowed free movement by inter-statal agreements and international treaties. In the wake of the suppression of the Solidarity movement and the imposition of martial law at the beginning of the 1980s another 250,000 Polish citizens left the country. The Polish Central Statistical Office estimates that the Polish diaspora comprises 12 million people worldwide (Alscher, 2005).

The year 1989 equally marked a turning point in Poland’s migration history. Profound political, legal and institutional changes in the wake of the breakdown of the former Soviet Union led the country to open its borders and to abolish restrictions on movement. Although Poland still remains a country of emigration, it has recently faced increasing numbers of asylum seekers, transit migrants as well as permanent immigration from both East and West. The exodus of a mass population from the former Soviet Union, expected and feared by western politicians, academics and journalists, has partly manifested itself in Poland.

Iglicka (2005) emphasises that two borders which divided Europe for several decades ceased to exist in the 1990s: one is the boundary between the socialist bloc and Western Europe and the other, far less mentioned, is the guarded frontier between the USSR and its satellite countries. In fact it was this mass movement of international ‘shuttle migration’ from former countries of the Soviet Union that affected post-communist Poland. But while the Poles, initially, saw this so-called ‘primitive mobility’ mostly as a threat, many positive aspects of this phenomenon soon became apparent: the circulation of visitors from the former Soviet Union coming to Poland for export and re-export purposes brought benefits such as the inflow of foreign currency, an economic boom in a number of Polish regions, accompanied by an increase in job opportunities etc.

Recognising the evident benefits of this recent phenomenon, the Polish government introduced to its migration policy a visa regime for citizens from the main sending countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) in autumn 2003, shortly before becoming a member of the European Union. Iglicka writes that this kind of ‘shuttle migration’, consisting of small traders and seasonal workers, has recently changed into a long-term or permanent residence in Poland (Iglicka, 2005). Besides the migration of citizens from former countries of the Soviet Union, contemporary Poland is experiencing ever growing immigration from the far East and from the West (return migration of Poles as well as managerial migration).
Its slow transformation, from being the most significant sending state in the CEE region into a country of immigration and transit, also involves new forms of migration: considered ‘exotic’ for this part of Europe, Poland hosts an increasing number of Vietnamese, Chinese and Armenians, coming to the country for a temporary stay as well as for permanent settlement, many entering the state through arranged marriages as well as illegally or to set up their own businesses. The Vietnamese and Armenian migrants living in Poland are considered to be the most integrated and visible diasporas of third country nationals. In terms of numbers, the Vietnamese community is estimated to amount to 20,000–50,000, while the Armenians are estimated to number around 50,000.

Both these ethnic groups have managed to find and to acquire their own economic niches, with the Vietnamese specialising in gastronomy and the textile trade, and the Armenians monopolising the (mostly pirate) CD-market and working in general trade. Both groups show a serious concern for affording their children a proper education; they loyally support their community's members and tend to favour the development of so-called 'parallel societies'. As some of these Vietnamese and Armenian migrants were known to be staying illegally in the country (as visa-overstayers or because they were smuggled into Poland), the Polish government decided to launch a regularisation programme in 2003, aimed at the inclusion of those who had lived in Poland since at least 1997 (Halik and Nowicka, 2002; Iglicka, 2005, pp. 5–7; Miecik, 2004; Korys, 2005, pp. 155–56).

Iglicka observes that Poland's 'new ethnic diversity', or the discovery of being a heterogeneous nation (communism tended to ignore these differences), is largely unexplored and under-researched. Research on the different aspects of immigration such as modes of incorporation or lack of integration or even discrimination, Iglick says 'is at the moment almost non-existent' (Iglicka, 2005, p. 7).

According to the Polish population census of 2002, around 37.3 million people lived in Poland, of whom 98% were of Polish nationality and 1.2% (almost 445,000 people) had Polish and another nationality. Of these 445,000 people, 279,600 (nearly 63%) also had German nationality, 30,100 (6.8%) were US citizens, 14,500 (3.3%) Canadians, 7,300 French and almost one thousand came from the Ukraine. Just 40,200 people (0.11% of the total population) had foreign nationality only. In this category, German nationality (7,900) outnumbered Ukrainian (5,400) and Russian (3,200) (Iglicka, 2005, p. 8).

Another impression is given by the numbers of non-permanent residents from other countries in Poland: this stock of temporary migrants consists of 34,100 people staying in Poland for at least two months. These are mostly of Ukrainian origin (22%), followed by German (13%), Russian (6%), Belarusian (6%) and American (5%). In addition, people from Armenia (4%), the UK (3%), France (3%) and Vietnam (3%) immigrated to Poland for temporary purposes in 2002. But two out of three of these temporary migrants have lived in Poland for over twelve months and could, therefore, be considered as long-terms migrants without permanent resident status.

For the first time since the Second World War, the population census collected migration data in 2002. But Polish experts argue that the statistical information given above considerably underestimates the de facto presence of immigrants in the country (Iglicka, 2005, p. 7; Korys, 2005, p. 149).

Due to the relatively small scale of permanent migration to Poland, interest in integration appears to be rather low and the issue treated as one of limited urgency that can be postponed to a later
date. The immigrants themselves seem to see the country as an ‘interim solution’, and avoid making ‘unnecessary investments’ such as learning the Polish language. Consequently, the integration of first-generation migrants is usually only minimal. Another factor is that due to the small numbers of migrants in Poland and their low visibility, there is no awareness of potential problems and little public interest in the integration of second-generation immigrants. Statistically, this group is expected to grow considerably in the coming years, considering the increasing numbers of existing migrants who intend to settle permanently in Poland (Korys, 2005, p. 149).

In general, integration in Poland, defined as guaranteeing rights to migrants and assigning responsibilities, differs significantly depending on their legal status. Officially, integration measures taken by the Ministry of Social Affairs are aimed exclusively at refugees recognised by the Geneva Convention. In practice, however, certain Polish legislative provisions might be considered as ‘indirect integration measures’ as they influence the range of opportunities at the disposal of migrants in the country, facilitating or retarding their inclusion in key institutions of the host society. The following examination of their degree of access to public goods helps to reconstruct the logic and general integration praxis of Poland, besides its ‘official’ integration policy concentrated merely on refugees.

Polish law distinguishes between different categories of migrants such as humanitarian migrants (refugees and ‘tolerated stay’), economic migrants (EU nationals and third-country nationals) and repatriates, bestowing different rights on each of them. Following EU directives, rights for refugees and holders of tolerated stay permits are similar to those of migrants with a permanent resident status. The most important goods refugees benefit from are contracted in the so-called ‘integration programme’. This assistance includes ‘expert counselling’, reimbursement for health insurance as well as direct financial support in form of a monthly allowance covering basic expenses (accommodation, food and clothing) and classes in Polish for a period of up to 12 months.

The programme is run by the Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie (PCPR). The head of PCPR entrusts a social worker with providing individual support to a refugee and being their ‘mentor’. The social worker is expected to help the refugee in relating to the local social environment, finding appropriate accommodation and in undertaking individual activities aimed at the economic inclusion and social orientation of the refugee. For their part, refugees are committed to register as unemployed at the Labour Office and to seek employment. In addition a newly arrived refugee is obliged to attend classes in the Polish language. If refugees do not fulfil their obligations, or leave the region where the integration programme has started, they run the risk of losing the individual help and financial assistance. Polish experts state, however, that in some cases the programme’s outcomes remain less than satisfactory: due to refugees’ poor Polish language skills and their inability to prove the professional qualifications required, the crucial inclusion in the labour market has proved problematic. However, the number of foreign citizens enjoying such privileged integration appears to be relative small: Between 1991 (when Poland signed the Geneva Convention) and the end of 2003, only 1,764 people were officially recognised as refugees.

To asylum seekers Polish law offers two other forms of migrant protection: the so-called ‘tolerated stay’ and the ‘temporary protection’ introduced initially as an interim solution for foreigners moving to Poland on a large scale for reasons such as invasion of their home country, war, civil war, ethnic conflicts or serious human rights violations. But since its introduction in 2003, ‘temporary protection’
has not been granted to any asylum-seekers. The most disadvantaged group of migrants in Poland is comprised of third-country nationals.

The crucial point for immigrants to Poland for accessing the key institutions of Polish society remains the acquisition of a permanent residence. These measures for the inclusion of migrants are decided at the central level, but carried out at the local level and partly subsidised by local authority budgets. According to Korys, the range and quality of benefits available to migrants at the local level may exceed the minimum standard provided by the law: some gminas, for instance, may provide psychotherapy for the children of Chechen background at the request of Polish schools, buy additional equipment or supply warm winter clothes etc (Korys, 2005).

Other integration activities carried out by NGOs (which are commissioned and funded as well by local authorities) are, in general, concentrated on humanitarian migrants and repatriates and their services only gradually extended to other migrant groups. These integration measures include the provision of free legal assistance, moral support, the offering of accommodation and Polish language courses and the creation of brochures in different languages informing migrants about the institutional setting and legal framework in Poland. The status of ethnic minority is, however, only granted to ethnic groups living in Polish territory for at least 200 years. Thus Polish citizens of Vietnamese origin are not afforded the status of ethnic minority.

Another kind of integration initiative relates to Polish citizens themselves, positively influencing the attitudes of Poles towards migrants and ameliorating their acceptance into the host society. Initiatives like open-air events (Multi-Cultural Week or Refugee Day) are organised in major Polish cities. These integration activities take place in larger cities, because the NGOs working in the field of immigration/integration are situated in these urban contexts. That means that migrants living in more peripheral areas are supposed to find their own way to integrate into the local community (Korys, 2005, pp. 156–65).

References


Spain

Until recently Spain was a typical country of emigration. Only at the beginning of the late 1980s/early 1990s did it begin hosting immigration. During the European economic boom of the 1960s, every year some 100,000 Spaniards left the country – a trend which came to a halt only with the worldwide economic crisis of 1973. By 1991 the number of emigrants had dropped to less than 10,000 people annually. Moreover, since 1975 some 650,000 Spanish migrants had returned to the country, while approximately two millions Spaniards continued to live abroad. In 1981 nearly 200,000 foreign citizens were resident in Spain, mainly of European origin, mostly retired people from Germany, the United Kingdom and other central and northern European Member States who found a permanent residence on the Spanish coast and its islands.

Besides this European immigration, a small group of Latin American migrants chose Spain as an exile, fleeing from dictatorships. The country's accession to the European Union in 1986 ultimately accelerated its transformation into a receiving country, showing high rates of immigration especially in the first years of the 21st century. Between 2000 and 2004 the number of migrants to Spain tripled, amounting to 7% (3,050,847) of the total registered population at the beginning of 2004. Spain in 2003 and 2004 was the main receiving country in the European Union, relegating Italy to second place (Final report, 2001; González-Enríquez, 2005, p. 8).

After Spain’s accession to the European Union, immigration to the country changed significantly: instead of retired people or political refugees, those entering the country since the 1980s came mostly to work. Showing a larger range of geographic backgrounds than previously, these migrants came mostly from developing countries or countries in crisis in Latin America and Africa. If citizens of EU Member States made up nearly 50% at the end of the 1980s, in 2003 they accounted for only 22%. As regards single non-EU nationalities, Ecuadorians outnumbered Moroccans, making up 18.7% and 18.2% respectively of the total in 2003, followed by Colombians (11.7%), Romanians (6.6%), Argentinians (5.2%), Peruvians (2.7%), Bulgarians (2.5%) and Chinese (2.5%) (González-Enríquez, 2005, pp. 8–10).

Another characteristic of Spain’s contemporary migration concerns legality: as with Italy, immigration to the country is marked by a significant rate of irregular entries and/or stays. In contrast to Italy, though, irregular migrants have to communicate their presence to the Spanish Municipal Registers to obtain access to the national health system (to get a health card). According to González-Enríquez, almost half of these migrants (46%) included in the Municipal Registers do not possess a valid residence permit. Spanish experts agree, however, that the numbers of registered migrants exceed of the actual number immigrants because they have not been deleted from the registers when moving to another municipality or region. Despite regularisation programmes, recent estimates of illegal migrants still vary from 800,000 to 1,300,000 people. Thus irregularity could be considered a ‘normal stage’ of migrant biography in Spain, as in the case of Italy. González-Enríquez concludes that around 90% of the immigrants currently living legally in the country experienced a previous period of illegal residence. In addition to irregular entries and stays, the Spanish authorities also turned legal immigrants into irregular ones, by failing to renew their residence permits within the compulsory period due to understaffing (González-Enríquez, 2005, p. 10).

Because of its long tradition of being a typical country of emigration, Spain lacked integration policies until the 1980s. Migration management appeared to be based on the Spanish foreigners’ law (LO
As a result aspects related to work and economy, and to police issues (controls), dominated other elements of migration policy. The sharp acceleration of immigration to Spain and the absence of a comprehensive political reaction encouraged the Izquierda Unida (the United Left) to submit a draft for an immigration law to the Spanish parliament in 1990. In March 1991 all parliamentary groups, except the United left, agreed on a ‘non-statutory bill’ fixing the main guidelines for a Spanish migration policy: a second regularisation process; a reform of the competent administration – including the establishment of an Inter-Ministry Commission on Immigration, the creation of immigration offices in the provinces, the transformation of the former Instituto Español de Emigración (the Spanish institute for emigration) into the Dirección General de Migraciones (General Directorate for Migration), affiliated to the Ministry for Social Affairs, in 1993 and the reform of the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs; modification of visa and asylum policies; the start of programmes for immigrants’ social integration; and the fixing of quotas for foreign workers (Final report, 2001; Morén-Alegret, 2005).

Moreover, in 1994 an ‘Inter-ministerial Plan for the Integration of Immigrants’ was created, considering integration as full citizenship for legalised immigrants, granting them the same civil and social rights and responsibilities as Spanish citizens. Despite some special integration matters, the incorporation of immigrants and their children into the Spanish society is mainly achieved within general policies and administrative practices. With memories of the Franco regime still fresh, the defence and granting of equal rights and freedom to every person living in the country assumed a special role within the Spanish integration philosophy. In line with the institutionalised cultural hegemony of Spain, i.e. the strong emphasis given to regional cultures represented politically in the autonomías, Spain tends to promote and to recognise the cultural autonomy of its migrants.

Special integration measures in the past contained information about regulations affecting migrants and the ‘regrouping of families’ as well as providing courses in the language and culture of origin, and facilities for religious practice for those immigrants from countries which had signed previous agreements with Spain. Nevertheless, children of migration background are integrated within the general Spanish education system and expected to follow the same school curriculum as Spanish pupils. Due to the autonomy of the Spanish regions, integration policies on the number and distribution of pupils with migration background may vary throughout the country: in some autonomías school attendance is linked to the place of residence, so in certain suburbs with a high density of migration population schools may experience ‘ghettoisation’ (Final report, 2001).

In 2000 the 15th anniversary of migration policy in Spain encouraged researchers to reflect on current trends and led them to comment on the general lack of integration policies. In this context the Plan Greco, a four-year programme launched by the Spanish government for 2000–2004, was criticised for being based on the idea of immigrants’ adaptation rather than integration. In the same year the foreigners Law was reformed (LO 4/2000) and counter-reformed (LO 8/2000) due to the political shift after the legislative elections of 2000 when the Partido Popular (Popular Party) won an absolute majority (Morén-Alegret, 2005).

Current public discussion in Spain, as given expression during the 4th Congress of Immigration in 2004, stressed that Spanish migration management had changed significantly at the institutional level since the elections of 2004: while the Partido Popular allocated immigration competences to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the current PSOE-government under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the
Spanish Socialist Party, tended to strengthen the relevance of the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs. In addition Spain’s integration policy is criticised as lacking multidimensionality, i.e. its integration model involves a low level of incorporation of migrants into the Spanish labour market, dependence for access to social services on the registration in the census (empadronamiento) which can be easily controlled by police forces, as well as absence of any decision on voting rights for immigrants (Morén-Alegret, 2005).

References


Sweden

At the end of 2004 the total population of Sweden amounted to 8.9 million people, while the resident immigrant population accounted for 1,078,075, i.e. 11–12% of the total (Benito, 2005, p. 4).

Sweden’s migration history started after the Second World War and can be divided into three specific periods: the first phase of Swedish migration management covers the years 1949 to 1965, which were characterised by a considerable shortage of people in the national labour market. At the end of the 1940s the Swedish government started stimulating labour migration, especially from Italy and Yugoslavia, and in the 1950s the number of recruitment countries was enlarged. The growth of the migrant population continued during the 1960s even without official agreements between countries: immigrants from Spain, Portugal and Turkey found their way to Sweden to work. In 1954 Sweden signed an agreement of free movement between the Nordic countries. The Finnish population in Sweden consists of some 200,000 people, making up the largest group of foreign citizens living in the country. In contrast, the enlargement of the European Union did not affect the Swedish population in the same way as the Nordic agreement. After the Second World War some 30,000 refugees from the Baltic countries fled to Sweden, mostly from Estonia. Many of these refugees from the Baltic countries did not reach the coast, but died on their way to Sweden (Benito, 2005, pp. 6, 11).

The second period of migration management in Sweden started in 1965. In this year the Swedish government initiated a survey on how to inform immigrants about Swedish society, which led to substantial modifications in migration management. As part of these changes, Swedish migration management was divided into immigration and integration policies: while the entry of new immigrants was limited, increasing resources were dedicated to promoting the integration of those already accepted. The Swedish Immigration Board was established in 1969 to regulate migration to the country by introducing working permits for migrants before coming to Sweden. In reality migration had almost been halted, and entries to Sweden were mostly restricted to refugees and family members of migrants already living in the country.

Moreover, in 1975 the Swedish parliament summarised the new direction of its immigration policy in the slogan ‘Jämlikhet, valfrihet och samverkan’ (equality, freedom of choice and cooperation). The new integration measures included the right to vote in local and regional elections (used for the first time in 1976), subsidies for migrant associations, cultural organisations, journals or magazines for and by immigrants and the right to study their mother tongue at school. In 1984 the responsibility for refugees was transferred from the Employment Office to the Swedish Immigration Board, and the Swedish parliament decided on a refugee quota for different cities to avoid concentration in a few places. To help immigrants facing personal cases of discrimination on the grounds of their ethnic background, an ombudsman for ethnic discrimination was established in 1986 (Benito, 2005, pp. 4, 20; Currie, 2004, pp. 195–238).

A third period of Swedish migration management can be identified as starting in 1994. The continuing migration of refugees to Sweden led, it seems, to a restrictive trend in Swedish migration management. Nevertheless, a commission of the Swedish government officially recognised the multicultural character of Sweden’s society in 1995 and anchored this awareness in the public mind. Dissent by Swedish political parties continued over questions of the efficiency of appropriate instruments. In

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5 Although the first Swedish immigration law was enacted in 1913.
1997 a new integration policy was officially approved in parliament, determining its institutional division into the Swedish Integration and the Swedish Immigration Board, which changed its name to the Swedish Migration Board in 2000. In 2001 the Swedish law on citizenship was modified, allowing dual citizenship. And in 2003 a new law on discrimination came into force, applying the penalty for ethnic discrimination to discrimination on the grounds of religious orientation, sexual preference and handicap. In 2004 the Swedish government proposed to restrict the free movement of EU citizens; but this was rejected by the parliament (Benito, 2005, pp. 11, 20; Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 117–21).

Evidence suggests that immigration to Sweden from the German region of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania will become more relevant in future. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is situated in North-East Germany and marked by significant and consistent unemployment. Already in 2004 the German board of trade in Sweden drew attention to the need for specialised craftsman emerging in the Swedish labour market, and referred at the same time to the liberal legal conditions in Sweden regarding the recognition of artisans. In January 2006 more than 20 craft enterprises from Germany participated in the biggest building trade exhibition in Sweden, the so-called Nordbygg, and over 50 craft companies from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania attend Swedish language courses offered by the board. Considering these recent developments the economic minister of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Dr. Otto Ebnet, finds increasing interest among local craft enterprises in gaining ground in the Swedish market (Handelskammer, 2004a and 2004b; IXPOS, 2006).

Despite these economic demands, the institutional setting for migration is deeply affected by the general organisation of the Swedish welfare state. Being a highly centralised and democratic state, Sweden shows a balance of power between a strong central government and highly independent local authorities. Broadly speaking, Swedish migration management is supposed to create a multicultural society, while multiculturalism is defined in terms of equal rights (Final report, 2001, pp. 35–36).

In 1995 the country introduced Swedish language courses for new immigrants of at least 16 years of age, which are part of the job of city governments. In the larger cities urban integration policy is divided between the city council and the districts which play the most important role in implementing integration measures in areas such as education, youth and childhood, social benefit, environment, culture and local infrastructure. Due to a high concentration of migrants some districts may undertake greater efforts to carry out integration measures than others. In general, integration policy is considered and established as an independent department within the city administration (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 117–21; Peucker, 2003).

References


United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has a long history of immigration which dates back to the 18th century. These entries turned into mass migration during the post-war years, when displaced persons and refugees from Germany and Poland started to settle in the country. Apart from that, a post-Second World War economic boom coincided with the demand for cheap labour by the national labour market and a liberal immigration policy among member states of the Commonwealth. Until now the UK’s colonial past and its persisting links with nations from the Commonwealth have determined the nature of migration to its territory: the overwhelming majority of immigrants come from nations with a historical, cultural, lingual and/or economical link to the UK (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, pp. 4, 8).

In 2001 the migrant population (foreign born) accounted for 4.9 million or 8.3% of the population. The increase in foreign-born in the decade 1991–2001 was greater than in any post-war period: almost 1.1 million people immigrated to the UK in that time. Among the migrant population, those from Europe as a whole ranked first, while the Republic of Ireland was the largest single country of birth. The overwhelming majority of the new entries in 2001 – 53% (2.6 million) – identified themselves as ‘white’, while the next largest ethnic groups of foreign citizens came from India (569,800) and Pakistan (336,400) (National Statistics Online 2006).

As regards non-European immigration, three key elements can be identified as determining the UK’s migration development. The first element is the arrival of the steamship *Empire Windrush* in 1948, which is considered the starting point of immigration from the Caribbean. Until 1976 Black Caribbean immigration accounted for approximately 500,000 people. In the late 1950s mass migration from Asia began. People from India, Pakistan and East Pakistan/Bangladesh made up a group of nearly one million foreign-born migrants in the late 1970s. A third source is related to the banishment of Asian people from newly independent African countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania, which caused the entry of 155,000 African Asians to the UK up to 1981.

Other important migrant groups derive from China (often, but not only, from Hong Kong), West Africa (Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone etc.) and Somalia. According to Düvell, many of the UK’s post-war immigrants were actually refugees, victims of early ethnic or religious ‘cleansing’ (Indians in Pakistan, Pakistanis in India, Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan), expropriated by post-war policies (Pakistanis and Indians) or Africanisation policy (Indians in Uganda), while the United Kingdom accepted, welcomed and partly recruited migrants as workforces for its post-war economic bloom (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, p. 9; Final report, 2001).

Later years of immigration to the UK were characterised by family reunion and asylum seekers seeking permanent residence on the one hand, and the temporary migration of students and workers of all categories on the other hand (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, p. 4, 9).

The migration movements cited above led to restrictions on British immigration. The first limitation dated back to 1905 when the Aliens Restrictions Acts was aimed at limiting the entry of East European Jews. In 1948 the British Nationality Act came into force granting freedom of movement.

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* In general, there are four major sources representing different aspects of the migration phenomenon in the UK: the 2001 population census, the annual immigration control figures of the Home Office, the annual Labour Force Survey and the Department of Social Security statistics. It should be noted, though, that these data sets show considerable discrepancies (Düvell, 2005, p. 9).
to all Commonwealth citizens. This provision was modified in 1962, when work voucher quotas were introduced in the course of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which again was tightened in 1968 making entries of African Asian origin more difficult (Commonwealth Immigration Act). Entry from the Commonwealth was halted in 1971 with the introduction of the Immigration Act, and the living conditions of Commonwealth migrants in the UK aggravated by rescinding their right to settlement in 1981 (Nationality act). Various follow-ups introduced visa requirements in 1986, regulated asylum applications in 1993 or dealt with illegal employment in 1996 (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, p. 9).

Of special importance to contemporary questions of migration management and integration in the UK are recent developments in civil rights and immigration legislation. Until 1996 asylum seekers, for instance, were basically free to choose their place of residence; they had access to (social) benefits and were entitled to work. The Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 introduced a refugee dispersal model for the whole country as well as minimum provisions under the NASS (National Asylum Support Scheme), while cutting them off, simultaneously, from migrant communities' support concentrated mainly in the London area (Düvell, 2005, p. 18).

Equally determinant of the living conditions of foreign-born people in the UK is the racial equality and anti-discrimination legislation and its strong tradition of civil rights. Even if the first Race Relations Act of 1965 proved to have a merely declaratory nature, its succeeding modifications in 1968 and 1976 went much further. In 1968 the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was established and gradually provided with statutory powers. The failure of the legal and institutional framework resulted in the enacting of the Race Relations Act of 1976 which made discrimination on grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins unlawful, but not on the ground of confession or religious belief. It should be noted that religious communities in the UK could rely on the Race Relations Act only in so far as they constituted an ethnic community. The Act covered all areas of employment, housing and urban planning and introduced the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, and legal remedies (compensations), giving people individual access to British courts.

The last modification of the Race Relations Act dates back to 2000, when the Race Relations Amendment Act came into force, obliging public authorities to promote race equality. Public authorities in the UK now have a general duty to abolish racial discrimination and to promote equal opportunities and good relations between members of different ‘racial groups’. Moreover, the Act empowered the Secretary of State to impose specific duties on key authorities in the public administration. The relevant authorities are obliged to publish and implement a Race Equality Scheme which functions effectively as a strategy and action plan, setting out the relevant policies and actions to promote race equality (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, pp. 4 and 18–19).

The context of the UK's immigration policy was changed by New Labour's agenda for modernising Britain. Its priorities could be summarised as inclusion into the labour market, the creation of a business friendly environment, and the establishment of an effective and flexible public sector. Britain's modernisation process has been accompanied by major cultural shifts, affecting the area of immigration. In this respect, 8 September 2005 could be interpreted as a turning point in UK's migration management, when Immigration Minister Barbara Roche revised the hitherto quite restrictive approaches of British immigration policy and emphasised the positive economic, cultural and political aspects of migration (Düvell, 2005, p. 14).
Media debates on immigration in contemporary Britain, in the wake of terrorist incidents, are dominated by discourses on illegal immigration, asylum and the shortcomings of the UK's immigration control system. The previous positive perception of economic migration has been put in question. Instead the need for firm controls on Britain's liberal migration policies is stressed (Currle, 2004, pp. 123–60; Düvell, 2005, p. 4).

The UK, it could be concluded, orientates itself towards a multicultural and pluralistic integration scheme. In comparison with other countries following a pluralistic approach, like Sweden or the Netherlands, the main focus is on the civic self-organisation of migrant groups and the enforcement of fairness principles, while the public sector assumes a secondary role in welfare benefits and direct support for minority groups. In general, the UK appears ethnically more diverse than ever: 54 different ethnic or national groups numbering more than 10,000 people could be identified, showing a certain residential concentration in England (9% of the population) and London (19%) (Düvell, 2005, p. 4; Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 90–5).

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National Statistics Online, 2006: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1312, Date of visit: 15.3.06.
Amsterdam

738,763 inhabitants are currently registered in the City of Amsterdam, including 173 different nationalities. After the City of Luxemburg (59.15%), Amsterdam (47%) shows one of the highest percentages of foreign citizens in Europe compared with capitals such as London (27%), Madrid (15%), Dublin (8.4%) or Rome (6.6%). The composition of the immigrant population depends on the migratory tradition and history of each country. The city of Amsterdam reports the main countries of origin as Surinam (21%) and the Former Dutch West Indies (6%) as well as Morocco and Turkey (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 109; UCEU, 2003).

Atypically for Dutch cities, ethnic segregation is rather low due to the remarkable dominance of public authorities over the local housing ‘market’ and a decentralist policy of assigning public housing facilities to migrants applied by city officials since the 1980s. As a consequence, Amsterdam does experience districts with a high residential concentration of migrants (the district Zuidoost, for instance, shows a level of almost 60%), but these are largely not dominated by single ethnicities. If socio-economic criteria (discrepancy in incomes) and its coincidence with residential distribution are considered, the city of Amsterdam shows a low level of segregation in comparison with international standards (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 109–110).

As in most of the larger cities in the Netherlands, the task of integration is divided among different local institutions: the city’s ‘diversity department’ is responsible for the planning and supervision of the local equality policy; other institutions are entrusted with special integration measures; and special consultative bodies function as a link between the city government and the foreign population. The ‘diversity department’ plans integration measures and implements them together with the different administrative services which are obliged to adapt strategies of diversity management within the scope of intercultural mainstreaming. There are no single employees entrusted with the task, but issues of equality should be considered and respected in the whole set of activities of the services. Moreover, the ‘diversity department’ is not authorised to issue directives, but has to base its work on the power of convincing and the common sense of the essential need for such a policy. If its faces implementation barriers it may lean on the support of the city council and the competent committee of the district council to achieve its goals.

The relationship between the city government and the rather autonomous districts of the city is of importance for the achievement of integration measures: districts with a low percentage of migrants tend to neglect cooperation, while those with high numbers plan and propose integration projects on their own. As to the consultative bodies (Adviesraden), it should be noted that these are created and established along minority group lines, a fact constantly attacked by critics. Not only do the existing five consultative councils appear inappropriate to reflect existing migrant populations (one of these councils represents refugees, Pakistani and Chinese people all together), but their effective influence on processes of local decision making is rather limited, and in general the Amsterdam integration policy aims to overcome the ethnic minority policy applied for years in the Netherlands. As a result the city government of Amsterdam plans to establish a new consultative mechanism by creating a group of experts, functioning as a kind of ‘think tank’.

Since 1998 the city of Amsterdam has followed the concept and principles of recognising ethnic diversity on individual grounds, instead of envisaging its integration measures in terms of minority
group rights. In a city in which the ‘white majority’ is rapidly shrinking, in which ethnic identities and backgrounds multiply and overlap and which is characterised by migrants of second and third generations, educated in the Netherlands, it seems neither useful nor effective to consider people with a migration background as a problematic group in general. So applying strategies of intercultural mainstreaming, the city administration shows itself to be aware of these rapid changes.

Once a year each department and service has to report on the implementation of measures to foster cultural diversity to the city council, and the ‘diversity department’ introduces new targets to intercultural mainstreaming via ‘diversity monitoring’, investigating a range of institutions and aspects of urban life for representation and equality. Moreover, its efforts to employ people with migration backgrounds to achieve a minority quota of 20% in the city services has been a remarkable success: supported by a special work programme, people with migration backgrounds attend two years of training on the job, during which they work within different services of the city administration. This training programme very often culminates in regular employment for a significant number of people (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 112).

References

**Birmingham**

Birmingham is the UK’s second largest city (after London), with more than one million inhabitants. Members of minority groups represent approximately 30% of the total population, peaking at 50% of pupils starting school in 2000. Members of ethnic minorities in Birmingham are mostly of the second and third generations, whose parents are of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean or Chinese descent. Given the permanence of citizens with foreign backgrounds, the integration of newly arrived migrants plays a secondary role in Birmingham’s integration policy (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 95).

Birmingham shows a long history of adapting its city institutions to its race relations policy, which dates back to the end of the 1960s. At that time the ‘Birmingham Community Relations Council’ was created, formalising relations between the municipality and the existing migrant associations. Already in 1983/1984 the city had committed itself to ethnic monitoring and equal opportunity employment, and a Race Relations Unit within the city administration had been established. In the years following, Birmingham experienced a rise in the employment of people with migration backgrounds in public authorities to 20%, the implementation of annual equality schemes in the city administration, the introduction of contract compliance and strict adherence to an anti-discriminating policy, especially in the housing sector. Nowadays the Race Relations Unit is the biggest institution of its kind in Britain, employing its own ‘Equality Officers’.

The adaptation of Birmingham’s administration to its ethnic heterogeneity was, however, troubled and lengthy. In addition to various political and internal implementation barriers within the city administration, the mid-1980s were marked by social tensions making Birmingham a focal point for riots throughout the UK. Consequently the Community Relations Council (considered to have failed) was abolished and changed into the ‘Standing Consultative Forum’ (SCF), formed by ethnic and religious umbrella organisations in 1987 and 1990. Nowadays the SCF could be considered the most important instrument for the involvement of minorities and as a coordination tool between urban policy, city administration and minority groups (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 96–97).

In the mid-1990s the exemplary ‘model Birmingham’ came under the spotlight, as ethnic group membership as the organisational principle for its urban equality policy was questioned. The increasing internal differentiation of Birmingham’s migrant population, the special needs and demands of its second and third generations, representation by mainly old and male community ‘leaders’, and the existing relationship of patronage between the SCF and the city led to the redefining of Birmingham’s diversity policy.

In 1996 the Race Relations Unit, the Women’s Unit and the Disabled Unit were consolidated into an overlapping ‘Equality Division’, responsible to the City Council’s board on equality matters. This modification followed the new assumption that in a highly diversified urban context like Birmingham combinations of disadvantages were most likely to be found. This marked the starting point for a new issue-oriented anti-discrimination and equality policy in the city. In this context the consultative system with the SCF, based on an ethnic group classification, lost its support and was substituted in 1999 by the ‘Birmingham Race Action Partnership’ (BRAP) which coordinated the roles of people involved in different issues. The BRAP draws together competent representatives from the social services, departments of the city administration and migrant associations, aiming at involving them equally in decision-making processes. Moreover, the City of Birmingham provides opportunities for
communication, especially to women and adolescents with migration background (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 97–8).

In terms of single actions, the city administration continues to employ people of migrant background at the local level, implementing cultural mainstreaming in all services, and seeks contract compliance. Having reached the target of a 20% employment rate for ethnic minorities in the city administration, Birmingham’s positive actions today aim at balancing the under-representation of migrant groups such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and at facilitating the advancement of minority group members into important positions in local authorities. Individual city offices show marked variations in engaging people with migration backgrounds, from a 12% employment level in the city planning department to 34% in social services (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 98).

In other areas of intervention the city relies on the Birmingham Race Action Partnership, which in 1999 created five action panels in the fields of health, education, professional qualifications and the labour market, culture and sport, and crime. The two panels on educational matters complement and support existing programmes in Birmingham’s (mostly independent) schools by providing intercultural training to teachers and establishing models of mentorship (Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 98–9).

References
Bologna

The largest national group of the 27,633 foreigners (7.4% of the 374,940 inhabitants) living legally in the city of Bologna on 30 September 2005 are migrants from the Philippines, followed by Moroccans, Bangladeshis and Chinese. The percentage of females (50.9%) exceeds the percentage of males (49.1%) (Comune di Bologna, 2006).

Institutionally, the city responded to the presence of migrants by establishing the so-called Città multietnica in 1995, a centre dedicated to migration issues, which draws together consultancy and information services for foreigners. In 2006 these services include information for third-country migrants on legal provisions, rights, access to services and integration into the labour market. To refugees and asylum seekers it offers information on the administrative procedure for asylum applications and on the (living) conditions of asylum seekers and recognised refugees.

The centre provides a service for cultural mediation (Servizio Centralizzato di Mediazione Culturale e Interpretariato Sociale) to all other services and departments in the city area which deal with migration issues as well as a legal counter which offers consultancy and legal support to immigrants. The centre is responsible for the management of the municipality hostels (centri comunali di accoglienza) and other transitory housing facilities for immigrants and refugees; it undertakes educational activities for minors. The centre aims to offer ‘basic instruments (services, laws, statistics etc.) provided for migrants from the world’ and claims to ‘open society for a thousand voices, a thousand perspectives and a thousand shades of colour in a manner which allows the coexistence of contradictions and differences’ (Comune di Bologna, 2006).

The centre went through significant structural changes. Under the right-wing mayor, Giorgio Guazzaloca, in 2000 its activities were restricted, and personnel, such as those working on migration statistics, became assigned to provincial institutions located in the city (see also: La Repubblica, 2004). In 2004 local left-wing politicians came back to power and changed things again.

Migrants living in Bologna have to face considerable housing problems (Piazza Grande, 2002), and its archbishop Cardinal Biffi has acquired a certain popularity by speaking out against Bolognese Muslim migrants (L’unità; La Repubblica 2000).

In 1992 the City of Bologna, together with other interested institutions at the provincial and regional levels and in collaboration with the University of Bologna, established a service to support teachers in receiving students with migration backgrounds and to promote their integration. The CD/LEI Centro Documentazione/Laboratorio per un’educazione interculturale (CD/LEI, Centre for documentation/Laboratory for intercultural education) aims at promoting the integration of pupils with migration backgrounds into the school system, carrying out activities to guarantee them equal rights in education and to improve their performance. Its purpose is to support Italian schools in creating intercultural school careers and in dedicating resources to the management of cultural diversity as well as to involve teachers. In addition the centre supports the exchange of ‘intercultural good practices’ between educational institutions at the local, regional and international level and promotes links between interested institutions and associations in order to facilitate activities to receive and integrate pupils with foreign backgrounds. In 2004 the centre opened a ‘counter of intercultural consulting’ to school teachers, intercultural mediators and intercultural operators (CD/LEI Centro Documentazione/Laboratorio per un’educazione interculturale, 2006).
During the 1990s the Forum Metropolitano delle Associazioni dei cittadini non comunitari di Bologna e provincia (Metropolitan Forum for third-country nationals in the city of Bologna and its province) was created in the city, promoted and supported by the left-wing policy on immigration of that time. The Forum was supposed to enable the political participation of immigrants; in 2006 it consisted of some 52 immigrant associations. Observers of its activities, however, raised doubts about the Forum as an appropriate body for making the ethnic minority voice heard in the local integration agenda of Bologna (Grillo, 2002, p. 19; Però, 2002; Ufficio Immigrazione della Provincia di Bologna, 2006).

Però considered the participation of immigrants, as representatives of the Forum, as being merely consultative. He argued that the ‘ethnic’ discourse within the political left did not differ ‘qualitatively’ from the one among the right (Però, 2002, p. 112). He criticised the left for not effectively establishing and promoting other forms of political participation in Bologna, claiming a significant discrepancy between multicultural rhetoric and the practices in the city. According to Però, this treatment of immigrants by Bologna’s left seems not to be limited to the sphere of political participation, but seems also to affect areas such as housing and general welfare provisions (Però, 2002, pp. 111–13).

References


In 2005 approximately 30% of Brussels’ one million residents were foreign nationals. Considering that Brussels migration statistics are based on foreign nationality (and do not reveal any migration background beyond citizenship), the de facto presence of people with foreign background is estimated to reach 38% of the total population of Brussels-Capital. The Brussels immigrants are mainly of Moroccan origin, amounting to 30% of the foreign population, followed by people of Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish and Portuguese nationality. Citizens of EU Member States amount to nearly 50% of foreigners, including labour migrants from South European countries as well as employees of European institutions situated in the capital. Migrants from former Belgian colonies in Central Africa are also assuming growing importance (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, p. 13; Europaforum Wien, 2002, pp. 146–8).

Regarding institutions dealing with migration issues, the region Brussels-Capital is marked by the coexistence of the Walloon individual right approach and the Flemish pluralistic model. Brussels’ four governments and parliaments, the Brussels parliament together with the Flemish and Francophone Community Commissions (VGC and COCOF) as well as the common Community Commission (GGC), have formally agreed on a special charter outlining basic rules for the harmonious coexistence of different ethnic groups in the capital. In 1992 a mixed consultative commission, formed by elected representatives of immigrant groups, was established. This commission had consultative power in matters affected by migration such as education, employment, housing, living conditions, the teaching of Islam, local political participation, women’s rights, refugees, problems related to the non-implementation of respective laws and contact with police forces. In 1995 the commission was split up into a Flemish mixed commission and a separate francophone mixed commission. In general their relevance and influence at the regional level was rather limited (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs, 2005, p. 13; Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 149).

The Brussels regional government, however, has yet not established an office or department responsible exclusively for migration matters, nor does a commission at the regional parliament exist. Questions in relation to the migration phenomena are handled inside the respective institutional sectors and are dominated by the Walloonian individual rights approach (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 148).

Politically Brussels faced the most significant changes during the elections of 1999 and 2000, when the number of elected representatives with migration backgrounds increased rapidly. One in eight parliament members are not Belgian, but of foreign background, mostly of Moroccan descent. Their number is already approaching that of the Flemish parliament members. While migrants of Moroccan background gained a presence in Brussels politics, this did not affect other immigrants groups. Indeed, citizens of EU Member States did not show any interest in playing an active role in the local elections (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 149).

A comprehensive integration policy in Brussels-Capital, in terms of a coordination throughout all interested administrative bodies, however, is still missing. An official policy of recognising diversity and respective instruments such as intercultural mainstreaming, ‘contract compliance’ or minority quotas for the local administration does not exist, due to the scepticism of the francophone league towards basing policies on ethnic affiliation. As a result of Brussels pragmatism, though, some municipalities, showing a high rate of resident migrants, provide multilingual information services to immigrants and employ people with migration backgrounds.
This situation leads the community commissions to assume an important role in the financing of ‘personal’ integration measures such as language training or practising religion. Once again the cultural-linguistic dichotomy of the country shows its impact on migration issues. The Flemish community of Brussels-Capital looks to the region of Flanders for financial resources supporting immigrant associations as well as the regional Integration Centre ‘Foyer’ which develops multilingual education models for Flemish schools: the Walloon community orients itself towards the francophone system. Following the individual rights approach, migration associations and NGOs working in the field of integration are granted financial support only if they show their measures to be embedded in general civic activities, i.e. to be open to anybody and not to target a special group of people.

It could be stated in conclusion that the integration policy of Brussels-Capital is deeply marked by the cultural-linguistic dichotomy of the country. Currently politicians of both community commissions aim at gaining greater influence over migration associations by granting them financial resources and incorporating them into the existing dual policy system. The migrants themselves, however, show little tendency to adapt to Belgian minority identities, i.e. to identify themselves with the Flemish or Walloon models, which carries the risk of excluding themselves from the institutional structure of Belgian society.

References

Frankfurt am Main

Frankfurt am Main (650,000 inhabitants, ranking fifth of Germany's cities) has a large share of residents with a migratory background (186,000 non-Germans, 28.6% of the city's population). Most foreigners have lived for more than a decade in Frankfurt, and families with a migratory background are now in the second and third generations. Many migrants have German citizenship, and if the immigration of ethnic Germans is considered, more than one-third of the city's population has a migratory background.

In 1989 the Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten (AMKA) (Office for Multicultural Affairs) was founded. Its task was defined as promoting the constructive coexistence of various groups with different national, social, ethnic and cultural background, and their integration. For many years such a municipal office was unique in Germany.

In addition to the AMKA, the city parliament (Magistrat der Stadt Frankfurt am Main) created several other institutions during the years following. For example, foreign residents in Frankfurt elected in 1991 the first foreigners’ council (Kommunalen Ausländer- und Ausländerinnenvertretung). Another body is the city parliament commission for equal rights and integration, established in 1995, which advises the city mayor and administration.

The AMKA performs a broad spectrum of activities. It is engaged as coordinator and councillor for migrant issues, but also initiates and implements its own integration programmes financed by its municipal budget and by state as well as federal and European funds. Target groups are the resident population with migratory backgrounds, and the resident German population of the city districts: it aims to involve the indigenous population in integration programmes and implements public relation activities to gain support in the native population.

The various tasks encompass, for example, counselling, mediation and conflict management. The AMKA acts as contact point for migrants and steers people requiring assistance to the responsible municipal and public offices. After initial conflicts, cooperation with other branches of the city administration became well established, and the AMKA receives frequently requests for counselling or mediation by other offices of the municipality when migrant affairs are involved. In 1996 the Stadtteilvermittlung project was launched. In this project, mediators are engaged in conflict management at the local neighbourhood level. It is meanwhile part of the standard function of AMKA. The AMKA features a heterogeneous group of 50 trained mediators, most of them in a voluntary capacity.

The AMKA further coordinates language and orientation courses in Frankfurt. So it closely cooperate with the adult education centre (Volkshochschule) which employs 150 trained staff members. Orientation courses are usually held by locally resident migrants: the personal experience and intercultural competence of these migrants, who consider themselves citizens of Frankfurt, contributed to the successful implementation of these courses. Those referred usually have a high motivation and perceive their competence as a very useful skill based on personal experience (empowerment approach). The AMKA cooperates with the municipal department for children and youth and the school department and provides counselling for language training programmes for kindergartens and primary schools that integrates language training and social as well as cultural integration and that targets the whole family.
Another project is intercultural work with parents on vocational training. This aims at improving vocational training results and the immersion into the labour market of young people with migration backgrounds. It uses increased involvement of parents. During the school phase the project creates small groups for the implementation of action strategies to improve the transition into working life. The young migrants are supported in making applications and are prepared for job interviews. The implementing organisations are supported by the AMKA, which cooperates with teachers, social workers, the labour office, the local chamber of commerce and employers’ associations.

The AMKA is interested in improving dialogue between police and migrants: in cooperation with the police, the AMKA organises seminars in which members of migrants’ associations and the police discuss migrant affairs.

Furthermore, the AMKA is carrying out various other activities, such as public relations and information on issues relevant to the migrant and native populations, anti-discrimination activities or information and service for and about elderly migrants. Since the AMKA reflects the state of integration and the demand for integration measures, it contracts scientific institutions for empirical research on the state of integration, on the demand for targeted integration measures as well as evaluation and scientific counselling for existing measures.

The AMKA in Frankfurt is – according to its founding statutes – in charge of integration measures in so far as the respective area is not under responsibility of other municipal departments. Although it has to perform a cross-departmental function, it has to rely on voluntary cooperation from other offices of the city administration. The same holds true for cooperation with state and federal institutions (labour administration, pension system, school, law enforcement). Although the AMKA was able to gain a good standing due to its competence and succeeded in establishing good cooperation with most administrative offices, it still lacks a clear mandate for coordination and implementing integration measures as well as anti-discrimination activities.

References


Madrid

In January 2005 Madrid's foreign population amounted to 453,872 legal residents (15% of the total city population of more than three million inhabitants). The largest immigrant group consists of people from Central and South America (62.4%), from European countries (19.5%), from Africa (8.3%), Asia (7.4%) and North America (2%). In terms of single nationalities, the most numerous groups are the Ecuadorians (29.7%), Colombians (9.3%), Romanians (6.5%), Peruvians (6.1%) and Moroccans (5.3%) (Dirección General de Estadística, 2005).

In recent years Madrid has experienced an unprecedented surge of immigrants. To respond to the migrants' need for health, education and social services, within a relatively short period of time (1993–2003) the municipality developed institutional arrangements such as the reception centre Centro de Acogida 'Casa de Campo' and intercultural mediation services, the so-called Servicio de Mediación Social Intercultural en el Municipio de Madrid (SEMSI). Some substantial programmes have been developed targeting important immigrant groups: among these are the Proyecto APOI de Actuación Integral con Minorías Étnicas de Europa del Este (a project aiming at the inclusion of minority groups from Eastern Europe); the Programa Integral de Prevención de Situaciones de Exclusión Social a Jóvenes Inmigrantes procedentes del Magreb (the project intents to prevent the social exclusion of young immigrants from the Maghreb); and the Initiative LIA – Proyecto de Intervención Participativa de la Población Inmigrante en la Zona Centro de Madrid, an exchange programme of best practices within the network of Eurocities, designed to promote the active participation of migrants in the centre of Madrid. Nevertheless, until 2005 no measures for the political integration of migrants were taken in Madrid.

In March 2005 the city council launched a strategic plan to elaborate ‘a city for everybody’, a ‘city of neighbours’ appointing mutual responsibilities for both immigrants and natives named the Plan Madrid de Convivencia Social e Intercultural (Madrid Plan for Social and Intercultural Coexistence) (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2005, p. 21). The Plan constitutes the practical outcome of a debate on migration matters between governmental and non-governmental participants convened within the Foro Social, a social forum established in October 2003. The overall objectives are defined a fostering the institutional progress of immigrant reception at the municipal level, to provide better access to civil rights and resources for immigrants, as well as to improve coexistence between Spaniards and foreigners in order to create dynamic and harmonious neighbourhoods. The Plan Madrid is coordinated by the city's General-Directorate for Immigration, Cooperation for Development and Community Service, affiliated to the Agency for Employment and Citizen Services (Dirección General de Inmigración, Cooperación al Desarrollo y Voluntariado del Área de Gobierno de Empleo y Servicios a la Ciudadanía), which controls a budget of €41.6 million till 2007 (Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia Intercultural, 2005, p. 3).

The Plan Madrid contains a clear set of working areas and instruments to attain the goals cited above. The municipality is entrusted with the planning and development of activities and institutions affecting the areas of employment (with the focus on gender equality), social services, immigration and civil participation. Since Plan Madrid was adopted, the city has established the first of three information centres for the integration of immigrants (Oficina Municipal de Información y Orientación para la Integración); another two centres were due to open in October 2006 and April 2007. It has also founded a centre to facilitate immigrants’ access to the local housing market called Agencia de Alquiler del Área de Gobierno de Urbanismo y Vivienda e Infraestructuras del Ayuntamiento.
(Accomodation Bureau of the Municipal Office for Urban Housing and Infrastructure). The housing agency collaborates closely with the intercultural mediation services of the city.

As regards active participation in city society, various institutions have been established on the basis of Madrid’s plan for peaceful coexistence. Several institutions have been established, aimed at initiating an effective intercultural dialogue. In Round Tables for Intercultural Dialogues in the Districts (Mesas Distritales de Dialogo y Convivencia, launched in April 2005) topics of everyday intercultural understanding are supposed to be discussed; representatives of these Round Tables are requested to meet in the Foro de Madrid de Dialogo y Convivencia (Madrid Forum for a Dialogue of Neighbours), which functions as a communication and advisory body on relevant issues. In addition, once in a year the Social Forum (Foro Social) is supposed to take place, following the precedent of the first meetings of the city government in 2004, gathering some 400 people from non-governmental institutions and from among those involved in policy implementation at the local level. Two more instruments are supposed to complete Madrid’s institutional setting to target migration issues: the city’s programme Apoyo asociacionismo, starting in April 2006, will promote the creation and establishment of immigrants’ organisations, while Apoyo a los proyectos de la iniciativa social para favorecer la convivencia social e intercultural is a programme, operating since 1995, to support initiatives of Madrid’s civil society for the advancement of intercultural coexistence in the city, (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2005, pp. 143–62).

In the wake of Plan Madrid a scientific institute, the Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia Intercultural de la Ciudad de Madrid (Monitoring Centre for Migration and Intercultural Coexistence of the City of Madrid), has been created. Since October 2004 the centre has exercised analytical as well as practical functions: besides investigating different aspects of the migration phenomenon in the city, it coordinates the exchange of relevant information within competent municipal structures (publishing a monthly bulletin, Dialogos, etc.) (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2005, pp. 66–9; Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia Intercultural, 2005, p. 3).

References


Marseille

The city of Marseille has been and is still strongly marked by migration. Because of its geographical position as a seaport, there has been a huge inflow of people of different nations and religions over centuries. At the end of the 19th century migration to the city was dominated by Italians. In the first half of the 20th century, up to 40% of the population was of Italian origin. During the Second World War refugees from Germany and later from Spain and Italy took refuge in Marseille. In the period of decolonisation many migrants from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africans as well as refugees from Indo-China entered France through the harbour of Marseille, contributing subsequently to the city's ethnic and cultural differences (Parodi, 2002).

Marseille has about 800,000 inhabitants of whom 8% are officially registered as foreign citizens. Considering that the French Republic traditionally assimilates migrants by granting them citizenship, it could be estimated that Marseille's de facto proportion of residents with migration backgrounds is as much as 20%. As to single geographic areas, immigrants from the Maghreb constitute the most significant migrant community: 70,000 citizens (almost 9%) are considered to be of Maghrebian origin, mostly from Algeria. The second largest group in Marseille in terms of single nationalities is from the Comoros, amounting to some 45,000 people (6%).

As far as the housing structure is concerned, Marseille shows a strong residential segregation of its migrant population, especially affecting immigrants from the Maghreb. In contrast to other French cities, migrants are not concentrated in the banlieues (suburbs), but particularly in the north of the city: nearly the whole migrant community lives in the Canebière district, reaching from the northern periphery almost to the city centre and numbering about 300,000 citizens. This area is characterised by an unemployment rate of 30% and represents the highest concentration of poverty in France. The residential segregation of Marseille's migrant population challenges the traditional republican assimilation model more than in other parts of France (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 137).

Institutionally Marseille's integration policy corresponds to the general French assimilation model: the responsibilities for migration matters are distributed among town councillors, administration departments and municipal council committees in areas such as employment, education, social affairs etc., while certain activities are carried out within the framework of the so-called 'politique de la ville'. As part of this, in northern parts of Marseille, district centres (centres d'animation de quartier) are maintained which provide intercultural mediation to its most heterogeneous clientele. It should be noted, though, that Marseille's migrant population is underrepresented in the city's elected bodies. In this respect Marseille matches the general situation in the French Republic.

While on the one hand Marseille's integration policy corresponds to the general French assimilation model, on the other hand the city shows pragmatic reactions of a more pluralistic kind. Already in the 1980s communication structures between the city government and people had been institutionalised within the contrat de ville (city contract), including programmes for urban renewal. Moreover, mediators in the city administration have assumed the role of representing the Maghrebian minority and of lobbying for them. Their influence established the awareness of specific migrants' needs and led subsequently to the shift from a 'social' to an 'ethnic' orientation of integration measures and policies (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 138).

It should be noted, though, that Marseille has always experienced a certain Italian influence due to its proximity to the country, economic relations and a common history: Marseille once belonged to the Roman Empire.
In addition Marseille is the only city in France which has created the so-called service de relations avec les communautés, an administrative body aimed at maintaining dialogue with resident migrant communities. The department works on Marseille Espérance, an inter-confessional commission, founded in 1990 by the mayor, Robert-Paul Vigouroux, to avoid ethnic-religious conflicts between Jews and Muslims. This lay institution is an opportunity for communication between faiths, aimed at creating mutual respect and fighting intolerance, ignorance etc. (Parodi, 2002, pp. 8–9).

The city administration’s intention is to demonstrate its openness towards multiculturalism by being present at the inauguration of cultural institutions, by paying attention to the resident minorities’ religious holidays and by visiting the countries of origin of its migrant populations (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 139).

In conclusion the local integration policy applied by the city of Marseille shows a greater tendency to pluralistic approaches than most other French cities. Despite the strong residential segregation in the city, several researchers have described the success of Marseille’s integration policy, based on its ability to create a strong inclusive framework at the local level (Parodi, 2002; Schmidt-Fink, 2005).

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Paris

Paris is the political, economic and cultural centre of France, the country's largest and most important city. The total population of Paris – without suburbs – is 2,120,000 people of which 10% have foreign nationality and 18% are first generation migrants.

Compared with other big cities, the percentage of residents with foreign nationality is relatively low, for several reasons. Firstly, French integration is based on the idea of granting immigrants citizenship. In this sense immigrants in France benefit from the liberal French nationality law, which is mostly based on principles of the *ius soli*. In accordance with its universalistic principles, children of immigrants are not considered 'foreign nationals', even if they have double nationality, but simply as French. Secondly, evidence suggests that the city is marked by a high rate of illegal migration, even higher than in other European cities, and which cannot be estimated accurately. Thirdly, immigrants are residentially concentrated in Paris's suburbs which are not part of the municipal area itself (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 133; Schnapper et al, 2003, p. 21).

Paris's foreign inhabitants come from 110 different countries. Among the most significant migrant group is the North African community, of which some 310,000 live in the city. Others came from Vietnam or Southern Europe, typical sources of immigration to France. Moreover, since the 1990s the city has experienced increasing rates of migration from China, India and Pakistan (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 133; Conseil de Paris, 2005).

Within the city of Paris residential segregation is not as marked as in the case of Marseille. Nevertheless, the 18th arrondissement and the 13th arrondissement constitute city districts dominated by single migrant communities, with immigrants coming from Western Africa and from China. The areas with the highest proportion of migrant populations are, however, the traditional workers' districts in the North and East of the city.

Characteristic of the capital's institutional structure is the power-splitting between autonomous districts' administrations and mayors, and the central administration of Paris as a whole. This overlapping of responsibilities and competences seems to create obstacles to effective and innovative policies. Integration matters are considered quite differently among the various districts' administrations: some of them do not mention it at all; others have commissioners for integration (Europaforum Wien, 2002, p. 134).

Due to the 'republican model' of citizenship, which forbids any differentiation between French and foreign nationals, until recently Paris did not apply any specific integration policies with regard to immigrants. Thus, integration policy was not considered and formulated as a policy on its own, but as part of the general social policy of Paris or the national policy for cities (Schnapper et al, 2003, p. 17). In the past, the most important measures have been implemented within the so-called town contracts (*contrat de ville*), containing action plans for 15 districts that show a migrant population above average. These contracts followed universalistic principles and did not emphasise migration matters explicitly, but focused on general 'colour-blind aims' such as social cohesion, employment or reducing the crime rate. Additionally, more than 20 cultural, social or youth centres (*centres*...
The attitude and policy on integration matters changed with the new city government, which came to power in the municipal elections of 2001. In the course of this political change, Paris planned and implemented an explicit integration policy for the first time in its history. Institutionally, this paradigm shift has been brought about by creating the department Politique de la ville et de l'intégration which is responsible for the coordination of integration activities. In addition, Paris's new city government explicitly entrusted a town councillor with the responsibility for migrant inclusion and integration policy (adjointe au maire de Paris chargée de l'intégration) and allocated some €7 million per year to integration and combating discrimination.

The new policy is organised in three fields of action: anti-discrimination, citizenship and access to rights, and valuing cultures of origin. Various projects have been realised since this political change, for instance the distribution of multilingual documents and information sheets with topics such as health or public housing, the inauguration of a French-Chinese kindergarten or the foundation of a café that offers social support for elderly immigrants. Additionally a council of foreign citizens without French or other European nationalities (Conseil de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens Non Communautaire, CCPNC) was inaugurated in 2001, assuming the role of a spokesman for migrant interests. Although holding a merely advisory role, many of its proposals have already been carried out. The paradigm change in integration matters under Paris’s new city government has ultimately been endorsed by a socio-demographic study on foreigners and residents with migration background, which confirms the legitimacy of an explicit integration policy in the city.

The violent riots in Paris’s suburbs (not in the city of Paris itself), which were in large part initiated and undertaken by young people with migration backgrounds at the end of 2005, rather encouraged the city government to continue their Parisian integration policy, instead of provoking a crisis.

In November 2005 the mayor, Bertrand Delanoë, pointed out that ‘integration’ neither meant total assimilation nor dissociation, but a continuous and gradual process. On the side of the migrants he emphasised the importance of their active (civic) participation in the host society as well as the nationwide importance of establishing equal rights for every citizen without neglecting differences between individuals. Furthermore he underlined that ‘integration’ also meant accepting the reality of cultural, social and moral particularities and he appealed for recognition and appreciation of this enriching variety (Conseil de Paris, 2005).

In conclusion it should be stressed that the city of Paris has recently turned away from the ideal of assimilation. The new awareness and creation of the political category ‘population with migration background’ and the adoption of new instruments considering Paris’s cultural diversity-oriented instruments can be seen as a fundamental break with the traditional French universalistic principle. Instead of a ‘colour-blind’ policy, a pluralistic approach is on the way to be implemented.

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Integration policy and practices at local level


Prague

About one-third of the total immigrant population of the Czech Republic, i.e. 76,764 foreigners on 31 December 2004, live legally in Prague, making up 6.5% of Prague’s 1,169,106 inhabitants (Czech Statistical Office, 2004).

This significant immigrant presence, however, seems to be not yet adequately reflected in municipal policies and institutions. Although the need for a principle of foreign integration is recognised by civil servants and NGOs, a coherent municipal policy is still missing. Moreover, immigration matters need to be better embedded in the strategic and conceptual planning of city management and development.

In the context of general strategic planning, the city established a special unit within the Department of Municipal Development which recognised the relevance of immigration in relation to Prague’s ‘opening to the world’. But although the presence of immigrants was noted in the Strategic Plan, this topic has only recently been acknowledged as relevant to Prague’s future. The issue of integrating immigrants in the urban environment became increasingly relevant when the riots in the French suburbs resonated in the Czech press, which compared the situation of Czech minorities and immigrants with France. Some activities, undertaken by organisations/institutions supporting ‘socially excluded’ foreigners, were made possible through the European Social Fund. Specifically, in 2003 a Commission for Integration of Foreigners was established at the City Council of Prague. Without its own working principles as yet, it seems to rely mainly on the national Concept of Integration of Foreigners as formulated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Nevertheless, there are debates between the Commission for Integration of Foreigners and the Commission for National Minorities of the City Council about the different agendas of the protection and promotion of national minorities on the one hand, and the ‘new’ migrants coming to Prague on the other. These debates on similarities and differences between these two types of ‘foreigners’ have not been resolved yet at the municipal level, and the debate on immigrants’ integration in Prague seems to be dominated by cultural aspects, while economic, social, legal and political aspects seem to be considered to a lesser extent. One obstacle that remains to a coherent municipal integration policy seems to be the distribution of responsibilities among various municipal departments. Čaněk has asked for a ‘a more conceptual and overarching picture of the integration of migrants and ideas about general policies that would cut across the limiting sectorial divisions’ (Čaněk, 2006).

References


Stockholm

In 2001 the total population of Stockholm amounted to 750,348 people, of whom nearly 20% were born abroad. The national backgrounds of these foreign citizens reflect Sweden's high level of cultural heterogeneity. In terms of single groups, immigrants of Finnish nationality outnumber those from Chile, Turkey, former Yugoslavia and Iran. But the most dynamic developments concern the group of African origin. As a result of this multitude of foreign backgrounds, ethnic segregation of single immigrant groups in city districts scarcely exists. What does exist, however, is the residential concentration of the migrant population en bloc: in comparison with other European cities Stockholm faces a high level of residential segregation of its migrant residents. In Stockholm's Rinkeby district, for instance, 60% of the inhabitants are first generation migrants deriving from more than a hundred different countries, while another 20% of its residents are defined as second generation. Rinkeby, however, is not an exception: in two other districts of the city the percentage of people born in countries other than Sweden exceeds 35%. All these districts, it should be noted, are situated in urban suburbs built in the 1970s as part of public housing programmes.

Apart from this the city of Stockholm is evidently trying to implement an urban policy of cultural diversity, carried out by the biggest integration service worldwide, which employs some 60 people. This important tool of Stockholm’s integration management is divided into several departments, responsible for the general inclusion strategy of the city, the reception programme for new immigrants (including language courses) and district activities. The service is entrusted with the planning and communication of new integration measures, consulting and intercultural training for civil servants as well as with the evaluation of integration programmes. It reports directly to the competent committee of the city council responsible for integration matters. According to the Europaforum, the perception of Stockholm as a multicultural city and the implementation of cultural mainstreaming are already embedded so deeply in the city administration that single services start promoting integration measures independently, without the support of the integration service cited above (Europaforum, 2002, pp. 122–3).

As regards the single districts of the city, it should be noted that they benefit from a high degree of independence in implementing local policies, including integration measures. While on the one hand this leads to the formation of committed partners for the city’s integration service, on the other hand it generates implementation barriers in districts with lower awareness and presence of migrants (Europaforum, 2002, p. 123).

In general Stockholm’s migration management has experienced various changes in recent years. Since 1997, though, integration into the local labour market, social desegregation (not residential) and confronting discrimination could be identified as crucial elements to the city’s integration policy, which is supported by all parties present in the town council. In this sense the voting out of the left-wing city government in 1998 and the subsequent takeover by the conservatives had rather limited affects on the city’s integration philosophy and management. Indeed a rate of 20% of employees with migration background in Stockholm’s city administration seems to show a widespread acceptance of its multicultural nature and the adaptation of the city’s structure to its factual ethnic heterogeneity (Europaforum, 2002, pp. 123–4).
Moreover, as part of the general integration policy in recent years, the city administration limits contract assignments to those companies which are ‘unknown for discriminating practices’. Since 2001 even contracts already signed may be dissolved legally when enterprises are responsible for acts of discrimination (Europaforum, 2002, pp. 123–24).

It is unclear, however, how the expression ‘unknown for discriminating practices’ is defined and applied in reality and how this primarily political declaration is embedded in the everyday routine of Stockholm’s city management and transformed into practice.

In addition, and despite all efforts to implement an urban policy of cultural diversity, the participation of Stockholm’s immigrants in important parts of civic society must be considered low. Even if 13% of the political representatives of local authorities (city council, district committee etc.) have a foreign background, i.e. were born abroad, the average turn-out of migrant voters is lower than the national comparable rate and has decreased. Despite the official intention to promote and establish cultural mainstreaming in the city, Stockholm lacks institutionalised ways and instruments of consultancy provided by recognised migrant representatives. Until now the city has not shown any clear intent to involve migrant associations systematically in processes of policy formulation which precede political decisions on migration matters (Benito 2005, p. 4; Europaforum 2002, pp. 123–24).

In the context of the everyday experience of cultural diversity, Stockholm assumes an exemplary character in the area of institutionalising bilingualism. Recognising fluency in two languages as a cultural resource and economic opportunity, the city supports remedial teaching in the native languages of its migrants, instructing Stockholm’s schools to provide funding for that purpose (Europaforum, 2002, p. 125).

Moreover, Stockholm grants two ‘integration awards’ for the exemplary achievement of integration measures inside the city administration and outside local authorities, and celebrates naturalisation parties for new citizens, giving them a visible welcome. In addition Stockholm’s cultural institutions, and especially libraries, are obliged to adapt their agenda to the ethnic heterogeneity of the city (Europaforum, 2002, p. 125).

References

Stuttgart

In 2005 nearly 130,000 of Stuttgart's 592,028 inhabitants were of foreign background, representing 21.9% of the total population. These immigrants come from more than 170 different countries (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, p. 6; Statistisches Amt, 2006).

Like many other cities which have experienced a high percentage of newcomers in recent years, the city of Stuttgart 'felt some pressure' to adapt its city administration to the changing situation and in particular to guarantee equal chances to all its residents in the areas of housing, education, labour market etc. The department of integration of Stuttgart says that 'successful integration is the glue for social cohesion and in order to be successful, endeavours of integration need the back-up of a strong partnership between the public sector, private sector and civil society'. To reach that goal the city of Stuttgart signed the 'Pact for Integration' in 2001, institutionalising the cooperation between politics and administration in the public sector and drawing together business people and interest groups in the private sector as well as associations, sport clubs, NGOs and community organisations to promote the social and competitive inclusion of its migrants (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, p. 6).

Stuttgart's integration philosophy is defined as consisting of eight so-called 'milestones', embracing areas such as education, economic growth, equal rights and opportunities, political and social participation, pluralism and cultural diversity, spirit of mutual respect and solidarity, participatory communication and international cooperation.

In the field of education the city of Stuttgart emphasises good German literacy, while encouraging simultaneously bilingual and multilingual education. German language training is provided at a very early stage of a child's life in order to prevent later social and educational exclusion. Moreover, parents with migration background are 'offered some help' in supporting the learning capacities of their children.

Assuming that economic growth is the base of everyone's well-being, Stuttgart emphasises the important role of migrant IT workers in fostering the competitiveness of Stuttgart and the economic benefits provided by migrants living in the city for decades who have successfully started their own businesses.

Relying on the policy of cultural mainstreaming, the city has implemented a number of instruments especially aiming at the promotion of girls and women in education and professional training. Special language courses have been organised, and this often marginalised group has been familiarised with the German social and educational system by 'getting around'. Following a 'modern strategy of integration', after-school groups for girls have been created to increase the acceptance by Muslim parents of after-school activities.

To foster political and social participation, the city of Stuttgart has established an 'International Committee', which is a local consultative body made up of elected migrant representatives, experts and city councillors. The International Committee meets on a regular basis to discuss matters of integration and other aspects of local life in Stuttgart aimed at supporting and influencing processes of policy formulation and decision-making in the city council.

To promote cultural diversity and pluralism, the municipal libraries of Stuttgart provide books and electronic media in various languages, and public and private organisations offer seminars on...
intercultural understanding and management. The Institute for Foreign Relations and different cultural institutions such as theatres and museums are involved in intercultural education. Aiming at establishing the city of Stuttgart as a multicultural reality, the city further promotes activities in individual areas such as language and education, integration in the neighbourhoods, support for pluralism and diversity in all spheres of society as well as strengthening the intercultural self-perception of the city.

In 1998 the Forum for Cultures was created, reflecting Stuttgart’s cultural heterogeneity and fostering its self-awareness as an ‘intercultural city’. As an umbrella organisation the NGO started with 16 cultural associations, expanding rapidly to 62 member organisations currently, with over 50 different national backgrounds. Besides its direct funding by the city, all member organisations qualify for the city’s financial support to promote cultural projects (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, p. 13; pp. 32–8). In addition to its intra-administrative efforts to reflect cultural diversity, the city of Stuttgart also encourages private organisations and associations in civil society to open up and to adapt their services to migrants. The employment agency cooperates closely with local entrepreneurs in finding new apprenticeship and job opportunities for young adults with migration backgrounds, emphasising their multilingualism and intercultural skills as key elements in a globalising economy. Moreover, various institutions and projects such as counselling services with bilingual psychologists, social services of migrant organisations, adult evening classes etc, receive financial support from the city (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, pp. 39–47).

Recognising the need to foster social cohesion between people belonging to and identifying with different cultural backgrounds, round tables were established drawing together social workers, policy workers, teachers, policemen and others to improve the quality of multicultural life in the various city districts and to fight discrimination. In cases of private conflicts with a cultural or ethnic background there is a team of trained mediators to solve problems outside the city courts. To promote integration into the neighbourhoods several community institutions have been established within the city. The ‘House 49’, one of the oldest community centres (founded in the 1980s), was set up by Catholic and Protestant Churches with financial support from the Robert Bosch Foundation. Its intercultural approach and philosophy is the basis for many new centres in the city (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, pp. 25–9).

As far as the participation of Stuttgart’s migrants is concerned, it should be noted that there are several shops in the city selling newspapers in a wide variety of languages and that some immigrant groups edit their own local papers in their native languages. Moreover, the ‘Forum of Cultures’ publishes a magazine that encompasses all the intercultural organisations and ethnic groups present in the city.

In order to foster international exchange on migration matters, the city of Stuttgart is closely cooperating with EU institutions and the Council of Europe, as well as being a member of the ‘International city network on integration policies’ (Stabsabteilung Stuttgart, 2003, pp. 8–13).

Special emphasis is given to the transition from school to work life, focussing on the one hand on migrant students and on the other hand on adult newcomers who have not been brought up in the German education system. In addition to the already existing training programmes on German language and other skills which explicitly target asylum seekers, refugees, German or Jewish re-
settlers and other groups of migrant youths of working age, a one-year preparation programme for regular apprenticeship has been established within the framework of the German ‘dual system’. This consists of theoretical instruction and practical training for young people with migration backgrounds. Moreover, young professionals benefit from the so-called JUMP programme in which they acquire additional job skills; and special training in language and professional qualifications for unemployed migrants, entitled ‘Work instead of welfare’, is provided.

Other projects are MIQUAS, aimed especially at migrant women, and QUASIE, targeting asylum seekers, both supported by the European Union as well as the Italian-Croat-Turkish initiative, KOLIBRI. So far, however, no infrastructure has been established to detect suitable courses. Instead, finding a helpful course has been a matter of pure luck. So the network BQN has been established, drawing together organisations working in the field of professional qualification of migrants. This network aims to structure current job offers and coordinate them in future.

References

Vantaa

The City of Vantaa has around 190,000 residents and two official languages: Finnish and Swedish. Approximately 12,000 people of foreign background live in the city, nearly 6.3% of the total (City of Vantaa, 2006a, p. 3). In its city brochure Vantaa declares that ‘multiculturalism constitutes a resource, which the city desires to develop’ (City of Vantaa, 2006a, p. 14).

In this context, the City of Vantaa has established a Multi-Service Office for Immigrants responsible for supporting refugees and expatriates from the former Soviet Union ‘to adapt to their new environment’ within the first one to two years after they have been officially registered as Vantaa residents. Besides focusing on this special immigrant group, the Multi-Service Office is open to all other migrants searching for help. Moreover, it provides training and consulting services to other departments and employees of the City of Vantaa who are working on immigrant-related issues. It is responsible for the future planning and development of the city’s procedures for immigrant reception (Multi-Service Office for Immigrants, 2005).

During 2004–2006 the City of Vantaa has been carrying out an employment and training project for immigrants called ‘Vasama’. The aim of Vasama, financed jointly by the Ministry of Labour, the City of Vantaa and the European Social Fund, is to ‘encourage the immigrants to become more proactive in leading their lives and to play a more active role in Finnish society’. The project consists of two parts: the section ‘Employment and Training’ focuses on adult migrants, while ‘Youth’ is intended for young adults with migration backgrounds.

The purpose of ‘Employment and Training for adult migrants’ is to support immigrants in finding employment in the Finnish labour market through training and personal guidance. The training and support in job-finding is provided by the Vantaa employment office. At a personal level, two work coaches are employed in the project to support migrants developing and establishing individual job seeking strategies and plans.

The ‘Youth’ project focuses on young immigrants who fail in the Finnish school system because of insufficient language skills, background education or for other reasons. The aim is to improve basic skills for further studies and to make young immigrants familiar with working life in Finland. The project, scheduled for one year, divides young migrants into two groups: the Oma Ura (own career) and the Startti (start) group. The Oma Ura is made up of a maximum of 16 people with decent skills in practical Finnish who attend a theoretical orientation into Finnish society and work practices at the Vantaa Vocational Institute. Startti, with a maximum of 13 young adults, aims at supporting immigrant youths to become familiar with the Finnish language and at promoting their learning in various ways. To foster their socialisation skills, club activities for young migrants are available once a week (City of Vantaa, 2006b).

In addition the City of Vantaa emphasises the role of its libraries in advancing pluralism, offering materials, events and information and promoting the establishment of ‘community-based practices’ (City of Vantaa, 2006a).

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http://www.vantaa.fi/en/i_perusdokumenti.asp?path=110;7867;36053, Date of visit: 21.2.06.

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Vienna

The population of Vienna in 2004 was 1,626,440, of which 1,333,084 were registered as Austrians and 293,356 (18.04%) were foreign citizens. As far as single nationalities are concerned, the largest immigrant group was from Serbia and Montenegro (74,370), followed by Turks (39,728) and Poles (18,258) and migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina (18,089) and Germany (18,094) (Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung 5, 2006a and 2006b).

Since 2002 the city of Vienna has provided its new citizens with an initial guide to integration in the form of a ‘welcome package’, which contains a letter on integration (Integrationsstadträfin), a city map, information on matters such as work, social insurance, childcare and schooling, health, housing, traffic and contact details for ‘prevention panels’. Moreover, a so-called ‘conversation for orientation’ (Orientierungsgespräche) has been introduced – small circles of immigrants moderated by a former migrant (Stadt Wien, 2006a).

Institutionally the city responds to the significant presence of migrants most visibly with the municipality departments (Magistratsabteilungen), MA 11 and MA 17. MA 11 coordinates cooperation with different groups and associations for families and their support. Besides German they provide help in other languages such as Turkish, Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian. Explicitly, within the project REBAS, a regional care centre was created in which teachers, social workers and two native speakers help pupils with migration backgrounds in solving problems at school, education or social demands (Stadt Wien, 2006b and 2006c). MA 17 is entrusted with the general task of integrating and promoting Vienna’s diversity policy. Founded in 2004, the department now employs some 45 people working in the fields of housing, city infrastructure, children, youth and education, health, employment matters, social relations and conflicts, and other aspects of the permanent settlement of migrants.

MA 17 is also engaged in district activities like networking, the establishment of relevant contacts and the promotion of integration projects involving various participants (Stadt Wien, 2006d). The two wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to numerous refugees entering Austria and their subsequent inadequate accommodation. As a result the Wiener Integrationshaus (integration house of Vienna) was established, a model project for the accommodation and inclusion of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. On average, 110 people can stay at the Wiener Integrationshaus, and some 500 people attend education and cultural projects every year.

In cooperation with the Wiener Kinderfreunde, the Integrationshaus has established a multilingual kindergarten, and at the national level it coordinates an EQUAL project that aims to improve the situations of migrants at work and has involved more than 500 people since it began. The Vienna Social Fund is currently the most important financier of the Wiener Integrationshaus, and around 20% of the total budget is raised through donations, events, cooperation with companies and other sources. But it should be stressed that public grants are insufficient to fund such projects, and that the operators of the Wiener Integrationshaus depend on, and have to ask for, private donations (Stadt Wien, 2006e).

The leisure and recreational activities of migrant youth has been researched by the magistrat department MA 18. In addition, the Policy Group for Integration of the City of Vienna and the city councillor for Integration, Sonja Wehsely, organised a conference in July 2005 under the patronage
of ‘Metropolis International’, ‘City: migration: integration – the role of cities and local municipalities’. On that occasion Wehsely said that Vienna’s integration policy started in the 1990s with the establishment of the city’s Integration Fund. Vienna’s integration policy, she stressed, was then modified in line with ideas of diversity management. In this context she referred to the Municipal Department (MA) 17 which was entrusted with implementing this new integration philosophy in 2004 and managed to include the subject in the urban development plan, which now contains chapters on immigration and diversity. Politicians, Wehsely said, had to consider the fears of all people involved but must also be courageous enough to deal with unpopular issues (Stadt Wien, 2006f; Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung 18, 2006).

References


Warsaw

According to the population census of 2002 almost 25% of all immigrants live in the Mazowieckie voivodship, mainly concentrated in greater Warsaw. While the total resident population is 5,069,524, foreign residents are estimated at 12,262 (0.24%). Of these, 6,481 are permanent residents and 5,781 have been granted a temporary residence permit. The main reason for the Mazowieckie voivodship being attractive to immigrants is its absorbant labour market, offering work opportunities for both highly-qualified experts and low-skilled workers. Moreover, transnational networks and migrant communities are already well established in the city, and the capital provides a better service infrastructure and access to institutions of migrant interest than peripheral areas. Although the cost of living is considerably higher in Warsaw than in other regions, recognised refugees choose to settle within the confines of the capital for these specific reasons (Korys, 2005, p. 150).

In this context, it is interesting to note that the so-called ‘new’ wave of Armenian immigrants who arrived in Poland in the early 1990s (for the most part asylum seekers fleeing the Caucasian conflicts) could benefit from the assistance of their ‘old’ diaspora members who settled in Poland during the 14th century. Their support was substantial, for instance, in helping run an ethnic school for Armenian children in Warsaw (Korys, 2005, p. 155).

In practice, however, the access of immigrants to social institutions and services in Poland is quite limited. Exceptions to this rule are made for those migrants who are granted a special status due to their historical relationship with the country (repatriates) or international legal provisions (humanitarian migrants and refugees) or because of EU legal norms (affecting EU nationals). Thus, two forms of integration policy can be identified in Poland. The first kind guarantees full access to all (or most) services at the municipal level for repatriates, refugees and EU nationals during their initial phase of integration. The second type concerns the remaining group of third-country nationals and other working forces who have to right to benefit from certain welfare provisions, but have to prove the ‘existence of durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland’ and are expected to have the ability to ‘adapt’ to the legal labour market (Korys, 2005, p. 160).

An exception to this rule relates to the education system in Poland: schools are obliged to accept all children who live on Polish territory regardless of their legal status. As a result children of parents holding an irregular status are enabled to attend public primary schools, in line with the so-called ‘educational obligation’. Nevertheless, in recent years evidence suggests that some heads of schools have been reluctant to integrate pupils with migration backgrounds, especially children of irregular migrants or refugees who evidently need additional effort, due to traumatic experiences, educational gaps or poor Polish literacy.

So in 2001 the Ministry of Education decided that pupils of foreign background were entitled to two hours of additional language training per week (for a maximum period of one year), provided by the school and financed by the local authorities. Moreover, a decreasing birth rate for Polish children and the movement of Poles from the city centre to the suburbs, leading to a reduction in full-time teaching positions, have driven schools in Warsaw to reconsider their approach to migrant students and to accept them more willingly (Korys, 2005, pp. 161–2).

References

The European countries and cities presented in this overview paper have very different migration histories and experiences. They follow different philosophies of integration and have distinctive ways of implementing concrete integration measures both at the national and at the local level. This conclusion contains some summarising comparisons.10

National integration policies differ enormously. In no European country do these modes of immigrant integration result from a consciously planned, systematic and goal-oriented national integration strategy. They are the outcome of the history and dominant characteristics of the national institutions engaged in integration work. National integration policies are first of all determined by basic socio-structural principles and institutions or by the social order of a country. Examples would be the German Soziale Marktwirtschaft or French étatism and republicanism. The way in which a country normally tries to secure cohesion and to solve social and economic problems will also be used when integrating migrants.

Second, the sense of nationhood plays a crucial role: constitutive principles of an idea of nation, especially criteria for membership and inclusion, are of major relevance for policies of citizenship and naturalisation in relation to immigrants. Third, national integration policies are determined by the societal definition of the immigrant situation, i.e. the understanding of the ‘nature’ of the ongoing immigration and integration process. These differences manifest themselves in different linguistic terms for those coming in as ‘foreigners’, ‘immigrants’, ‘migrants’ or ‘ethnic minorities’ (c.f. also the concept paper on integration, mentioned in the introduction). A short overview of the philosophies and tendencies in Europe follows.

In France we find a republican model of assimilationist integration: a culturally unifying, universal model that does not give minority cultures a place in public space. Intégration à la française does not mean that cultural differences are not tolerated, but it is linked to the tradition of political nation-building since the foundation of the Republic and aims at a culturally-homogenous nation. However, there is a difference between this ‘model’ as a normative standard and how ‘real’ integration policies work, especially at the local level.

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were willing to retain the cultural differences and ethnic identities of migrants. This multiculturalism, with its official recognition and support of ethnic minorities, could be regarded as the opposite of French republican universalism. In the UK integration policies are predominantly defined as anti-discrimination policies; the legal backbone of such policies are Race Relations Acts. In the Netherlands, the integration policy is influenced by the tradition of ‘consociational’ democracy. Following the murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and the impact of 9/11, the idea of multiculturalism is becoming less popular and less predominant in both countries, especially in the Netherlands.

Another group consists of Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries: the main feature of their mode of integration has been the inclusion of immigrants into the general welfare state and social policy system. Compared with that, special policies for migrant integration have much less relevance at the national level. Nevertheless, there are many special integration measures at the

10 In profound scientific research on integration policy, three levels have to be considered: legal framework of immigration and integration policy; integration policy and policy discourse, and practical implementation of integration policies. Because this paper was written in the beginning of the CLIP-project that will analyse these aspects, we can not yet evaluate the approaches with an in-depth analysis.
local level. In Germany, for instance, they are mainly offered by welfare organisations. Belgium could be included in this group; but it is marked by the coexistence of the Walloon individual rights approach, comparable to the French integration philosophy, and the Flemish pluralistic model.

The immigration situation in Southern Europe is characterised by large numbers of illegal migrants and ensuing amnesties. Because immigration is a new phenomenon, national consistent integration policies are still absent. NGOs play an important role; they offer language courses and information as well as trainings for mediators etc.

In the Eastern European countries, emigration is more important than immigration. They are now just becoming countries of immigration as well. So integration policy is still in a fledging state. In these countries we can find several formal regulations with little, or only intermittent, implementation through local initiatives. Due to their structural changes they have other urgent priorities in home affairs.

In spite of the national differences, there are also processes of convergence and Europeanisation of integration policy. During the 1980s or 1990s most countries eased juridical access to citizenship. Old immigration countries like the UK and France have always made some room for the *jus soli*; but the new German citizenship law (which came into effect in 2000) also introduced some elements of *jus soli* and has eased naturalisation. The opposition of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* is becoming increasingly obsolete.

In all European countries migrants with long-term residence permits have the same economic and social rights as natives. All countries give the right of family reunion to migrants and all countries have – in principle – opened the core institutions of their societies to the migrants, e.g. education and health services. Convergence and Europeanisation of migration and integration policies are presently accelerated by the direct intervention of the European Union. Directives against discrimination in the labour market and against racist and xenophobic discrimination are examples of this trend.

European countries generally follow policies of acculturation and all countries have realised that education at school is the main instrument for integrating children of international migrants. Convergence consists not only of what one does in a common or similar way, but may also consist of what one does not do; and no European states have embarked on policies of positive discrimination like affirmative action.

In summary, there are strong convergent tendencies in European countries but national differences remain. These national particularities have an influence on integration policy at the local level: what municipalities are able and allowed to do depends on the general degree of political, legal and financial autonomy that they have within national constitutional structures. Municipalities are further influenced by their general national integration philosophies. The Czech Republic, for instance, gives low priority to an integration strategy, so Prague is not implementing integration measures to a great extent.

Spain, in contrast, has become conscious of the new immigration situation and the need for an integration policy; in 2005 Madrid launched a strategic integration plan with overall objectives and a clear set of working areas and instruments. Another example of national influence relates to self-perception and respecting measures. The United Kingdom is known for its multicultural and
pluralistic stance with a main focus on the civic self-organisation of migrant groups and enforcement of fairness principles. Following this philosophy, Birmingham created a community relations council and committed itself to ethnic monitoring and equal opportunity employment.

However, what a city is actually doing depends not only on the national context, but also on its migration situation, the composition of its immigrant population (country of origin, socio-economic status, duration of stay etc.) as well as of its definition of the immigrant situation and understanding of the position of the migrants in the city.

So, in spite of the fact that cities are influenced by the national context, there are also municipalities that do not fit into the categories described above. One example of these differences is Frankfurt am Main: while the illusion of the temporariness of ‘guest-worker’ residence was prevalent in Germany, Frankfurt created the Office for Multicultural Affairs. This city can be seen as a front-runner for a specific integration policy. Another example of a divergence between national and local self-perception is Paris: instead of pursuing the typical French universalistic, colour-blind philosophy, the French capital implemented a pluralistic approach.

For deeper analyses of local integration policies, cities’ awareness of an immigration situation and of the necessity for an integration policy is a relevant factor. Furthermore, cities’ self-perception and intention (multicultural or cultural homogenous city), their preference for special versus general integration measures, and the organisational structure within the city, have to be considered.

But regardless of the municipal self-perception, organisational structure and other local factors, several common challenges affect most cities. Matters of particular importance are the amelioration of housing conditions and residential concentration as well as the improvement of diversity both in democratic bodies and municipal administration.

In conclusion, while there are strong tendencies towards convergence within European cities, important national differences still remain. The aim should not be to create one ‘European way of integration’, but to use the different European experiences to learn from each other and promote the integration of immigrants in every city.
## Annex

### City profiles

### Population structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>% of nationals born abroad</th>
<th>% of non-EU nationals</th>
<th>% of non-EU moved into the city (past two years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>738,763</td>
<td>347,218</td>
<td>18.1 (47%)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>374,940</td>
<td>27,633</td>
<td>2.0 (7.4%)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>300,000–380,000 (30–38%)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>186,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Over 3,000,000</td>
<td>453,872</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>64,000–160,000 (8%–20%)</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>2,120,000</td>
<td>(307,400) (14.5%)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>1,169,106</td>
<td>76,764</td>
<td>5.6 (6.5%)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>750,348</td>
<td>150,069</td>
<td>10.8 (20%)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>592,028</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vantaa</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>1,624,440</td>
<td>293,356</td>
<td>9.8 (18.04%)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>5,069,524</td>
<td>12,262</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Urban Audit, city publications. Most recent data available since 2001.
### Employment structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Demographic dependency index (&lt;20-&gt;65/20–64)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Ratio employment/population of working age (%)</th>
<th>Self-employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Proportion of part-time employment (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>48,39</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>78,36</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>62,16</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>65,98</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>49,52</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>57,83</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>71,50</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>50,75</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>55,15</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>57,09</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>55,23</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Income and expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Annual GDP per head</th>
<th>Average annual rent per m² for an apartment</th>
<th>Annual expenditure of the municipal authority per resident</th>
<th>Proportion of households with children aged 0–17 (%)</th>
<th>Number of children 0–4 years in day care per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>38,896,72 €</td>
<td>58,00 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>288,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>25,019,23 €</td>
<td>92,00 €</td>
<td>2,137,57 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>765,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>49,876,12 €</td>
<td>78,98 €</td>
<td>2,227,22 €</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>211,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>68,48,45 €</td>
<td>94,60 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>449.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>749,93 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>441.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Marseille</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,642,84 €</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<td>Paris</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>2,145,42 €</td>
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<td>Prague</td>
<td>14,860,28 €</td>
<td>55,56 €</td>
<td>585,76 €</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>390.0</td>
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<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>50,355,33 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>651.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>36,844,39 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,487,01 €</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>408.3</td>
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Sources: Urban Audit.
Local integration policies for migrants in Europe

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The economic, social and cultural integration of migrants represents both a challenge and an opportunity for all Member States of the European Union. Many of the challenges have to be dealt with at local level. Cities and local authorities have a vital role to play, not only in the implementation of integration policies, but also in the development of innovative policies on housing, education and cultural diversity. This report looks at immigration flows in 12 countries and 14 cities in Europe, documenting the historical and legal framework, assimilation patterns and measures taken to foster integration. It highlights several initiatives of an innovative nature which are aimed at encouraging immigrants to participate in their new community and could help to eliminate social inequalities and discrimination.

The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions is a tripartite EU body, whose role is to provide key actors in social policymaking with findings, knowledge and advice drawn from comparative research. The Foundation was established in 1975 by Council Regulation EEC No. 1365/75 of 26 May 1975.